

Swedish Support under the Montreal Protocol

- the Ozone Layer Protection Programme

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and Economic Co-operation**

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Sida Evaluation 03/26

**Department for
Infrastructure and Economic
Co-operation**

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Abbreviations

A5C Article 5	Country, in other words a developing country operating under the approximately ten year grace period of the Montreal Protocol
CAP	Compliance Assistance Programme
CFC	chlorofluorocarbons
CTC	carbon tetrachloride (tetrachloromethane)
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ExCom	the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
HCFC	hydrochlorofluorocarbons
LFA	log-frame matrix/analysis or logical framework analysis
MAC	Mobile Air-Conditioner
MF	Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
MP	Montreal Protocol
NCPP	National CFC Phase-out Plan
NOU	National Ozone Unit
ODP	Ozone Depleting Potential
ODS	Ozone Depleting Substances
ODSONET	ODS-Officer Network
RMP	Refrigerant Management Plan
RNC	Regional Network Coordinator
SCMEF	Sub-committee on Monitoring, Evaluation and Finance
SCPR	Sub-committee on Project Review
SEAP	South East Asia and the Pacific
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TCA	methyl chloroform (1,1,1-TriChloroethAne)
ToR	terms of reference
UD	The (Swedish) Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet)
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
WB	World Bank

1. Executive Summary

This executive summary sets out the findings and recommendations of the evaluation of the three Sida-funded contributions to the Montreal Protocol. The findings are based on our research, which is largely based on interviews with various stakeholders in Sweden and abroad, as well as on study of documents received from Sida.

These three Sida-funded contributions are:

- The Stockholm Environment Institute’s (SEI) support as advisers to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in ExCom and other work related to the Montreal Protocol.
- The Swedish bilateral Ozone layer Protection Programme implemented and co-ordinated by SEI
- The regional network for the National Ozone Units (NOUs) in South East Asia and the Pacific, ODSOINET/SEAP, implemented by UNEP in Paris and regionally through a co-ordinator at UNEP’s Regional Office for Asia/Pacific in Bangkok.

The overall objective of the Swedish bilateral cooperation programme is to support development in the areas of critical importance for sustainable and costefficient phase out of ODS, according to the ToR of this evaluation. This implies i.a.:

- Development of efficient implementation procedures
- A holistic approach to use environmentally sound technologies
- Addressing widespread and small-scale use of ODS.

Before discussing the findings a short background and introduction is made to describe the linkages between the three contributions that are evaluated.

All countries which contribute to the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol have the right to use up to a 20% quota of their contribution to the Fund for their own bilateral projects. The Swedish bilateral projects – so far 2 completed and 5 ongoing – are implemented and co-ordinated by the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI). The projects follow the 1997 Sida Guidelines for the Swedish Bilateral Programme under the Montreal Protocol. These Guidelines focus on increasing developing-country ownership of the phase-out with necessary institutional build up and programmes.

The SEI also supports and advises the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund (ExCom), which is the body set up to administer the Fund. The Executive Committee must approve projects financed by the Fund, including donor countries’ own projects in the 20% quota.

Apart from Swedish financing through the Fund, Sweden has funded the first ODS-officers Network in the South-East Asia/Pacific region (ODSOINET/ SEAP), through its own independent bilateral assistance for ten years.

These three contributions are intertwined and the evaluation’s overall purpose is to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the present programme and to create a basis for Sida to decide on the needs and type of further support in coming project periods.

The overall evaluation is that the Swedish contribution has been very useful in the global ODS phaseout work. However, a number of recommendations are proposed with the aim of making the work more effective and efficient. An important issue is that the Swedish resource base for working with ODS phaseout in developing countries is fairly small. The present arrangements entail a very high dependence on SEI, which has developed a unique competence in Sweden concerning this work.

1.1 SEI support to the Foreign Ministry in ExCom

The evaluators make the following conclusions and recommendations regarding SEI's support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other related activities.

1. That SEI has fulfilled its consultancies with zeal and competence with regard to the Ministry and other stakeholders.
2. That SEI has acquired a competence which seems to be difficult to replace, and that it is consequently difficult to find a more competitive advisor in Sweden. A strong synergy exists between the support to the Foreign Ministry in ExCom and SEI's work with the Swedish bilateral Ozone layer Protection Programme. Consequently, the Ministry gains much from this cooperation and therefore, these consultations should continue.
3. It is recommended that the procedure should be formalized whereby the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sida, the Swedish EPA and SEI hold preparatory meetings three times a year in phase with the ExCom meetings. It is also recommended that one of the authorities, e.g. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, should be formally charged with calling the other parties to the meetings.
4. It is recommended that Sweden, in co-ordination with the holder of the "EFTA constituency" seat, should make greater lobbying efforts concerning policy issues before the ExCom meetings.
5. It is recommended that Sweden should, in co-ordination with the holder of the "EFTA constituency" seat, explore the possibility of having an informal ExCom policy development workshop once a year with other European Union member countries.
6. It is recommended that SEI together with Sida should find suitable methods based on the LFA to provide financial statements regarding SEI's support to the Ministry regarding ExCom.
7. It is recommended that a document be prepared describing the Swedish stance at ExCom and what the roles of the main Swedish parties involved in ExCom's work shall be.

1.2 The Swedish Bilateral Ozone Layer Protection Programme

It is difficult to make an overall assessment of the projects within the Swedish bilateral programme. One reason is that only two projects have been completed, another is that the ultimate objective of the Swedish bilateral projects is to influence other projects financed by the Multilateral Fund, and it is not easy to distinguish their input from a host of other factors that influence the MF projects. However, it is clear that SEI have carried out the Swedish bilateral program with competence and that SEI is much respected by other stakeholders for their work.

The Swedish bilateral ODS phase-out programme is guided by Sida's guidelines for this programme, from 1997. There is no LFA in these guidelines or in the ToR for the programme, which is a disadvantage for the effective formulation and evaluation of projects. Furthermore, the guidelines are not up-to-date, as there have been many changes in the policy environment of ODS phase-out projects since the guidelines were formulated.

The main Swedish strengths appear to lie in the areas of refrigerant management, import/export control systems and networking. Outside these areas, the Swedish resource base concerning ODS phase-out appears to be very limited.

Through budgetary reallocations it would probably be possible, within the same total Swedish budget for ODS phase-out support, to establish some direct, independent Swedish bilateral projects to complement the Swedish projects under the ExCom bilateral quota. The advantage with this would be the possibility to more directly design some projects according to Swedish priorities and to carry them out more rapidly; the disadvantage would be that the impact (“echoing effect”) on ExCom through gaining approval at ExCom meetings would be lost.

The total overhead costs for the Swedish bilateral programme are high compared to the overhead costs of the multilateral implementing agencies. These costs include costs for administration, project identification, project preparation and project support to consultants. These costs are partly due to a high level of ambition. They can be motivated if the Swedish projects are examples that influence many other ExCom projects.

The evaluators make the following recommendations regarding the Swedish Bilateral Ozone Layer Protection Programme:

1. Revised guidelines, with a log-frame matrix, should be prepared for the bilateral support programme in order to clarify more particularly what Sweden can and should achieve. The LFA should be an aid in the preparation and evaluation of the bilateral support. The revised guidelines should take into account developments and policy changes since the original Guidelines were formulated in 1997.
2. The guidelines should specify the types of projects that should be given priority by Sida/SEI. Priorities should be based on what is important for Sweden to influence in ExCom and the Implementing Agencies, and focus on Sweden’s comparative advantages, *i.e.* refrigerant management, import/export control systems and networking.
3. The revised guidelines will need to be reviewed on a regular basis in order to take into account developments in ExCom etc., at least once every three years (corresponding to the business plan period).
4. Sida should institute procedures for more control and review by SEI and Sida of the use of SEI’s funding from Sida. SEI, in co-ordination with Sida, should have a procedure to more regularly review the situation and prioritize among project ideas on the basis of the guidelines compared with the costs so far, and the anticipated costs, for each project idea.
5. This prioritization should include both the choice of how much effort to put into a project, as well as an analysis of whether the project should be carried out under ExCom rules or as an independent bilateral project:
6. Projects which after a thorough analysis are judged to have great importance to be put through ExCom in order to influence ExCom practice – as well as having a reasonable probability of being approved – should be channelled through the 20 % quota.
7. For other projects, urgency and Swedish control may be more important. For instance, it may be most valuable for projects which have a high degree of learning and capacity building for the Article 5 country, that they start on an early basis. Thus it is recommended that room should be created for independent projects (direct bilateral support). If Sida does not wish to increase the total budget for Montreal Protocol support, support to ODSNET/SEAP could probably be switched over to being financed over the 20 % quota, while the equivalent resources could then be liberated for other, independent Swedish bilateral support.

8. A strategy-development process should also look at other ways of influencing the outcome of MF-financed projects, by financing more active Swedish involvement and influence directly in the policy-making of the dominant multilateral implementing agencies, e.g. through
 - seconded staff or internships at multilateral implementing agencies,
 - high-level contacts with multilateral implementing agencies
 - support to the Swedish resource base to get contracts with the multilateral implementing agencies

1.3 The ODSONET/SEAP Network

Although networking is difficult to evaluate in numerical terms, the fact that the concept of regional networks has spread to cover virtually the whole globe from the original Swedish initiative in South-East Asia can be seen as a ringing endorsement of its perceived value. Furthermore, one thing all our interviewed stakeholders have been unanimous about has been the immense value of the Networks and of Sweden's great contribution to bringing them about. However, there also needs to be a pragmatic understanding that in some of the leastdeveloped countries, the ODS phase-out cannot be expected to be a national priority, so the level of commitment will vary.

The evaluators make the following recommendations regarding ODSONET/ SEAP:

1. That support to the ODSONET/SEAP should continue and resources should be secured for continued Swedish participation in the Network.
2. The existing LFA should be used, maybe modified, but it must be allowed to use subjective verifications and subjective assessments of the various results and objectives.
3. Swedish experiences are a very important contribution. However, it is also important that Sweden participates in a supporting role – it is the ideas and perspectives of the Article-5 countries, which must dominate.
4. If Sweden wishes to have more resources in the ODS-phase-out area that are freely disposable rather than bound to ExCom rules, it would probably be possible to transfer the funding of the ODSONET/SEAP to the Swedish bilateral quota of 20 % of funding to MF. This should in the first instance only be done if the Network would continue to cover approximately the same area, and not be merged with other regions.
5. Sweden should, together with other experienced developed countries, initiate a discussion regarding financing of new networks. Cooperation with the EU and interested individual countries to instigate a network covering approximately the Confederation of Independent States could be of vital importance to secure the success of the Montreal Protocol.

2. Background

2.1 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

2.1.1 Introduction

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (hereinafter referred to as the MP) is considered to be a landmark multilateral international agreement that was signed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. The MP obliges the Parties to protect the ozone layer by taking measures to control equitable total global emissions of substances that deplete the ozone layer with the ultimate objective of eliminating these substances. The Protocol was originally signed in 1987 and amended in London 1990, Copenhagen 1992, Montreal 1997 and Beijing 1999. The Protocol entered into force January 1, 1989 and has now been ratified by 185 parties.¹ The amendments strengthen the targets either with earlier phase-out schedules or by adding new ODS to be controlled.

The Montreal Protocol stipulates that the production and consumption of compounds that deplete ozone in the stratosphere are to be phased out in accordance with an agreed schedule. These substances include chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl bromide and methyl chloroform as well as hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). Together, they are often referred to by the acronym ODS – ozone-depleting substances. Developing countries are given a grace period of approximately ten years compared with the phase-out schedule of the industrialized countries.

Once emitted to the atmosphere, these compounds significantly deplete the stratospheric ozone layer that protects the earth from harmful UV-B radiation. The “ozone hole” forms over the Antarctic every winter, and has varied between 20 to 29 million square km during the last decade. Ozone depletion over Europe and other high latitudes in the northern hemisphere varies between 5 % to 30 % in the spring.

2.1.2 Characteristics of the MP

The MP stipulates a difference in relation to phasing out of ODS between developing and industrialized countries. At the time of the signing of the MP, ODS had gained widespread usage in the areas of refrigeration and airconditioning, aerosols, foam production, electronics, metal finishing, dry cleaning and fire extinguishing. However, the major manufacturers and consumers of ODS were industrialized countries, whereas in developing countries the per capita consumption was low but increasing. It was recognized that developing countries would be increasing their consumption and hence also emissions of ODS, the use of these substances being inherently linked to economic development and an improving standard of living.

It was considered that premature restrictions on access to ODS would lead to economic disadvantages for the developing countries – which were the least responsible for the depletion to date of ozone in the stratosphere.

An increased use of ODS was particularly foreseen in air-conditioning and refrigeration for domestic use in developing countries, as well as in growing exports for products made with or containing ODS e.g. in the refrigeration and electronics sector.

¹ Out of 200 member states of the United Nations. Not all the Parties to the Protocol have ratified all the amendments.

In order to enable developing countries to meet their needs during the transitional period, Article 5 of the MP provided for a ten-year period that permits these countries to defer compliance with the control measures stipulated in Article 2 of the Protocol. Article 5 of the MP also urges industrialised countries to provide financial and technological assistance to developing countries to assist them in their phase-out programmes and to encourage them to replace harmful technologies and processes.

Furthermore, a provision under Article 2 permitted developed countries to increase their production an agreed percentage for the purpose of meeting the basic domestic needs of Article 5 countries. However, the production levels in industrialised and developing countries changed significantly since the original agreement, and in 1995 the Parties agreed to enable also developing countries to export ODS to other developing countries.

2.1.3 Access to alternatives

Access to safe and ozone-friendly alternatives is necessary for a successful phase-out of ODS. This is relevant for both developing and industrialised countries. Furthermore, the rapid phase out in industrialised countries' markets implies that industry trying to export to those markets often has to move ahead of the allowed 10 years grace period. Mostly, large reductions in emissions could be achieved quickly through improved practices (e.g. better maintenance of refrigeration equipment to reduce leaks). In other cases, alternatives were available (e.g. water for fixed systems for fire extinguishing). In some cases the alternatives were not readily available and needed to be developed and distributed. Developing countries with industries that had invested in ODS technology needed access to new technologies on terms that they could afford.

2.1.4 Common but differentiated responsibility

Conclusion of the MP implies that Governments have agreed that the protection of the ozone layer would require concerted efforts by all countries, parties to the Protocol. However, the ability to contribute would be linked to the technology and institutional capability of the specific country and that some Parties were considered to be in a special situation.

The original Protocol addressed these issues in Article 5 (Specific Situations of Developing Countries) paragraph 2 and 3, together with article 10 (Technical Assistance) paragraph 1 and 2.

Although those provisions of the Protocol have been amended, their intent remains the same – namely, those developing countries whose consumption of controlled substances is less than 0.3 kg per capita at the date of entry into force of the Protocol, are able to defer for a period their obligations regarding control measures. Furthermore, those same countries should have access to the funding through the Multilateral Fund (see below). However, even though the phase-out schedule may differ for the developing and industrialised world, the objective is the same, namely to phase out ODS.

2.1.5 The Financial Mechanism, The Multilateral Fund (MF) and the Executive Committee (ExCom).

At the 1990 London meeting – the second Meeting of the Parties – the Parties accepted that the Financial Mechanism should be based on common but differentiated responsibility and that developing countries need assistance so that the phase-out process should not affect their fragile economies. It provides for financial and technical assistance and an information clearinghouse to enable these countries to meet the commitments set forth in the MP.

The MF is a dominant instrument of the Financial Mechanism. It meets the incremental costs of the developing countries (known as Article 5 countries or A5Cs in the context of the Montreal

Protocol) transition from ozone-depleting technology to ozone-friendly technology. In doing so the funding is also intended as an incentive for an early shift away from ODS. The fund promotes technological change through sustainable transition towards the use of environmentally safe products, materials and equipment.

Funding is also provided for Country Program preparation, Institutional Strengthening, Project Preparation, Technical Assistance, Training and Demonstration.

The second Meeting of the Parties established the Executive Committee (Ex- Com) to develop and monitor the implementation of operational policies, guidelines and administrative arrangements, including the disbursement of resources for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Multilateral Fund.

Countries to sit on the ExCom are selected on the basis of a balanced representation of countries that are Parties to the Protocol. Consequently, seven developing and seven industrialized countries are members of ExCom. The ExCom meets three times a year.

The implementing agencies of the MF projects are the World Bank, UNDP, UNIDO and UNEP. They submit business plans and project proposals to ExCom for approval.

Up to 20% of each country's financial contribution to the MF can be used directly for bilateral cooperation, instead of going through the four multilateral implementing agencies. However, ExCom still must approve the projects. Over the years, ExCom has built up a vast body of regulations that all projects must fulfil, including the bilateral projects.

Much of the decision-making in ExCom is de-facto carried out by two subcommittees. The subcommittee on Monitoring, Evaluation and Finance (SCMEF) and the sub-committee on Project review (SCPR) meet during the two days prior to each ExCom meeting.

The Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund has administrative duties and responsibilities but also an important role as it advises ExCom and its subcommittees.

2.2 Swedish support under the Montreal Protocol

The overall objective of the Swedish support under the Montreal Protocol is to support the process in developing countries in areas of critical importance for a sustainable and cost-efficient phase-out of ODS. As stated in the ToR for this evaluation, this implies:

- An integral approach, using the development systems for efficient implementation procedures, as a spearhead for environmental control and monitoring in general. Examples of such systems for control and monitoring of the use of ODS are legislation, customs control, educational schemes and accreditation schemes.
- A holistic approach to use environmentally sound technologies, covering all environmental effects. One aim is to tackle the emerging use of transitional alternatives, such as HCFC (which has an ozone depleting potential lower than CFC but still significant, and has high global warming potential, like CFC).
- Addressing the widespread and small-scale use of ODS, particularly in the refrigerant servicing sector, not only large sources. Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), taken together, have a large share of the total contribution.

The Swedish support is also based on the assumption that successful approaches applied during the Swedish phase-out can be useful in other regions.

The Swedish support consists of three parts. These are described as three contributions or projects within the overall MP support programme and are the subject of the present evaluation. These contributions are:

- The Stockholm Environment Institute’s support as advisers to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in ExCom and other work related to the Montreal Protocol.
- The Swedish Bilateral Ozone Layer Protection Programme, consisting of projects financed within the 20 % quota allowed under MF-rules and implemented by SEI
- The ODSINET/SEAP regional network between the National Ozone Units (NOUs) in South-East Asia and the Pacific, implemented by UNEP in Paris and regionally through a co-ordinator at UNEP’s Regional Office for Asia/Pacific in Bangkok.

Costs are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below.

The support from the MF is basically not intended as “development aid” but as a financing mechanism of developing countries’ incremental costs for phase-out of ODS. However, Sweden’s approach is that an important goal of development aid, namely capacity building, also is important for the phase-out. It is also apparent from our interviews with many Swedish stakeholders that they consider it to be reasonable to see the MF-support also as a support to the overall capacity building for environmental issues in developing countries. This view is not shared equally by all members of ExCom – these different attitudes constitute an important background to some of the difficult issues in ExCom.

Table 1: Approximate cost figures and comparative data concerning different parts of the Swedish support for the ODS phase-out in developing countries

Project/support area	Time-frame of cited cost	Cost
SEI’s support to UD in ExCom	~ June 1999 – July 2002 ²	1.18 MSEK
Multilateral Fund budget	2000 – 2002	440 MUSD
Swedish contribution to the Multilateral Fund	2000 – 2002	5.45 MUSD
20 % of the above, available for Swedish bilateral projects	2000 – 2002	1.09 MUSD
Funding approved by ExCom for Swedish bilateral projects	1999 – 2002	1.30 MUSD
Financing to SEI for work with the Swedish bilateral projects	July 1999 – Sept 2002	5.65 MSEK
Swedish funding to UNEP for ODSINET/SEAP	1990 – 2000	~ 20 MSEK
Swedish funding to UNEP for ODSINET/SEAP	2001 – 2002	4.6 MSEK

Table 2: Swedish bilateral projects (in shared projects, the figure given is the Swedish contribution)

Project	cost (USD)
Regional workshop for the SEAP Region on Import/Export controls	63 000
Preparation of Government Strategy to reduce and eliminate the use of CFC refrigerants for servicing in the Philippines.	141 000
ODS/Customs officers cooperation in the SEAP region.	250 000
Import and export licensing system in Lao PDR.	55 000
Preparation of an Update of Refrigerant Management Plan in Croatia.	17 000
Halon Management Plan for Thailand.	226 000
National CFC Phase-out plan for the Philippines.	385 000

² 10 meetings plus policy documents.

2.2.1 A note on terminology regarding “bilateral support”

There is some ambiguity in the use of the general term Swedish Bilateral Programme, as it sometimes refers solely to the projects implemented by SEI and run within the 20 % quota allowed under MF-rules, whereas very similar terms sometimes refer to all three Sida funded contributions for ODS phase-out described above.

Consequently, when reference is made in this report to the three parts together, they are referred as “the Swedish Support under the Montreal Protocol”. The term “Bilateral Programme” is reserved for bilateral projects financed under Sweden’s 20 % quota under the Multilateral Fund.

Projects which are financed by Sweden but do not go through the 20 % quota of the Multilateral Fund are called “direct bilateral projects” in this report.

3. The Evaluation: Methodology

3.1 Reasons for the Evaluation

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, economic and financial viability, and sustainability of the Swedish MP support. The focus of the evaluation is on efficiency and effectiveness of the support, in order to create a foundation for Sida's decision-making regarding the forthcoming project periods. The evaluation focuses on the period of 1999 to 2002.

The ToR of this evaluation indicates that the direct influence will be in Sida's decision-making process for further support in the area, but that the benefits of the evaluation should also be specific improvements of activities in the field.

3.2 Approaches and Methods

Important Swedish and international stakeholders were interviewed based on questionnaires that were tailored to meet the objectives in the three contributions. The issues are so variegated and the various stakeholders have such different roles and experiences of different parts of the areas evaluated, that it has not been possible to ask the same questions to any significant number of stakeholders. It has therefore not been able to get answers that are presented in a statistical manner, i.e. number of answers with one point, two points etc.

The evaluators attended the meeting of the Ozone Officers on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the SEAP Network, which was held in Stockholm 7–11 October 2002. At that meeting the Ozone Officers were interviewed.

A field trip to Rome was conducted in order to interview international stakeholders at the 38th ExCom meeting and at the same time study the procedures and methods of the ExCom and the role of the Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund. At the same time, SEI's advisory functions and lobbying activities were studied.

A list of interviewed persons is enclosed as Annex 2 to the report.

Documents in general – programme proposals, reports etc – have been examined and analysed.

The evaluators have assessed and described factors critical to success and failure. Obstacles have been analysed concerning if and how they can be avoided or if they are inevitable.

A seminar was held at Sida on the 9th of December 2002 to discuss a draft version of this evaluation report. At the seminar the Swedish Stakeholders were invited to discuss the report and to give comments on the draft.

4. The SEI support as advisers to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

4.1 General remarks

There is a shared responsibility in Sweden for different issues under the MP. For European Union member states, most issues concerning the MP are regulated at the EU level, through EU regulation (2037/00). Financial issues – i.e. the Financial Mechanism of the Protocol – are within each country's own national competence. In Sweden, the Ministry of the Environment has the overall political responsibility whereas the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for financial issues and the linkage to development cooperation.

The Swedish EPA is the national “Focal point” for the Montreal Protocol and is responsible for its implementation, including data reporting. The Swedish EPA is responsible for technical issues at the Meetings of the Parties to the Protocol, and also advises the Ministry of Environment on policy issues at the meetings. Furthermore, the Swedish EPA is the representative of Sweden at the ODSNET/SEAP Network meetings.

Sida is responsible for the support to the developing countries relating to ODS phase-out.³

This report does not focus on the relationships among the Swedish stakeholders and how their roles should be strengthened with regard to the MP.

4.2 SEI's support

The ToR for the present evaluation states:

“the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI) has been advisers to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in their work in ExCom for several years. The Ministry paid SEI for these services from 1997 until November 2001 and after that Sida has financed this support. The SEI adviser reads a considerable amount of the papers to be presented at the three ExCom meetings per year and is supposed to identify strategic and important issues. The adviser is also present at the ExCom meetings and the preparatory meetings”.

SEI has also implemented the Swedish bilateral Ozone layer Protection Programme on behalf of Sida. Since that part constitutes a separate component of this evaluation (see section 5 below) it is not commented on here. It should be noted, however, that both parts/components are inherently linked to each other and that the Ministry consequently benefits from the synergy of both components.

4.3 SEI's advisory role and contractual obligations

From 1997 to 1999 the consultancies between the Ministry and SEI were commissioned on an *ad hoc* basis. The consultancies are not specified in any detail.⁴ During the course of cooperation, the framework for the consultancies were formulated and in UD Promemoria 1998-03-17 the roles of the parties in ExCom are specified. However, the consultancies between the Ministry and SEI

³ Montrealprotokollet/Arbetsplan för år 2002 (rev 5). //Vi bör ange en ”utgivare”//

⁴ Uppdragsavtal datumet omöjligt att läsa 1997, 1997-10-16, 1997-11-10, 1998-03-19.

continued to be commissioned on an *ad hoc* basis – call on agreements.⁵ A framework agreement was signed between the Ministry and SEI 2000-06-16, valid until 2001-06-30.

SEI signed an agreement with Sida in July 1999. That agreement regulated SEI's role as implementing agency for Sida with regard to the programmes channelled through the 20% quota. The ToR for the agreement between Sida and SEI, dated 1999-04-29, and the later framework agreement are sparse in their comments relating to the consultancies between SEI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The ToR stipulates that costs for advice relating to Sida/SEI shall not be mixed with other resources assigned, i.e. SEI's role as experts vis-à-vis the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Ex-Com. The ToR from 1999 also mentions that if the consultant (SEI) assesses a need for such a relation – between SEI and the Ministry – to be established it is upon the consultant to specify how such a separation of functions shall be established.⁶

The above-mentioned framework agreement signed 2000-06-16 between SEI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not stipulate in any detail the role of the consultant. Neither does SEI's proposal in any detail specify the consultancies.⁷ As requested by Sida, SEI's Programme proposal (Extension of INECINFRA- 635-99) indicates that as of 2002 this activity – provide assistance to the Swedish delegation during two ExCom meetings – is proposed to be included in the assignment to administer the Bilateral Programme under the Montreal Protocol.⁸ The contract has been prolonged until 30 June 2003⁹ and further activities between the Ministry and the SEI. The activities in the call on agreement – between the Ministry and SEI – have now been subsumed in the contract between Sida and SEI.

Furthermore, the various SEI proposals for SEI consultation have been tailored in line with the guidelines set forth by the Ministry in Promemoria 1998-03-17. This document can together with other essential documents be seen as a fundamental document – or guidelines – stipulating the Swedish stance with regard to ExCom. In this particular case the role between the Ministry and the SEI is stipulated. The document makes clear that Sweden has a long-sighted approach in its bilateral cooperation and that focus shall be put on strengthening the developing countries' own capacity. The document makes reference to noninvestment projects and indicates furthermore that in the wake of this Swedish approach, other European countries have in their bilateral cooperation followed the Swedish approach. However, the document makes reference to the fact that this approach has to be followed systematically and that further negotiations with the ExCom remain.

The evaluators recommend that a revised guideline document be presented that develops and updates the Swedish stance at ExCom and what the roles of the involved Swedish parties shall be.

SEI has throughout its cooperation with the Ministry and in its bilateral programmes, extended and developed these ambitions set forth in the guidelines.¹⁰

⁵ See UDs förfrågan om uppdragsbeskrivning, 2000-10-18, SEIs Avropsavtal för konsulttjänster ang. Montrealprotokollets Multilateral Fond – uppdragsbeskrivning betr. ExCom 32 (UD/GC brev 200010-18) and UDs Avropsavtal för konsulttjänster ang. Montrealprotokollets Multilateral Fond.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Anbud å konsulttjänster för möten angående användningen av Montrealprotokollets multilateral fond. (UG/GCs uppdragsbeskrivning 1999-12-10) SEI 12 januari 2000.

⁸ SEI Programme Proposal November 2001, s. 8.

⁹ Letter dated 19 November 2001.

¹⁰ Program Proposal entitled "Consulting Services for Co-ordination and administration of the Swedish Bilateral Programme under the Montreal Protocol including activities related to the Executive Committee, Extension of INEC-INFRA-635-99, January 2002–30 June 2003.

It has not been difficult to assess if SEI has *succeeded in giving the Ministry concrete proposals relating to policy options in ExCom*

SEI has established a team that reflects both zeal and competence. They have extensive knowledge in all subject matter areas related to the MP and have upon call from the Ministry supported and assisted the Ministry – from 1997 until the present – with the preparation for and participation at ExCom meetings. Sweden has participated in ExCom since 1997: during 1997–1998 as a co-opted member of the Swiss delegation; during 1999–2000 as an elected member, with Switzerland and Austria as co-opted members; and during 2001–2002 as a co-opted member of the Finnish delegation.

When Finland held the seat of the constituency of former EFTA-countries, 2001–2002, and chaired the Subcommittee on Monitoring, Evaluation and Finance (in 2001), Finland received assistance from SEI to become familiar with the issues on the agenda and the strategic approaches. Sweden has also chaired one SCMEF during 2001 as Finland. During the period 2003–2004, Austria will be the new seat-holder for the “EFTA-constituency”.¹¹ Austria has informally requested Sweden to continue to give advice during this period.

Within ExCom, Sweden has been seeking to change the prevailing emphasis on individual investment projects towards a greater focus on how to enable developing countries to meet their commitments to phase-out ODS in accordance with the time frame stipulated in the MP. Moreover, this has included a successful advocacy for more emphasis on strategic planning and non-investment projects, a more “country driven” approach and a greater focus on small scale use of ODS. ExCom appears to have been influenced by this approach, which can be seen in some recent ExCom decisions that Sweden contributed to, particularly regarding support for NOUs (e.g., ExCom decision 30/7) and RMPs (e.g., ExCom decision 31/48).

SEI has thus played an active role in briefing the Ministry. It is indicative of the good relations existing between SEI and the Ministry that the SEI has been entrusted with the task of *actively contributing to negotiations in the ExCom*.

SEI’s advisory role is also important with regard to the discussion concerning replenishment issues. The responsible Swedish Government parties (the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sida, the Swedish EPA) and SEI meet informally before meetings of the parties. SEI with most field experience has probably valuable information that may be used as a basis for the replenishment discussions, when the issue comes under discussion again in 2005.

Possible effects on the Ministry postures if SEI had not prepared and participated in ExCom meetings and other issues related to the MP

For a long time, the Ministry had considerable competence within the area related to the MP. However, because of staff turnover, the competence within the area has been weakened. During this time, however, the competence of the SEI has been strengthened and it seems as if SEI complements the competence gap that has been created at the Ministry. The influence on the ExCom has to a great extent been focused on field experience. SEI’s knowledge from the various programmes in the field and its frequent briefings with the Ministry has strengthened the Ministry’s postures and capability to be active and thereby presumably also influence the ExCom.

¹¹ In 2003 Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Hungary, Japan and the US will be non-Article 5 Party members of the ExCom, and of Bolivia, Burundi, El Salvador, India, Jordan, Mauritius and Saint Lucia as Article 5 Party members. Tadanori Inomata (Japan) will serve as the ExCom Chair and Roberto Rivas (El Salvador) as Vice-Chair for one year beginning 1 January 2003.

However, if SEI had not succeeded to build up a competence within the subject area of phasing out ODS – strategic issues as well as technical details – the Ministry would have had considerable difficulties in acting and influencing the ExCom since the Ministry’s competence related to these issues is limited.

The issue has been raised if there is a “conflict of interest” regarding SEI participating in ExCom delegations and at the same time being the implementing agency for Swedish bilateral projects that are submitted to ExCom. The evaluators have specifically asked several other participants at ExCom meetings, outside the delegation that Sweden belongs to, about this. None of our interviewees have seen this as a problem.

Can the Ministry find advisers elsewhere or increase its own capability?

As in the case with the Ministry’s own staff turnover, competence within the area is volatile. SEI has built up a competence, which for the time being seems to be unique in Sweden. Such competence and subject matter experience take time to develop and have to be maintained. However, the Ministry cannot only lean on SEI. It has to strengthen its own posture by employing staff that can deal with issues related to the MP. It is also the Ministry’s intention to strengthen its unit by employing a person who can work with MP issues. A strengthened capacity within the Ministry will probably lead to a different kind of advisory role of the SEI in their work in ExCom. This implies that the Ministry in the future will be able to act within ExCom with greater vigour. However, the relation with SEI will probably be continued, albeit in a different form.

The Swedish EPA could probably play a more active role as advisers to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As mentioned above, they advise the Ministry of the Environment at the Meetings of the Parties as well as supporting and participating in the SEAP Network meetings. However, since the cooperation with SEI functions well and SEI is currently engaged with programme implementation there seems to be no need for major change. However, the Ministry’s dependence to one actor may create a vulnerable constellation (which is only mentioned as a reminder in this context and not delved into in order to find a suitable balance or solution).

4.4 Sweden’s strategy in ExCom

It is clear from our interviews that many people (outside Sweden) do see Sweden as being fairly un-self-interested in ExCom. Furthermore, Swedish actors in development cooperation also often feel that Sweden acts with relative lack of self-interest. Sometimes, this may have the effect that Swedish participants e.g. at ExCom may not fully take into account the arguments of other stakeholders, e.g. other donors, because of a consciousness of being morally “right”. One of our interviewees used the term “preaching the gospel” about Swedish participation in ExCom. This was not meant purely negatively, but as a reminder about how Sweden can be perceived. Understanding how others may see us can help to improve our negotiating style. Based on the interviews the evaluators assess that Sweden has contributed a lot to ExCom but that Swedish participants in some cases could be more open to other stakeholders’ arguments and to seeing that all parties have some combination of self-interest and some committed non-self-interest, albeit in varying proportions.

The evaluators assess that Sweden plays an important and positive role in Ex-Com. However, although our overall approach may be specific, we do have much in common with some other members of ExCom. In significant issues, for instance, many other European countries are closer to us than the USA.

Furthermore, the policy environment in ExCom has changed considerably in the last few years (see section 5.2). The evaluators suggest that Sweden should carry out a review of our policy goals and priorities for changes in the policies and praxis of ExCom and the multilateral implementing agencies. This would of course be done together with the recommended review of priorities for the Swedish bilateral programme (see section 5.5).

In order to obtain leverage and maximize the results of Sweden's efforts, the evaluators suggest that some of the policy development take place with reasonably likeminded countries that participate in the work of ExCom. This would have two positive results:

1. Sweden could "anchor" proposals and policies with other countries that participate in ExCom delegations, in a more long-term manner.
2. Sweden would also get inputs to making prioritizations of what issues should be presented in ExCom. If there is a policy for which Sweden obtains no understanding from countries that we feel are fairly like-minded, we might draw the conclusion that we should spend more time on other issues with a larger potential for success.

Specifically, the evaluators propose that Sweden should explore the possibility of having an informal ExCom policy development workshop once a year, for instance with other European countries. The interest and possibilities for this could be sounded out within EU cooperation on MP issues and also in particular with the holder of the "EFTA constituency" seat at ExCom, i.e. Austria.

One important issue that could be brought up is how to get more effective incentives for the implementing agencies, including better performance criteria for National Phase-out Plans. In some cases the timetable is not realistic, which will give the country and the implementing agency a significant financial contribution at the beginning, but may leave the country in the lurch when the plan does not actually work. (An example that has been cited to the evaluators is the NCPP for Indonesia.)

4.5 Financial remarks

The budget for the over all costs for the consultancies during the evaluation period are commented on below. The evaluation focuses on the consultations for the period 1999 to the 37th ExCom meeting. The budget for the 38th meeting held in Rome November 18–22, 2002 is not included. The financial statements presented here only include the budget posts "consultancies" (preparatory work (fees and reimbursable) for SEI to assist in ExCom) 1999–2002.

The figures relating to the two consultancies in 1999 are established with no difficulties based on data received from SEI. However, figures relating to the period August 1999 – September 2002 have been difficult to read. SEI has therefore actively contributed in the clarification of these financial statements and it has thus been possible to assess these figures presented below.

SEI advisers have read documents, briefed the Ministry, prepared documentation to be presented at the ExCom meetings etc. During the course of the cooperation with the Ministry, SEI has identified strategic and important issues and has also been present at the ExCom meetings and related preparatory meetings.

The total sum of SEK 1.18 MSEK that has been reimbursed to SEI does not, in accordance to these findings, appear to be unrealistic. Both fees and reimbursable costs have been reasonable and also approved by the Ministry. However, the presentation of the financial comments relating to these activities have been difficult to grasp and it is therefore advisable that SEI together with Sida should find suitable methods based on the LFA principles to provide financial statements in the future.

Table 3 SEI's preparatory work to assist in ExCom meetings during the period 1999– 2002.

1. ExCom 28th meeting 1999	SEK 72 000 incl. reimbursables
2. ExCom 29th meeting 1999	SEK 72 000 incl. reimbursables
3. ExCom 30th meeting 2000	SEK 152 000 incl. reimbursables
4. ExCom 31st meeting 2000	SEK 127 000 incl. reimbursables
5. ExCom 32nd meeting 2000	SEK 119 400 incl. reimbursables
6. ExCom 33rd meeting 2001	SEK 32 000 fees
Position papers to ExCom concerning: – SMEs – Concessional lending – HCFC	SEK 37 500 SEK 33 750 SEK 63 750
7. ExCom 34th meeting 2001	SEK 116 500 incl. reimbursables
8. ExCom 35th meeting 2001	SEK 114 323 incl. reimbursables
9. ExCom 36th meeting 2002	SEK 112 387 incl. reimbursables
10. ExCom 37th meeting 2002	SEK 124 799 incl. reimbursables
Activities: 1–6 <i>invoiced to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs</i>	SEK 709 400
Activities: 7–10 <i>invoiced to Sida</i>	SEK 468 009
Total activities 1–10	SEK 1 177 409

As discussed above it is concluded that SEI has accomplished their consultancies in accordance with the ToR for the various assignments. Furthermore no complaints have been registered against SEI. All stakeholders seem to be complimenting the institute for their competence and zeal.

A final remark is that SEI lobbied during the 38th ExCom meeting in Rome. A Swedish project proposal was pending for decision at ExCom. Despite the lobbying activities, the Swedish project was not approved, but it was decided to allow it to be reformulated and resubmitted to the next Meeting, scheduled for 30 March–3 April 2003. It is difficult to evaluate the result of these activities and it would probably not have changed if the Ministry had been represented at the 38th ExCom meeting.

It is also difficult to evaluate the value of the lobbying activities before the ExCom meeting was held i.e. what the outcome of the pending proposal at the SCPR would have been if SEI had lobbied differently.

4.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The evaluators make the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. That SEI has fulfilled its consultancies with zeal and competence with regard to the Ministry and other stakeholders.
2. That SEI has acquired a competence which seems to be difficult to replace, and that it is consequently difficult to find a more competitive advisor in Sweden. A strong synergy exists between the support to the Foreign Ministry in ExCom and SEI's work with the Swedish bilateral Ozone layer Protection Programme. Consequently, the Ministry gains much from this cooperation and therefore, these consultations should continue.

3. It is recommended that the procedure should be formalized whereby the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sida, the Swedish EPA and SEI hold preparatory meetings three times a year in phase with the ExCom meetings. It is also recommended that one of the authorities, e.g. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, should be formally charged with calling the other parties to the meetings.
4. It is recommended that Sweden, in co-ordination with the holder of the “EFTA constituency” seat, should make greater lobbying efforts concerning policy issues before the ExCom meetings.
5. It is recommended that Sweden should, in co-ordination with the holder of the “EFTA constituency” seat, explore the possibility of having an informal ExCom policy development workshop once a year with other European Union member countries.
6. It is recommended that SEI together with Sida should find suitable methods based on the LFA to provide financial statements regarding SEI’s support to the Ministry regarding ExCom.
7. It is recommended that a document be prepared describing the Swedish stance at ExCom and what the roles of the main Swedish parties involved in ExCom’s work shall be.

5. The Swedish bilateral Ozone Layer Protection Programme

As mentioned above, up to 20% of each country's financial contribution to the MF can be used directly for bilateral co-operation, provided that ExCom approves the projects. Sida has worked with such bilateral co-operation on a trial basis, since the fiscal year 1996/97.

Many developed countries do not have any bilateral programme, but channel 100% of their support directly through the Multilateral Fund.

In 1999 SEI was contracted by Sida to be the responsible institute to coordinate and administer the Swedish Bilateral Programme under the MP. The initial contract period ran through July 1999 to 31 December 2001 and was extended to June 2001.¹² That contract is based on the ToR for the assignment prepared by Sida dated 1999-04-29. The contract has been prolonged until 30 June 2003 in accordance with a programme proposal prepared by SEI.¹³

The background – preamble – of the ToR for SEI's assignment indicates that a sole person at Sida had been responsible for the implementation of the bilateral programme and that only very few projects had been initiated. The reason for the slow progress is explained to be that the requests from the recipient countries proved not to be as strong as expected and that a Swedish resource base had been difficult to identify.¹⁴

It was therefore decided that the processing of the Sida programme would be contracted to an "External actor" – a consultant – to administer and coordinate the Swedish bilateral projects and at the same time support Sida under the MP cooperation. Nevertheless, the ToR indicates that Sida still is responsible for the programme and the party in charge of submitting project proposals to ExCom. Sida would also continue to formulate the bilateral programme according to its guidelines and give written approval for particular projects.

5.1 Guidelines for the Swedish Bilateral Programme

The Swedish Bilateral Programme is steered by guidelines published by Sida in 1997.¹⁵ The Guidelines specify that the overall objective of the Bilateral Programme is

“to support the process in developing countries in areas of critical importance for the sustainable and cost-efficient phase out of ozone-depleting substances”.

The guidelines furthermore stipulate that the emphasis of the bilateral programme will be:

“on enabling the countries' or regions' own capacity. The individual recipient countries' plans for phasing out of ODS within the identified problem areas will form the basis for prioritization and identification of assistance”. The guidelines state that projects within the bilateral cooperation should focus on strategies to:

¹² Invitation to tender and accompanying documents were issued by Sida on 4 May 1999 and sent to two consultancy firms. IVL, the Swedish Environmental Research Institute and the SEI, the Stockholm Environment Institute, see Tender Evaluation, diariennr INEC-1999-02258. The limited tendering indicates the difficulties in identifying a resource base.

¹³ Letter dated 19 November 2001.

¹⁴ See ToR Hanteringen av det bilaterala programmet under Montrealprotokollet, dated 1999- 04-29.

¹⁵ The Montreal Protocol, Guidelines for the Swedish Bilateral Programme; Sida; May 1997.

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- Further develop systems – legislation and/or implementation procedures – to control and monitor the total ODS consumption”.
- Control and phase-out the widespread use of ODS refrigerants in stationary and mobile refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment, in particular for service and maintenance.
- Control and phase-out the widespread use of ODS solvents, which also partly is difficult even to localize.
- Tackle the emerging use of transitional alternatives, such as HCFC.
- Control and phase-out the use of ODS in small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs).”

These focal strategies can be briefly summarized as:

1. Capacity-building (“soft” issues);
2. Wide-spread use, SMEs;
3. Avoiding use of HCFC as replacement for CFC.

The guidelines further stipulate that the following criteria should be used for prioritization of proposals:

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1. A clear demonstration effect;
2. Useful as model for other countries, sectors, groups of ODS-consumers etc;
3. Catalytic impact, i.e. duplication can be achieved without, or with limited, additional support;
4. The project leads to sustainability. Implementation capacity resources for control and maintenance etc. should be secured;
5. The project enables measurable and communicable results;
6. Alternatives introduced that are benign from environmental, human, health and safety point of views;
7. The project builds upon lessons learned and successful results demonstrated in Sweden or elsewhere;
8. Donor and host expertise is available which is deemed appropriate by the host countries;
9. The project could be enforced¹⁶ by Sida’s regular activities.”

[The points have been numbered by the evaluators for the present report.]

These points can be more briefly summarised as:

- demonstration effect (points number 1 – 3 and 5 above);
- ensuring sustainability of the project (capacity in the host country, point 4);
- alternatives introduced that are benign from environmental, human, health and safety point of views;
- connection with other Sida activities in the host country (point 9)

(Points 7 and 8 are relatively non-specific.)

¹⁶The term “enhanced” or “reinforced” is probably what is meant.

Apart from the focuses and priorities cited above, there is no log-frame matrix or analysis for the Swedish bilateral projects. There is thus no explicit assessment of other ways to reach the Swedish goals. A log-frame approach in the Swedish project preparation phase would undoubtedly make it easier to evaluate projects. This would entail a clearly defined approach, improved analysis of situations, objective-oriented planning and implementation, verifiable outcomes, more emphasis on quality, focus on sustainability, standardised formats and a shared understanding of objectives and the process to achieve these.

5.2 Major policy developments in ExCom since 1997

Since the Swedish guidelines were adopted, there have been changes in the policy environment of ODS phase-out projects. Sweden has contributed to a greater emphasis on non-investment projects through its diplomatic and lobbying work in ExCom. Sweden has also contributed to an increased emphasis on phase-out issues concerning SMEs.

Another important change is the introduction of National CFC Phase-out Plans (sometimes abbreviated as NCPP, even if they may include some other ODS as well as CFC). These plans, pioneered by among others the World Bank, entail a country committing itself to a schedule for a complete phase-out. The phase-out is audited and payments are made every year in accordance with the agreement between the Multilateral Fund, the Implementing Agency and the Article 5 country. In this way the country itself takes over responsibility for the phaseout, and there is no need for micro-management from the Multilateral Fund. The use of overall phase-out plans also removes the incentives that there have been for inflating the costs of each individual investment for replacing ODS.

Similar to the National CFC Phase-out Plans are sector phase-out plans. They are basically the same, but only cover one sector in the country. They entail a complete phase-out within the sector and the country commits itself not to seek any more funding for phasing out ODS in the sector covered by the plan.

Another policy change concerns the commitment to sustain a given phase-out. A problem in the effectiveness of the fund has been that the same amount of ODS could be phased out several times. There is a given base-line for CFC use from which the phase-out is counted. As an example, the case of a country where 300% of the CFC use in foam industry was phased out has been quoted to us several times. CFC use at one factory was phased out, but the same quantity was used again in another factory, which subsequently was also subject to CFC phase-out, with production increasing at another factory, etc. Therefore, ExCom decided (Decision 33/54(a)) that further funding must be predicated on a commitment by the country to achieve sustainable permanent aggregate reductions in consumption and production, as relevant.

5.3 Swedish bilateral projects approved by ExCom to date

Seven Swedish bilateral projects have been approved by ExCom to date. These projects are:

1. Regional workshop for the SEAP Region on Import/Export controls, approved at the 29th ExCom meeting, Nov 1999
2. Preparation of Government Strategy to reduce and eliminate the use of CFC refrigerants for servicing in the Philippines, approved at the 29th ExCom meeting, Nov 1999
3. Halon Management Plan for Thailand, approved at the 29th ExCom meeting, Nov 1999

4. ODS/Customs officers cooperation in the SEAP region, approved at the 34th ExCom meeting, July 2001
5. Import and export licensing system in Lao PDR, approved at the 34th ExCom meeting, July 2001
6. Preparation of an Update of the Refrigerant Management Plan in Croatia, approved at the 36th ExCom meeting, March 2002
7. National CFC Phase-out plan for the Philippines, approved at the 38th ExCom meeting, Nov 2002

For the evaluation of individual projects, the ToR of this evaluation enumerates a number of evaluation criteria in the form of questions a – f cited below:

- a. Do the projects help the developing countries in identifying and phasing out the widely spread out small-scale use of ODS, in particular CFCs?*
- b. Do the projects have a pilot-character, influencing the preparation and approval of MF-projects in areas prioritised by Sweden such as small-scale use of ODS or even influencing ExCom policies? Has this lead to a more cost-effective use of the MF?*
- c. Assessing and discussing the ownership in the developing countries and the capacity building component of the projects and their activities. Have the country abilities to tackle the phase out been strengthened via the projects? How can it be improved?*
- d. Have the national ozone units (NOUs) been strengthened through the projects or other stakeholders?*
- e. Have the projects helped bring concerns to higher political and administrative levels in the countries?*
- f. To what extent does the programme work in the spirit of partnership between developing countries and developed countries?*

These projects are analysed below:

5.3.1 Regional workshop for the SEAP Region on Import/Export controls

Date of approval: 29th ExCom meeting, November 1999

In cooperation with: Japan (and carried out through UNEP)

Approved budget: 63 000 USD (Sweden) + 62 000 USD (Japan)

Report approved by ExCom: May 2002

This project is completed. Indications of its success are concrete output as detailed in the Project Completion Report. Also, the Project Completion Report contains several important lessons learned that are useful for similar future work.

Furthermore, since the completion of this project, a project for ODS/Customs officer's cooperation in the SEAP region has been started (see section 5.3.4 below), to a significant extent as follow-on from this workshop. The answers to the evaluation questions a – f are therefore discussed in section 5.3.4 below.

5.3.2 Preparation of Government Strategy to reduce and eliminate the use of CFC refrigerants for servicing in the Philippines

Date of approval: 29th ExCom meeting, November 1999

Approved budget: 141 000 USD

Completed (the project resulted in a national phase-out plan for the servicing sector, as part of a project document for a NCPP for the Philippines, see section 5.3.7 below).

Cooperation with the World Bank, which was asked by the Philippine Government to assist in the manufacturing sector, was initiated after the original project was approved. This project is completed, but it is the preparation of a strategy. It is thus not possible to evaluate it as a full project. All the same, the answer to questions a – f is largely “yes”. The preparation of overall strategies is an important method within the framework of the Swedish Guidelines for the bilateral programme.

At the same time, similar NCPPs have been prepared in Thailand and Malaysia. All these three projects are part of a fairly new kind of project, thus having pilot character. Swedish involvement in the Philippine project has been very competent, according to the evaluators’ assessment of information and opinions we have received in our interviews. The evaluators’ assessment is that the difference made by the Swedish involvement are real but not fundamental. Key differences that Sweden contributed to in the NCPP for the Philippines compared with those for Thailand and Malaysia are:

- o give emphasis on small-scale servicing of refrigerant equipment,
- in particular, to include an obligatory (rather than voluntary or semivoluntary) certification/ accreditation system for refrigerant service technicians/workshops (a policy which is not desired by Thailand or Malaysia in their plans, at present),
- the use of CFC-11 for flushing systems is addressed in the Philippine NCPP, an issue which otherwise tends to get forgotten
- More measures concerning infrastructure to deal with recovered refrigerant are outlined in the Philippine plan.
- A tendency in the Philippine plan to have more detailed proposals already presented in the plan; whereas in the Malaysian and Thai NCPPs more details are left to be developed during the implementation of the plan.

SEI stresses the importance of these special “Swedish inputs”. Naturally, the plans have many similarities. A representative of the World Bank credits this partly to Swedish influence in the ODSNET/SEAP. Also, SEI, Swedish consultants, the World Bank and World Bank consultants had contact with each other in many ways during the process of preparation of these plans. There has obviously been a learning process from all sides. We have understood also that there was one consultant who worked in the preparation both of the Malaysian NCPP and for SEI in the preparation of the “Swedish” part of the Philippine NCPP.

5.3.3 Halon Management Plan for Thailand

Date of approval: 29th ExCom meeting, November 1999

In cooperation with: the World Bank

Approved budget: 226 000 USD (Sweden), 475 000 USD (total)

Not completed (delayed).

This project has suffered significant delays, due largely to the difficulties of the Thai NOU to find a suitable national consultant. The project will probably support the goals implicit in Sida’s questions. Sweden made useful input to the terms of reference, according to our interview with a World Bank representative, but apart from that it does not seem as if there are going to be any special results of the fact that the project is partially financed through the Swedish bilateral quota. Swedish consultants were involved in bidding for the tasks to be carried out by the international consultant, but have not been chosen by the Thai Government.

5.3.4 ODS/Customs officers cooperation in the SEAP region

Date of approval: 34th ExCom meeting, July 2001

Approved budget: 250 000 USD

Ongoing.

The two ODS/Customs officer network meetings that have been held to date have resulted in concrete recommendations, which also have started to be implemented, such as:

- increased contacts and cooperation between NOUs and customs offices within each country, which could be formalized through written agreements;
- increased contacts and cooperation among the countries, with specific recommendations concerning information to be exchanged concerning importer, exporters, cases of seizing smuggled ODS etc;
- to get more information about and use various techniques such as methods for risk profiling that are used in countries that have got more advanced systems for smuggling control (techniques that have been presented by experts at the meetings);
- cooperation with the World Customs Organization, with ASEAN and with the two major ODS-exporters to the SEAP region namely China and India.

This project appears to be pioneering, and the answers to the applicable evaluation questions a-f are judged by the evaluators to be “yes”.

5.3.5 Import and export licensing system in Lao PDR

Date of approval: 34th ExCom meeting, July 2001

Approved budget: USD 55 000.

Ongoing.

The first mission by SEI and the international consultant was carried out in September 2002. It is thus as yet difficult to evaluate the project. The evaluators believe, however, that it is likely to be a valuable project, considering the competence and experience of involved personnel.

It can be noted that a parallel project is being implemented by UNEP in Vietnam. This project is using the same (Swedish) international consultant as the SEI-implemented Lao PDR project.

In this project, in contrast to the UNEP project in Vietnam, a team of Lao government officers have been asked to come up with the first draft for import control legislation, based on guidance and discussions with the international consultant. The government team includes representatives from the environment agency as well as from the Trade, Justice, Finance and other relevant ministries. The draft will then be commented on by the international consultant, further revised and discussed with all relevant stakeholders. As a next step, details in the administrative procedures and border controls will be developed, using the same approach. At this point it is intended that the Swedish Board of Customs also will become involved.

5.3.6 Preparation of an Update of the Refrigerant Management Plan in Croatia

Date of approval: 36th ExCom meeting, March 2002

Approved budget: USD 17 000.

Ongoing.

This project is ongoing, and is therefore not possible to evaluate. There are, however, several positive indications of the value of this project. The project is carried out by SEI who indicates that

they have a good dialog with UNIDO, who have so far worked with these issues in Croatia. A positive indication is that the Croatian NOU has requested that SEI should continue working in Croatia with projects that are identified in the RMP. The evaluators have received very positive feedback from Croatia about SEI's work.

To the extent that they can be evaluated so far, the answers to the evaluation questions a – f (above) appear to be “yes”.

An interesting aspect here, which the evaluators support, is that SEI is actually intending to put more resources into this project than are proposed by ExCom. This will strengthen the demonstration effect of the project in a way that would not have been possible if ExCom's limit for RMP-updates were to be followed.

5.3.7 National CFC Phase out plan for the Philippines

Date of approval: 38th ExCom meeting, November 2002

Sweden as co-implementing agency and the World Bank as lead agency

Approved budget: 385 000 USD (Sweden), 10 600 000 USD (total)

To be started up.

This project has only just been approved. Concerning the Swedish part of the project, SEI states the following in their work report to Sida:

“Sweden has proposed to fund parts of the train the trainer programmes, the infrastructure to reclaim CFC and important Advisory services during 2002–2004. ...

The Advisory services will include the following elements:

1. assisting in the overall revision of the CCO and other relevant rules, including formulation of legal requirement for importers and users of CFC refrigerants, reporting requirements, entry into force of different requirements,
2. assist in development of the scheme for subsidies to service enterprises for required equipment
3. assisting in the establishment of a Code of Practice and
4. assisting in developing targeted information to enterprises and equipment owners.”¹⁷

Considering that the project has not started yet, it is not possible to evaluate further than is done under section 5.3.2 above.

5.4 Potential projects – approved by Sida for preparation of project documents

5.4.1 Regional Cooperation for Monitoring and Control of ODS Consumption in the South Asia region

This project was presented to ExCom in November 2002 but did not get approval. The ExCom indicated that the project was not eligible for funding and recommended Sweden to resubmit a revised project proposal to ExCom at its 39th Meeting, incorporating the lessons learned from the first project.¹⁸

¹⁷ Swedish Bilateral Programme under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; Report, 1 January 2002 – November 2002; SEI (report to Sida).

¹⁸ See Report of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, 38th Meeting, Decision 38/19.

The proposed networking with NOUs and customs officers in the SA region is very important, as it includes India and China, the two main producing countries, which export to the rest of the SA region as well as to the SEAP region. China has already participated in the second meeting of the cooperation between NOUs and Customs offices in the SEAP region (see 5.3.4 ODS/Customs officers cooperation in the SEAP region above).

The evaluators' preliminary assessment of this project is that it could be very useful and fulfil the criteria implicit in Sida's evaluation questions. However, it may be good to modify the project, as planned, to more be an expansion of the SEAP NOU/Customs cooperation project, as the trade issues are very much in common for South Asia and South-east Asia/Pacific.

SEI is also interested in looking into possibilities to fund such a project through Sida and independently of ExCom. However, SEI estimates that there is a reasonable possibility that the project will be approved by ExCom in March 2003. It could be argued that a more specific assessment of whether this project should have been carried out as an ExCom-bilateral or as a direct bilateral should have been carried out earlier on. One such project had already been financed by ExCom. The added exemplary effect in approval of a second project before the evaluation of the first project may have been limited. Whereas a positive effect of not going through ExCom would have been a much earlier start-up of the project. Therefore, it could have been advantageous to liberate resources from the 20 % quota, as discussed in section 5.8 below, and used them for this project. Getting immediate start in a project, which would involve so many countries, including ExCom members, could well even have more direct effect on ExCom than discussions at ExCom to gain approval. However, at this stage the likely prospect of approval at ExCom within a few months time means that the evaluators would agree with SEI there is little reason now to change tactics for this project unless there is no approval at the next ExCom.

5.4.2 Workshop on Preparation of Updates of Refrigerant Management Plans

The first project description for a "Workshop on Preparation of Updates of Refrigerant Management Plans" was developed by UNEP and SEI and submitted to ExCom 34 in July 2001. However, the project was not approved but deferred to a future meeting.

At ExCom 35, guidelines and a format for preparing RMP updates were adopted and there was an agreement on the level of funding for such Updates, 50% of what the country received for preparing the original RMP.

SEI considers that the present praxis for RMPs and their updates are too limited and standardized. The low level of funding does not allow for much work to adapt the RMP to the specific conditions pertaining in each country. The evaluators agree with this assessment. It is therefore important to find methods to improve RMPs. Here, demonstration effect, as hoped for in the RMP update in Croatia (see section 5.3.6 above), is one key.

Training and discussion is another key. SEI's intention with this project was to find countries about to do RMP updates and go through issues with them so that the NOUs' own capacity to contribute to the update would increase, as well as the quality of the updates.

In this case, the demonstration and training effect in the actual implementing of the project would presumably have been much greater than the policydemonstration effect of having the project approved in ExCom. This particular project was urgent. In sum it would have been more effective to run the project as an independent project – although this is admittedly said with the benefit of hindsight.

5.4.3 Strategy to Phase Out CFC Refrigerants for Servicing in Malaysia

SEI has hoped to be involved in the NCPP in Malaysia. However, this issue is now part of the World Bank-implemented NCPP. Whether there will be Swedish participation is up to Malaysia and the World Bank.

The evaluators believe that it is not worthwhile to spend significant resources – i.e. Sida’s financing of SEI – in order to be engaged in this project. If there is an active interest from the side of Malaysia, Sweden should get involved, but otherwise it is better for SEI to work where the Swedish input is more actively desired.

5.4.4 National Phase-out strategy for non-CFC solvents¹⁹ in Thailand

According to the Thai NCPP, the main Thai use of non-CFC ODS-solvents is in the textile and garment industry. This is not an ODS-phase-out area where Sweden has a strong competence profile. The evaluators have been informed by SEI that it was only intended that Sweden should be involved in the metalcleaning sector and in shoe-sole manufacture.

Like with the CFC-refrigerants in Malaysia in section 5.4.3 above, this project is now part of the World Bank-implemented NCPP, so whether Swedish participation will be implemented is up to Thailand and the World Bank.

The evaluators believe that it is not efficient to spend significant resources (i.e. Sida’s financing of SEI) in order to get into this project. If there is an active interest from the side of Thailand, Sweden should get involved, but otherwise it is better for SEI to work where Swedish input is more actively desired.

5.4.5 National Phase-out strategy for non-CFC solvents in Malaysia

Like with two projects in sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 above, this project is now part of the World Bank-implemented NCPP, so whether Swedish participation will be implemented is up to Malaysia and the World Bank.

The main use of non-CFC ODS solvents in Malaysia is in metal cleaning, according to the NCPP. This is an area where Sweden has considerable competence. However, the competence focussed on ODS phase-out has rather dissipated. Furthermore, the competence concerning metal cleaning is not unique to Sweden.

Based on the above, the evaluators conclude that it is not efficient to spend significant resources (i.e. Sida’s financing of SEI) in order to achieve Swedish participation in this project. If there is an active interest from the side of Malaysia, Sweden should get involved, but otherwise it is better for SEI to work where Swedish input is more actively desired.

5.5 Guidelines: lack of LFA approach

The Swedish bilateral programme is steered by the 1997 guidelines. These guidelines are fairly general, and obviously cannot take into account important policy developments within ExCom since 1997. The evaluators also note that there is no log-frame analysis in the Guidelines or in the terms of reference for the Swedish Bilateral support.

The evaluators propose that revised guidelines, with a log-frame analysis (LFA), should be prepared for the bilateral support in order to clarify more particularly what Sweden can and should achieve.

¹⁹ The term ”non-CFC solvents” refers to other ozone-depleting solvents than CFC.

This LFA should take more account of the present-day policy situation in ExCom, in particular policy changes since the Guidelines were most recently formulated in 1997, such as

- the use of national CFC phase-out plans and sector phase-out plans
- the requirement that countries receiving funding commit themselves to sustain the given phase-out.

In the more detailed parts of the LFA, the guidelines should indicate the kinds of projects, which should be given priority, based on:

1. The specific changes that Sweden wants to see in the policies and praxis of the Multilateral Fund/ExCom and/or of the Implementing Agencies;
2. Which changes Sweden is likely to be able to get accepted;
3. Which changes are best supported by arguing for projects within ExCom;
4. Which changes – and which objectives of the bilateral programme – are best reached by running independent bilateral programmes outside the 20 % quota, outside ExCom’s restrictions;
5. Sweden’s comparative advantages.

It should be clear from the revised guidelines that one of the goals of the Swedish ODS-phase-out support is to help build up competence in the host A5C – that is, competence in the NOU, among national consultants and other stakeholders (note: this is not only the same as stakeholder dialogue). This goal should also be clearly stated to prospective host A5Cs so that they then can hold Sweden to account for it in project design and implementation.

Because the revised guidelines/the LFA will be more detailed and related to the present policy environment, they will need to be reviewed more often, e.g., twice during each three-year period.

5.5.1 Example: RMPs

A typical issue that the evaluators see as important for Sweden is the quality of RMPs and not least the activities to be implemented according the RMP. Considering that the ExCom decisions on the level of finance for RMPs are very restrictive, it might be suitable to “top-up” the financing of some plans in order to be able show how they could be designed to be more comprehensive and effective. It is also important to focus on creating some excellent examples, and the evaluators therefore endorse continued cooperation in Croatia.

5.6 The Swedish resource base

According to the ToR, the evaluation shall describe the size and role of the Swedish resource base, its development over time since early 1990-ies, and how it has been used for support to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol in developing countries. Is there (still) a need and interest for Swedish expertise in the field from the recipients? From the Swedish resource base including the Swedish environmental authorities?

SEI’s overview of the Swedish resource base is presented in Annex 3. The resource base is limited. Some of the listed companies have limited international experience. Concerning for instance solvents, the competences that Sweden had at the time for the phase-out, have rather dissipated and are no longer as available as they were maybe ten years ago.

The list of resources concerning refrigeration is one of the stronger sections. It is noted, however, that by far the largest ODS-consuming part of the refrigerant servicing sector in many Article 5 countries is MACs. Specific competence in this particular field is not so well represented in the list,

to our understanding. To the extent that Sweden intends to work with refrigerant issues, it would be important to complement the resource base concerning MACs. This concerns technical issues as well as systems and socio-economic-administrative issues, which can be rather different for MAC-servicing than other refrigerant servicing.

It can be noted that the main members of the resource base that have been used in the Swedish projects approved so far are two: Berglof Refrigeration Technology Ltd and IKZ Miljökonsult. Apart from these two, the resource base has been used to a very little extent.

Of course, non-Swedish resources can be used in Swedish projects, but the knowledge of where this competence is to be acquired is still necessary.

The evaluators note that there have been some indications of some – certainly minor – shortcomings in cultural sensitivity of Swedish consultants. However, the main impression we have got from our interviewees is of respect for the overall good work and competence – both general and technical – of Swedish work.

The evaluators have also sometimes been told that Swedish consultants have a high cost. In particular in more developed A5Cs, where competent local consultants may be available, the cost of large input from Swedish consultants may be seen as relatively high.

In sum, the Swedish comparative advantages would appear to be in RMPs and in legal and administrative issues concerning import/export of ODS. It should however, be noted that the Swedish resource base appears to be very limited. This fact must be taken into account when prioritizing Sweden's efforts to support the developing countries' ODS phase-out. To a certain extent the Swedish resource base could be strengthened, e.g. with some backup support to get international contracts. But considering that the ODS phase-out has already almost completely taken place in Sweden, the resource base is not likely to increase dramatically beyond its present extent.

5.7 Finding host countries

The ToR raises the question to explore the reasons for difficulties Sida and SEI have encountered in finding countries interested in cooperation to the extent that it results in approved projects. Some of the started projects that did not lead to approved projects should be studied.

To a large extent, countries do not come asking but SEI has to go out and find project ideas and interested host countries (In some cases there is host country request, but often to several implementing agencies at once for the same or similar projects). The lack of host country request is connected with that the ODS phase-out is to a large extent not an internally developed domestic priority for A5Cs. The evaluators conclude from this that Sweden should weigh the costs of “chasing” projects. It is necessary to have a procedure to more carefully and at an earlier stage prioritize different potential projects, comparing their:

- feasibility,
- estimated cost of ensuring host country commitment and of developing the project,
- contribution to the Swedish goals in accordance with the (revised) guidelines.

Some indication has been received from South-East Asian countries that there in some cases may be certain competition between SEI and the World Bank. In our interviews with staff at these two implementing agencies, it is clear that SEI and the World Bank both have respect for much work done by the other, but it is also quite clear that both the WB and SEI think that they are in significant ways better than the other in working together with Article 5 countries.

Sida also cooperates with UNEP and UNIDO in projects. A factor, which does not reflect negatively on SEI, but does influence the situation, in this case is that the multilateral implementing agencies, perhaps in particular the World Bank, are more important partners in many different fields for developing countries than SEI. This can influence countries to choose, i.a., the World Bank as an implementing agency in MF-projects.

5.8 Going bilateral?

5.8.1 Direct bilateral support outside the 20% quota

The question that is raised here is if Swedish financing of the projects should continue within the ExCom 20 % quota for bilateral cooperation or if Sweden is better off to go “direct bilateral”, i.e. to channel financing through regular bilateral channels in order to avoid ExCom’s screening procedures.

Theoretically, the Swedish programme could be carried out with Swedish financing outside of the 20 % quota. The implicit policy decision in Sweden has so far been that trying to comply with ExCom’s rules, in order to get project approval at ExCom, is worth it, because the demonstration effect is greater if the project goes through ExCom. This argument gives significant weight to the formal discussions at ExCom. Naturally, important discussion takes place at ExCom. However, in many diplomatic bodies, such as the ExCom and its subcommittees, more influence can often be achieved by discussing with representatives before the plenary meetings, in this case presenting the Swedish stance and results of projects from the field, including those that have been financed independently of ExCom criteria.

ExCom policy restrictions – Only one instance of new project models is accepted

One problem perceived by many actors in Sweden is that many ExCom decisions only allow for one instance of a new kind of project until this first project has been completed and evaluated. An innovative project thus is seen as a pilot project, and no more projects of that kind are allowed until the pilot project is evaluated. This constitutes a significant brake on innovation, causing a very long start-up period before new ideas can be implemented. At present, the Swedish policy response to this is:

- a) to try and influence ExCom policy in connection with ExCom meetings,
- b) to go on trying to get bilateral projects with the new ideas approved by ExCom.

Policy option a) is perfectly valid. Whereas actually getting the projects carried out if Sweden and host country(-ies) wish it, without interference from ExCom, could be better than option b) as delays could be avoided and a real-life example be set. During the time that a project is being processed at ExCom, CFC is still being used, smuggling is continuing etc, while the planned support measures cannot be implemented as they are “stuck in the pipeline”.

This could be a reason to change the present policy of submitting projects through the 20 % quota and ExCom restrictions. Furthermore, in this hypothetical case with new project models, carrying out a project while ExCom is waiting for their one and only project to be completed could be a very good way of influencing the design of such projects. Admittedly, it would only be the ExCom-project that got official discussion at ExCom meetings, but Sweden and the host country could tell other ExCom members about the project before the meeting, as information and as a background for policy decisions to be taken at ExCom.

ExCom policy restrictions – Only incremental costs

The Multilateral Fund is meant to pay for incremental costs for converting to non-ODS technology. This has sometimes been a problem when cleaner production options have been available. Although these options should in the long run save money, they may often be seen as too risky for the individual companies. Therefore it would be necessary to introduce these techniques with some seed funding – which is not available from the Fund because there shouldn't be any incremental costs.

An example of an independent Swedish direct bilateral project, that partly for the above-mentioned reason concerning incremental costs was not an ExCom project, is a project on solvent use in China. From 1997 to 2001, Sweden carried out a project in China, based in Shanghai, to demonstrate efficient techniques to phase-out ODS solvents in the cleaning of electronics and metal. This project was carried out as a Swedish project, independently of the Multilateral Fund. One reason for this was that the project was intended to support no-clean techniques for electronics,²⁰ a form of cleaner production which should basically be cheaper in the long run. Thus there should not have been any incremental costs for the production – and the MF only finances incremental costs (although it can finance know-how for new, less costly technology).

The project was operated by UNDP in China, and coincided in time with UNDP's project to develop a national phase-out strategy for CFC (as well as CTC and TCA) in the solvent sector. Apparently the Swedish project had some influence at this stage on the project to develop a national strategy, thereby to some extent influencing the whole 52 MUSD national phase-out plan for ODS solvents in China.

Critical review

Although ExCom does have cumbersome procedures, a critical review can be useful. If Sweden decides to run direct bilateral projects, an independent review – preferably by non-Swedish actors – should be carried out in order to get a critical view. In this case the criteria for the evaluation, as well as the schedule, are controlled by Sida (rather than by ExCom). The aim should be that the efficiency gains in improved design of the projects more than offset the cost for the review.

5.8.2 Keeping assistance within the 20% quota

Another option is to keep the programmes within the 20% quota. The pros and cons for such an option are discussed below. The issues presented here touch and overlap in some respect with the ones presented above.

During the period of 1999 to 2002 Sweden has had 7 projects approved by Ex-Com. Most of these projects are still ongoing. Only one project has so far been disapproved. The projects approved at ExCom have followed the Sida Guidelines for the Swedish Bilateral Programme under the Montreal Protocol of May 1997. As mentioned above, Sweden has had an impact on the ExCom decisions. However, it is difficult to see/evaluate if Swedish projects that have been approved by ExCom also have been innovative – pioneering character – in the sense that they have also affected the ExCom's decisions in general.

From the above discussion, when some of these projects are proven successful they have also managed to influence the criteria for project approval under the MF. These innovations have undoubtedly had positive effect on how to best tackle the phasing out of ODS in a number of sectors, including the SMEs which is a complex issue and the question is now how to best approach

²⁰ I.e., avoiding the use of solvents altogether, rather than just using alternative solvents.

this task in order to achieve the best result in accordance to the MP. A critical, three-year period is envisaged to lie ahead.

The question that is raised here is if Swedish financing of the projects should continue along the same “old” path or if Sweden is better off to go “direct bilateral” i.e. to channel financing through regular bilateral channels in order to avoid the ExCom’s cumbersome screening procedures.

There are two questions that have to be tackled before an answer to the question whether to stay within the 20% quota can be given. The first relates to the experience gained from the seven approved projects. It may be too early and the experience gained too scarce to say if the projects within the 20 % quota have been cost beneficial and if the “common good” within the MP is better maintained than finding alternative solutions of financing the Swedish projects.

The Swedish goal for bilateral projects to have an “echoing effect” on the ExCom is difficult to evaluate. Some of these “echoing effects” derive their force from the Swedish Guidelines mentioned above and in some of the projects.

The second question relates to the experience gained from the projects that already have been financed on a regular bilateral basis, as the China solvent project (discussed above) outside the 20% quota. These projects are even fewer than the above seven within the 20% quota. In this case the “echoing effect” – among member states to the MP – is more difficult to evaluate than in the first case. As a result it is more difficult to evaluate the effect of this/these projects that are outside the 20% quota than within the quota.

Concluding remark

It seems to be difficult to evaluate the overall effect of the Swedish projects’ “echoing effects” on the ExCom. As indicated above ExCom has during the years from 1999–2002 approved seven projects and others are now pipelined to be channelled through the ExCom. From this evaluation only few projects seem to have been really “pioneering” and consequently had direct effect on ExCom’s future decisions.

Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to continue to channel pioneering projects for submission at the ExCom. Even if projects with “pioneering effects” are few and initially refused and the process at ExCom tedious there seems to be a positive effect on other member countries and also has an impact on ExCom that eventually leads to approval and creates an “echoing effect”.

These pioneering projects should continue to be channelled through the 20% quota even if they are delayed and may have negative – short-term – consequences for the recipient country.

Sweden has considerable experience from ExCom procedures. Sweden should therefore try and streamline its projects better so that more projects can be seen as “pioneering” and channelled through the 20% quota. This could be achieved by revising the Guidelines. Also, a closer examination of ExCom’s decisions could be helpful in this respect.

In this respect Sweden should also try to evaluate ExCom procedures so it better can overview the ExCom lines and accordingly prepare better proposals. The proposals should also reflect the use of LFA tools relating to non-investment projects.²¹

²¹ An evaluation or an assessment of ExCom’s decisions could possibly give a better understanding of ExCom’s visions and help streamline the guidelines and future projects. This would also be beneficial for all implementing agencies.

5.9 Financial Remarks

The ToR raises the question if it would make any difference if Sweden did not have a bilateral programme? Can the relatively high costs for administration of the bilateral support be justified by the positive effects of the programme?

SEI's costs in the 38 month period from Aug 1999 – Sept 2002, excluding support to the Foreign Ministry in ExCom, were 5.65 MSEK: 4.40 MSEK for the base assignment and 1.25 MSEK for the preparation of project documents.²² According to SEI, the administrative costs have constituted 50 700 SEK per month out of these total costs.

The budget for SEI's work with the bilateral programme is thus approximately 50 % of the total sum available for Swedish projects under the 20 % quota. In one way, this is a very high cost, compared with the up to 15 % that the multilateral implementing agencies have for Multilateral Fund projects.²³ However, the ambitious goal of the Swedish bilateral programme is to use a small sum – the Swedish 20 % quota – in order to influence the use of the other, much larger, total support through the Multilateral Fund. Thus, higher overhead costs can be motivated if the Swedish projects do influence the rest of ExCom. It can also be noted that SEI's budget includes costs for administration, project identification, project preparation and project support to consultants. However, the issue could be raised whether the administrative portion could be reduced.

In order to ensure effective use of Sida's resources in the form of SEI's relatively high overhead costs, the evaluators suggest that there should be more regular follow-up of the use of these resources and a stricter prioritization among project ideas. SEI should be requested to identify to a greater extent in the accounts which costs pertain to which project ideas. SEI, in co-ordination with Sida, should have a procedure to regularly review the situation and prioritize on the basis of the revised guidelines, compared with the costs so far, and anticipated costs, for each project idea.

There should not be an implicit goal to try and ensure that the whole Swedish quota is filled. If there are projects that fulfil the criteria for the Swedish bilateral support and are accepted at ExCom, and that altogether correspond to the 20 % – all the better, but the emphasis is on fulfilling the criteria, not on reaching 20 %.

5.10 Conclusions and recommendations

It is difficult to make an overall assessment of the projects within the Swedish bilateral programme. One reason is that only two projects have been completed, another is that the ultimate objective of the Swedish bilateral projects is to influence other projects financed by the Multilateral Fund, and it is not easy to distinguish their input from a host of other factors that influence the MF projects. However, it is clear that SEI have carried out the Swedish bilateral program with competence and that SEI is much respected by other stakeholders for their work.

The Swedish bilateral ODS phase-out programme is guided by Sida's guidelines for this programme, from 1997. There is no LFA in these guidelines or in the ToR for the programme, which is a disadvantage for the effective formulation and evaluation of projects. Furthermore, the guidelines are not up-to-date, as there have been many changes in the policy environment of ODS phase-out projects since the guidelines were formulated.

²² SEI's accounts for their work given to Sida as well as personal communication from SEI.

²³ The ExCom rules give implementing agencies 7.5 – 9 % of the project costs. Furthermore the three implementing agencies that run most individual projects (UNIDO, UNDP and the World Bank) each get about 2.5 MUS\$D/year in core funding for personnel and for project preparation. This adds up to *approximately* 12 – 15 % of the total budget for projects by these agencies.

The main Swedish strengths appear to lie in the areas of refrigerant management, import/export control systems and networking. Outside these areas, the Swedish resource base concerning ODS phase-out appears to be very limited.

Through budgetary reallocations it would probably be possible, within the same total Swedish budget for ODS phase-out support, to establish some direct, independent Swedish bilateral projects to complement the Swedish projects under the ExCom bilateral quota. The advantage with this would be the possibility to more directly design some projects according to Swedish priorities and to carry them out more rapidly; the disadvantage would be that the impact (“echoing effect”) on ExCom through gaining approval at ExCom meetings would be lost.

The total overhead costs for the Swedish bilateral programme are high compared to the overhead costs of the multilateral implementing agencies. These costs include costs for administration, project identification, project preparation and project support to consultants. These costs are partly due to a high level of ambition. They can be motivated if the Swedish projects are examples that influence many other ExCom projects.

The evaluators make the following recommendations:

1. Revised guidelines, with a log-frame matrix, should be prepared for the bilateral support programme in order to clarify more particularly what Sweden can and should achieve. The LFA should be an aid in the preparation and evaluation of the bilateral support. The revised guidelines should take into account developments and policy changes since the original Guidelines were formulated in 1997.
2. The guidelines should specify the types of projects that should be given priority by Sida/SEI. Priorities should be based on what is important for Sweden to influence in ExCom and the Implementing Agencies, and focus on Sweden’s comparative advantages, *ie* refrigerant management, import/ export control systems and networking.
3. The revised guidelines will need to be reviewed on a regular basis in order to take into account developments in ExCom etc., at least once every three years (corresponding to the business plan period).
4. Sida should institute procedures for more control and review by SEI and Sida of the use of SEI’s funding from Sida. SEI, in co-ordination with Sida, should have a procedure to more regularly review the situation and prioritize among project ideas on the basis of the guidelines compared with the costs so far, and the anticipated costs, for each project idea.
5. This prioritization should include both the choice of how much effort to put into a project, as well as an analysis of whether the project should be carried out under ExCom rules or as an independent bilateral project:
6. Projects which after a thorough analysis are judged to have great importance to be put through ExCom in order to influence ExCom practice – as well as having a reasonable probability of being approved – should be channelled through the 20 % quota.
7. For other projects, urgency and Swedish control may be more important. For instance, it may be most valuable for projects which have a high degree of learning and capacity building for the Article 5 country, that they start on an early basis. Thus it is recommended that room should be created for independent projects (direct bilateral support). If Sida does not wish to increase the total budget for Montreal Protocol support, support to ODSNET/SEAP could probably be switched over to being financed over the 20 % quota, while the equivalent resources could then be liberated for other, independent Swedish bilateral support.

8. A strategy-development process should also look at other ways of influencing the outcome of MF-financed projects, by financing more active Swedish involvement and influence directly in the policy-making of the dominant multilateral implementing agencies, e.g. through
- seconded staff or internships at multilateral implementing agencies,
 - high-level contacts with multilateral implementing agencies
 - support to the Swedish resource base to get contracts with the multilateral implementing agencies

6. ODSONET/SEAP

Based on the successful Swedish experience of a network for ODS-officers in the Nordic countries during the 1980s, a Swedish initiative, with Ingrid Kökeritz as the original driving force, was taken to start a similar network for South-East Asia and the Pacific (ODSONET/SEAP). The Network started work in 1992, and celebrated its 10th anniversary with a meeting in Stockholm in 2002. Since the start of this network, another seven networks have started, covering most Article five countries. Each network also has one or two developed countries as members, in order to share experiences from the ODS phase-out. In the SEAP Network, the developed countries are Sweden and Australia – originally also New Zealand, but they later withdrew.²⁴

The idea of the network was to enhance collaboration and experience sharing between regional Ozone Officers, a desire to further South-South and North-South co-operation through knowledge transfer.

Sweden currently finances the costs of operating the ODSONET/SEAP, while the Multilateral Fund finances the remaining seven. Sweden's funding is through Sida's regional development assistance programme, and is additional to the Swedish financial contribution for implementing of the MP. It is thus not part of the 20 % quota for bilateral projects. All eight ODS-networks are supported through UNEP regional offices, with UNEP DTIE in Paris providing co-ordination and technical assistance.

Having had the privilege to attend the ODSONET/SEAP tenth anniversary meeting in Stockholm, the evaluators strongly agree that the Network is extremely useful for the participants and for their work to phase out their countries' use of CFC and other ODS.

6.1 Evaluating networks

The ODSONET/SEAP network has recently been evaluated.²⁵ This evaluation points out that it is difficult to define linear end-means, input-output and cause effect relations. The evaluation points out that in regional Networks:

“There are too many factors interrelated with mutual (positive or negative) feedback effects which influence overall effectiveness and goal-achievement of the ODS phase-out process. It is, therefore, practically impossible, useless and in some cases also misleading to directly attribute certain results to activities isolated from the overall context of a complex process. Attempts to measure the effectiveness of networks in terms of quantities of ODS eliminated ... could be compared to an effort to evaluate the performance at school in terms of future income. Results at school may constitute an important condition for increasing future earnings but the latter depend on the configuration of innumerable other factors not subject to performance at school. In analogy, Networks may contribute to increase the effectiveness of the phase-out process but there is no deterministic link between their immediate results and the success of the phase-out strategy.

²⁴ The other seven networks are: South Asia (which also includes East Asian countries, namely China, Mongolia and the Koreans, and has Japan and the United Kingdom as developed country members), West Asia (with France and Germany), South America, Central America and the Caribbean (all three with Canada and the U.S.), French-speaking Africa (with France and Switzerland) and English-speaking Africa (with Germany).

²⁵ Evaluation of Regional Networks with particular reference to the SEAP Network, On request of the Multilateral Fund Secretariat presented by Stefan A. Musto. Bangkok/Berlin, April 2000.

... in the case of Networks costs and results are not commensurable. Financial inputs are quantifiable, outputs (e.g. capacity building, exchange of experiences) are not”.

The present evaluators agree with this way of viewing networks.

6.2 Ozone officers

The evaluators have noted that the turnover of ODS-officers is very high. Many of the participants at the latest ODSNET/SEAP meeting had only been ODS-officers for a year or two. This can hardly be said to be caused by deficiencies in the Network. The high turnover is something that stakeholders are aware of, but have difficulties to find a solution to. It emphasizes all the more the need for the Network and the importance of informal collaboration and experience sharing between National Ozone Officers. All the recently appointed ODS-officers agreed that the support they receive in the Network is very important for them to develop competence and capacity for dealing with their tasks in their respective country.

6.2.1 Gender issues

There is a high proportion of females among the ODSNET/SEAP-members, and it our impression from participation at the tenth-anniversary meeting that they participate the Network on an equal basis.

6.3 Alternative financing of the network?

Sida question: Advantages and disadvantages with alternative financing of the network, via MF or via the Swedish bilateral programme.

The ODSNET/SEAP Network has been funded through Swedish bilateral assistance. Considering that the seven other networks are financed over the Multilateral Fund's normal budget, with no bilateral financing, it would be practically possible to turn over the financing of ODSNET/SEAP to the Multilateral Fund. However, the financing of the Network would then be subsumed in the budget of UNEP's Compliance Assistance Programme (CAP), probably entailing altogether less resources for this programme, which largely consists of the kind of capacity building programmes that Sweden is trying to support and increase. Furthermore, it could easily be seen as “sending the wrong signals [about Sweden's commitment]” as one of our interlocutors credibly put it.

However, if Sweden wishes to have more resources to support ODS-phase-out that are freely disposable rather than bound to ExCom guidelines (see discussion on pros and cons in section 5.8) it would probably be possible to transfer the funding of the ODSNET/SEAP to the Swedish bilateral quota of 20 % of funding to the MF. This should in the first instance only be done if the Network would continue to cover approximately the same area, and not be merged with other regions. As many of the other Networks are of the same size as the SEAP-network (several have about the same number of countries, and probably most have smaller population and ODS-consumption), a Swedish support under the 20 % quota would probably be acceptable. It can be noted that most of the other networks also have or will soon have (in the case of the African networks) one Regional Network coordinator each, although the three Central/South American networks share one. Sweden would probably ensure continued staffing at the same level at present. It is also important to ensure that no other deleterious changes would be made in the event of the envisaged changing of mode of funding.

If such a changeover is to be made, it cannot realistically be made until 2004. It is not possible yet, without more studies and discussions, to tell what disadvantages there might be with such a changeover. However, the evaluators have discussed this idea with e.g. representatives of UNEP, who have not dismissed it. It would also take time to make the necessary redistributions in Sida's budget.

6.4 UNEP's performance

Sida question: An evaluation of UNEP's and the programme coordinator's performance and support to the network members.

The SEAP Network's information-sharing structure includes a Regional Network Coordinator (RNC) acting as a facilitator, arranging the Network meetings and supporting the NOUs in other ways. The RNC is based in UNEP's regional office in Bangkok. His role is to attend to the National Ozone Officers. UNEP also has a Network Manager who is based at the UNEP headquarters office in Paris, and who supports all the RNCs at the different UNEP regional offices.

The overall impression of the SEAP Network is that communication is strong and that RNC is dedicated and willing to participate in the informal collaboration among the National Ozone Officers. The RNC has made a particular effort to ensure that new ODS officers in the Network are properly introduced.

An email forum has recently been started, with a moderate rate of usage. Although the usage rate could be higher, the prevailing rate is definitely useful.

The progress reports and financial statements from UNEP about the Network, and the meeting reports, are often delivered too late to Sida, entailing inefficiencies for Sida's follow-up of the work.

6.5 Ownership and partnership

Sida question: Assessing and discussing the ownership and partnership character of the project and its activities. Is the ownership in the right place? If needed – how can it be improved? To what extent are the activities based on partnership between the network members?

There is networking in the form of support from more developed A5Cs to less developed ones, also outside of the network meetings. There is also an exchange of policy ideas and information, which has been strengthened now that there is a network also involving customs officers.

However, it can be noted that the positive effects of the Network activities have only had a limited impact on the national political level. Relations between ministries, EPAs and other stakeholders seem sometimes to be lacking in commitment and this may effect the implementation of ODS phase-out strategies. Environmental issues, particularly related to the MP, are perceived as a low ranking issue.

The evaluators suggest that Sida together with UNEP should elaborate a policy in order to reach out at a National level. Ozone issues are ranked low in most of the Article 5 countries. The purpose with this "national networking" is to inform ministries and authorities in the country about current developments concerning threats against and protection of the ozone layer, and if possible also to upgrade the status of these issues in the country. The RNC or the Network Manager together with Sida/the Embassy can work to achieve this by a high level meeting in the country. Sweden and the EU can also support these issues in contacts at the ASEAN level.

Sida question: Potential for improvements regarding issues of concern for the network members.

There is networking outside the meeting. There are several examples of bilateral support between A5-countries within the Network. This bilateral support will tend to be from more experienced to less experienced countries, and entails some cost for the country that has to set aside resources for transfer of experience and know-how. UNEP has recently decided to create a special budget line to support such activities. The evaluators find that this is a very good idea, as there is otherwise a risk that some transfer of experience will not take place.

Swedish experiences are a very important contribution to the Network. The evaluators are convinced that the contribution of the Swedish EPA is very valuable and well-tuned to the needs of the A5Cs. However, it is important that Sweden participates in a supportive role – it is the ideas and perspectives of the Article-5 countries, which must dominate the dialogue. There is a slight risk with the Swedish counterparts' enthusiasm to spread the Swedish model, including their interest in finding new bilateral projects, that this important psychological aspect might not be fully taken into consideration in all interaction with the SEAP-countries.

6.5.1 Overall capacity building

Networking as a method is a useful input to the general institutional strengthening of the countries' environmental work. However, it does need to be kept in mind that ozone layer protection is not the most important environmental issue for these tropical countries, and may thus not always be the best peg on which to hang efforts to strengthen overall environmental awareness. Particularly in some of the least-developed countries, the ODS phase-out cannot be expected to be a national priority.

6.6 Go Networking?

There is no doubt that the innovation of the Network and the support to the ODSONET/SEAP Network have proven to be successful. Sweden has shown that the Network idea is needed and that it works. Sweden has furthermore, greater experience than most other countries in this area and should therefore take the lead to support other areas with ideas to maintain and improve network structures.

We suggest that Sweden should use some resources that Sida wishes to make available to instigate a European cooperation to create and support a network covering roughly the area of the Confederation of Independent States (approximately the former Soviet Union). Involving Russia and the Central Asian republics in a network would be a way of lifting the self-confidence and status of ODS-officers in these countries.²⁶

This is not a project that Sweden can or should run on its own, for many reasons, not least that Sweden's potential contributions of both personnel and financial resources would be far from sufficient on their own. For instance, for networking in this field, the Swedish resources are probably mainly limited to the Swedish EPA, SEI, IKZ-Miljökonsult and Globalkonsult. However, with Sweden's experience and reputation concerning networking, we could have a unique strength to help start up this cooperation which could be vital for the realization of the Montreal Protocol. Other suitable parties in such cooperation could be other EU member states, the European Union itself as well as other countries. Financing from GEF might also be a possibility.

²⁶ This suggestion is also made in "A Country-Driven Approach to the Phaseout of Ozone- Depleting Substances in Developing Countries", by Rasmus Rasmusson et al., March 2001.

In instigating such a work, the practical but important language issue will need to be looked into at an early stage, as it will have an impact on which individuals in different potential supporting countries will be able to participate in the Network.

6.7 Financial remarks

The financial maintenance for the ODSONET/SEAP Network was 2.02 MUSD (approximately 20 MSEK) during the period 1990 – 2000. The first meetings and conferences were held in 1992 and it is from that date that the tenth anniversary was celebrated in Stockholm 2002. During the period 2001 – 2002, Sweden has disbursed 4.6 million SEK to UNEP for the Network.

Sida question: Efficiency and administration costs for the network compared to other similar types of capacity building efforts.

An undisputed fact is that Network activities are perceived as crucial for the phasing-out of ODS. A particular success story is the ODSONET/SEAP Network. The network costs include the operational costs of the two annual meetings of the Network including travel, per diem expenses of the Ozone Officers for attending the meetings and the salary and associated costs of the RNC.

The evaluators have discussed with UNEP a comparison with the other networks' budgets. The budgets are not constructed in directly comparable ways, but UNEP sees the SEAP-network as one of the more economical networks. However, this is partly due to the fact that some costs of the SEAP network are carried by UNEP outside the Swedish contribution.

6.8 Conclusions and recommendations

Although networking is difficult to evaluate in numerical terms, the fact that the concept of regional networks has spread to cover virtually the whole globe from this original Swedish initiative can be seen as a ringing endorsement of its perceived value. Furthermore, one thing all our interviewed stakeholders have been unanimous about has been the immense value of the Networks and of Sweden's great contribution to bringing them about. However, there also needs to be a pragmatic understanding that in some of the least-developed countries, the ODS phase-out cannot be expected to be a national priority, so the level of commitment will vary.

The evaluators make the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. That support to the ODSONET/SEAP should continue and resources should be secured for continued Swedish participation in the Network.
2. The existing LFA should be used, maybe modified, but it must be allowed to use subjective verifications and subjective assessments of the various results and objectives.
3. Swedish experiences are a very important contribution. However, it is also important that Sweden participates in a supporting role – it is the ideas and perspectives of the Article-5 countries, which must dominate.
4. If Sweden wishes to have more resources in the ODS-phase-out area that are freely disposable rather than bound to ExCom rules, it would probably be possible to transfer the funding of the ODSONET/SEAP to the Swedish bilateral quota of 20 % of funding to MF. This should in the first instance only be done if the Network would continue to cover approximately the same area, and not be merged with other regions.

5. Sweden should, together with other experienced developed countries, initiate a discussion regarding financing of new networks. Cooperation with the EU and interested individual countries to instigate a network covering approximately the Confederation of Independent States could be of vital importance to secure the success of the Montreal Protocol.

7. Concluding Remarks

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is considered to be a landmark Multilateral Environmental Agreement, as it furthers and strengthens North-South cooperation through knowledge-transfer in the area of phasing out ODS. The mechanisms relating to the Multilateral Fund are such that experiences learned can well be introduced in other international environmental conventions. This is the case, even if the phase-out plan in the Protocol is quite inflexible, imposing identical phase-out plans on the vast and disparate group of countries called “developing countries” (or “Article 5 Countries” in Protocol parlance), without flexible mechanisms for optimizing resource use as there are in, e.g., the Kyoto Protocol. When the Protocol’s goal is successfully fulfilled, the Multilateral Fund will be considered as a successful instrument to achieve the objectives set forth in the protocol.

To achieve the goals, ExCom applies a strict approach regarding its rules and procedures, and focuses on ODS consumption/production statistics – with perhaps too little attention to how these figures are really obtained. However, there is some room for flexibility in ExCom’s procedures particularly within each country’s 20% bilateral quota.

Sweden has played an important role throughout the development of the Protocol, being a pioneer in domestic ODS-restrictions and being an influential participant in the negotiations leading up to the protocol. Sweden is continuing this role by being an active participant in the work of ExCom (even when it does not actually hold a seat at the meetings), and by operating its own bilateral programme steered by guidelines with an approach of influencing overall ExCom policies.

Thus Sweden can play a role as an innovator trying to influence and extend ExCom’s procedures and approaches in order to safeguard a viable and sustainable ODS phase-out.

Sweden’s approach appears to be largely constructive and successful. For optimal results, however, Sweden must focus, and concentrate on some areas where Sweden can make a significant difference, also taking into consideration where significant input in line with Swedish goals is already being carried out by other countries or implementing agencies.

From the experiences of the bilateral programme, it seems that the Swedish comparative advantages lie chiefly in RMPs (refrigerant servicing sub-sector, SMEs) and in export/import issues (legislation, licensing administration). These comparative advantages appear to be based on a combination of competent human resources and a willingness to pay for quality and capacity-building. The Swedish Bilateral Programme has high “overhead” costs, but these costs are to a significant extent connected with diligent and extensive preparation as well as extra top-up efforts when ExCom’s financial restrictions are too great compared with the resources needed to ensure sustainable capacity-building.

Working within the ExCom 20 % quota for bilateral projects provides both opportunities and obstacles. The opportunity is to influence ExCom policy by creating decisions that can be precedents for future projects, whereas the obstacles can be some ExCom policies that may hinder efficient work for some Swedish policy goals. Sweden has thus two main options that it can follow:

1. To maintain its entire 20% quota unchanged, channelling all bilateral projects through ExCom;
2. To open a funding also for some independent projects. In this case, Sida should assess if a project is most suitable to run through ExCom (policy influence) or to run as a direct bilateral project (faster startup, more freedom to prioritise capacity building).

Whatever Sida decides, it should also use additional tools to improve the focus of the projects and to create evidence of effectiveness. “Soft issues” can be difficult to evaluate. Using log-frame analysis in the bilateral programmes will help Sida to clarify more particularly what Sweden can and should achieve. The LFA should be an aid in the preparation and evaluation of the bilateral support. The Programme Guidelines should be regularly updated to include present-day policy situation in ExCom etc., starting with policy changes from the time of the formulation of the Guidelines in 1997 to the present.

Sweden also has an important contribution to make – a comparative advantage – concerning experience with networks. The Network of ODS officers in South- East Asia are a success story based on a Swedish initiative. Continued Swedish support and commitment in one form or another is valuable. The Swedish experience of networks could also be exploited in an international initiative to develop a network covering approximately the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Confederation of Independent States. This could turn out to be a very important contribution to the success of the Montreal Protocol.

The evaluators’ overall assessment is that the Swedish contribution has been very useful in the global ODS phase-out. An important issue for designing strategies is that the Swedish resource base for working with ODS phase-out in developing countries is fairly small. The present arrangements entail a very high dependence on SEI, which has developed a unique competence in Sweden concerning this work. To a certain extent the Swedish resource base could be strengthened, e.g. with some backup support to get international contracts. But considering that the ODS phase-out has already almost completely taken place in Sweden, the resource base is not likely to increase dramatically beyond its present extent. Therefore, the strategy and prioritisations should be based on the limitations of the Swedish resource base.

With the increased use of larger more all-encompassing projects, e.g. National CFC Phase-out Plans, it might be more difficult for a relatively small player like Sweden/SEI to find projects. Maybe cooperation with like-minded countries, e.g. Nordic countries, pooling the 20 % for bilaterals, could be one way to continue with projects having a different profile from those of the multilateral implementing agencies. However, the coordination costs in the form of negotiations and administration could well be significant.

ANNEX 1

Sida

INEC/URBAN

2002-09-19

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF THREE Sida-FUNDED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SWEDISH BILATERAL SUPPORT UNDER THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL

1. Background

The Montreal Protocol (MP) is an international agreement aiming at reduction and phase-out of the use and production of ozone depleting substances (ODS). A specific financial mechanism, the Multilateral Fund (MF) of the MP, has been set up to assist developing countries in their fulfilment of the agreement.

Sweden is one of the parties to the Montreal Protocol and contributes each year to the multilateral fund. In addition Sweden participates in the Executive Committee of the Fund (ExCom), sharing a vote with the former EFTA-countries.

Up to 20% of each country's financial contribution to the Fund might be used directly for bilateral co-operation, provided that the Fund's Executive Committee approves the projects. Sweden has decided to explore the possible benefits of direct bilateral support. The principles and priorities are set out in "The Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for the Swedish Bilateral Programme. Sida 1997". Sida has had the responsibility to administer the Swedish bilateral programme on a trial basis since the fiscal year 1996/97.

1.1 Programme objectives

The overall objective of the Swedish bilateral Co-operation Programme is to support the process in developing countries in areas of critical *importance for a sustainable and cost-efficient phase-out of ODS*.

This implies i.a.:

- An integral approach, using the development of systems for efficient implementation procedures, as a spearhead for environmental control and monitoring in general. Examples of such systems for control and monitoring of the use of ODS are legislation, customs control, educational schemes and accreditation schemes.
- A holistic approach to use environmentally sound technologies, covering all environmental effects. One aim is to tackle the emerging use of transitional alternatives, such as HCFC (with a high global warming potential).
- Addressing the widespread and small-scale use of ODS (e.g. in the service-sector), not only the large sources. Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), taken together, have a large share of the total ODS.

The programme is also based on the assumption that the successful approaches during the Swedish phase-out can be useful also in other regions. The programme should therefore also address the need to maintain and develop a resource base with sufficient working capacity in Sweden for technology transfer¹ in this specific area.

¹ Please note that the term "Technology transfer" also includes so-called "soft" technologies – like knowledge.

The extra inputs needed to run a separate bilateral programme should give at least equally valuable outputs in return. The aim is to provide a flexible support-mechanism for non-investment projects, and when such projects are proven successful also influence the criteria for project approval under the Multilateral Fund of the MP. The Swedish support may change the use of the funding of the MF in a more cost-effective way.

1.2 Objectives and content of the three contributions /projects in the programme subject to evaluation.

To date, the programme encompasses three parts:

1. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) support as advisers to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in ExCom and other work related to the Montreal Protocol.
2. The Swedish bilateral Ozone Layer Protection Programme implemented and co-ordinated by SEI.
3. ODSOINET/SEAP, a regional network between National Ozone Units (NOUs) in South East Asia and the Pacific, implemented by UNEP Division of Technology Industry and Economics in Paris and regionally through a co-ordinator at UNEP Regional Office for Asia/Pacific in Bangkok.

	Development objective	Project objective/s	Budget SEK
1. Support to Swedish participation in ExCom and MP negotiations	Referring to the general ones.	Swedish participation in negotiations /ExCom meetings.	288 000 Nov 2001–June 2003
2. Coordination + Administration of the Swedish bilateral Programme under the MP	Support developing countries in areas of critical importance for a sustainable and cost-efficient phase-out of ODS, especially through noninvestment projects (capacity building).	Increase the amount and quality of Swedish bilateral projects. Identification of potential projects. Development of Swedish resource base.	8 268 000 July 1999– June 2003
3. Support to regional network ODSOINET/ SEAP	Strengthen the capacity of network countries government to phase out the consumption of ODS.	Improvements in SMEs, refrigeration and air condition (AC) service sectors.	3 300 000 expenditures 1998–2000 4 600 000 2001–2002

No Swedish bilateral projects were approved in ExCom before 1999. Three bilateral projects were approved in ExCom November 1999 at a total maximum cost of USD 430 850. In the triennium 2000—2002 USD 363,127 per year can be used for bilateral projects, total USD 1,520,231 for 1999—2002 SEK.

1. The Stockholm Environment Institute has been advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their work in ExCom for several years. The ministry paid SEI for these services from 1997 until November 2001 and after that Sida has financed this support. The SEI adviser reads a considerable amount of the papers to be presented at the three ExCom meetings per year and is supposed to identify strategic and important issues. The adviser is also present at the ExCom meetings and the preparatory meetings.
2. SEI implements *the Swedish bilateral Ozone layer Protection programme* on behalf of Sida since July 1999. The programme should benefit from experience of efficient methods gained through the

Swedish phase-out of ODS, and adapt them to counterpart conditions. To date, six bilateral projects at a total cost of USD 752 800 have been approved by ExCom, of which two also have been completed. Sweden plans to propose projects for approval in ExCom November 2002. If they are approved they will consume the total amount of available bilateral Swedish assistance during the period 2000–2002. The projects addresses issues like refrigerant management plans, use of ODS in the service sector, import/export licensing systems and customs control, halon management plan and phase-out strategy for non CFCsolvents in SE Asia.

3. Sweden has for ten years supported the first *ODS-officers network for South-East Asia and the Pacific (SEAP)*, based on a model from Nordic countries co-operation. The network model is now used for cooperation also in six other regions; these are financed by the MF. ODSINET/SEAP is still funded by Sidas regional development assistance programme, additional to the Swedish financial contribution for implementation of the MP. All ODS-networks are being implemented through UNEP regional offices, with UNEP DTIE in Paris providing co-ordination and technical assistance.

2. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

Sida has decided to evaluate the contributions to the Swedish bilateral Programme under the Montreal protocol during autumn 2002. The purpose is to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the present programme and create a good basis for decision-making on the need and type of further support in coming project periods. Requests for further support during the next project period is anticipated from UNEP regarding ODSINET/SEAP. The contract with SEI is valid until June 2003 and Sida needs to decide on the future of the bilateral support beginning of 2003.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and the Ministry of Environment also participate in the international work and it is important that their views are taken on board in the evaluation.

The programme and its guidelines are presently functioning on a trial basis. Its basic assumptions need to be assessed, and necessary changes made.

The evaluation shall focus on the period 1999 and onwards.

The *degree and benefit of interaction and synergy* between the three parts of this programme needs to be explored. If one or two of the parts are not supported in the future, will that influence the other parts in a negative or positive way? Can the parts be design to complement each other better?

The key questions on the different parts can be summarised:

2.1 Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) as advisers to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in ExCom and other work related to the Montreal Protocol.

- a) Has SEI succeeded in giving the Ministry concrete proposals relating to policy options in ExCom?
- b) Has SEI actively contributed to negotiations in the ExCom?
- c) Possible effects on the Ministry postures if SEI had not prepared and participated in ExCom meetings and other issues related to the Montreal Protocol.
- d) Can the Ministry find advisers elsewhere or increase its own capacity?

2.2 Regarding the bilateral programme

Evaluation criteria: Degree of fulfilment of the overall objective.

- a. Do the projects help the developing countries in identifying and phasing out the widely spread out small-scale use of ODS, in particular CFCs?
- b. Do the projects have a pilot-character, influencing the preparation and approval of MF-projects in areas prioritised by Sweden such as small scale use of ODS or even influencing ExCom policies? Has this lead to a more cost-effective use of the MF?
- c. Assessing and discussing the ownership in the developing countries and the capacity building component of the projects and their activities. Have the country abilities to tackle the phase out been strengthened via the projects? How can it be improved?²
- d. Have the national ozone units (NOUs) been strengthened through the projects or other stakeholders?
- e. Have the projects helped bring concerns to higher political and administrative levels in the countries?
- f. To what extent does the programme work in the spirit of partnership between developing countries and developed countries?
- g. The evaluation shall describe the *size and role of the Swedish resource base*, its development over time since early 1990-ies, and how it has been used for support to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol in developing countries. Is there (still) a need and interest for Swedish expertise in the field from the recipients? From the Swedish resource base including the Swedish environmental authorities³?
- h. Would it make any difference if Sweden did not have a bilateral program? Can the relatively high costs for administration of the bilateral support be justified by the positive effects of the program?
- i. Explore the reasons for difficulties Sida and SEI have encountered in finding countries interested of cooperation to the extent that it results in approved projects. Some of the started projects that did not lead to approved projects should be studied.

2.3 Regarding the support to ODSNET/SEAP

Evaluation criteria: Degree of a sustainable capacity building⁴. Use of efficient methods and lessons learned within and amongst the network(s).

- a) Advantages and disadvantages with alternative financing of the network, via MF or via the Swedish bilateral programme.
- b) Assessing and discussing the ownership and partnership character of the project and its activities. Is the ownership in the right place? If needed-how can it be improved? To what extent are the activities based on partnership between the network members?
- c) Potential for improvements regarding issues of concern for the network members.
- d) An evaluation of UNEPs and the programme coordinators performance and support to the network members.

² For Reference on these specific matters in the context of ODS-networks, please see the Harvard University report: A Country driven approach to the phase-out of Ozone-depleting substances in Developing countries. Rasmusson, Artusio et al March 2001.

³ Ministry of Environment, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Swedish EPA and others.

⁴ For Reference, see the Desk study on evaluation of regional networks. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/30/8

e) Efficiency and administration costs for the network compared to other similar types of capacity building efforts.⁴

3. The Assignment – Issues to be covered in the evaluation

The assignment consists of three major parts:

3.1 *Compilation of outputs versus inputs*

3.2 *Evaluating the relevance of the existing design of the programme* by answering the key-questions above

3.3 *Summarising and commenting the inputs from stakeholders and other interested parties during the evaluation, turning them into relevant recommendations for the future.*

As can be seen in the project documentation, the *results are mainly* presented at the output-level. The evaluation shall assess and describe *factors critical to success and failure*. Such factors should be classified according to if (and if so how) they can be avoided or if they are inevitable. Division of responsibilities for possible and necessary improvements shall be included in the report.

The administrative capacity of the programme/project management shall also be evaluated, i.e. – delivery of reports and financial follow up, even if the main purpose of this assignment is rather learning than control. Items above should all be included but are not necessarily the limitation of the assignment. The Consultant may suggest and add other areas of importance.

4. Methodology, Evaluation team and Time Schedule

4.1 Methodology

The purpose of the evaluation is learning for the future for Sida and other concerned governmental bodies. The direct influence will be in Sida's decision making process for further support in the area, but the benefit of the evaluation should also be concrete improvements of activities in the field. A participatory approach should be chosen in order to maximise the interest and influence from the recipients and other stakeholders.

The Consultant should describe the model chosen for compiling Outputs versus Inputs. *Verifiable indicators* should be defined and proposed in the inception report. Special attendance should be given to the issue of monitoring the performance of non-investment projects.

The Consultant should describe the methods that will be used to evaluate the effects of the programme at the organisational level – the capacity *building component*⁵. The assignment should result in practical guidance on efficient capacity building methods regarding environmental monitoring and control. The result should especially focus on the opportunities for leverage provided by international agreements including financial mechanisms.

Inputs from stakeholders benefiting from assistance in similar programmes tend sometimes to be “over”-positive, for courtesy reasons or simply based on a wish to continue the co-operation. The Consultant shall suggest ways and means to seek balanced and more truthful answers to the issues at stake.

Sida's Evaluation Policy should be applied for the assignment.

⁵ Papers on the theoretical background to the issue can be obtained from Sida Methods Development Unit.

4.2 Evaluation team

One or two persons can perform the evaluation. The Consultant may hire a subconsultant to fulfil the requirements or if it is deemed necessary. The competence requirements for the assignment are:

- Academic degree in a subject relevant to the assignment
- Practical experience in the field covered by the assignment: capacity building in environmental institutions, preferably in connection with international environmental agreements.
- Working knowledge in English at a high professional level.
- Analytical skills, experience in evaluations and/or assessments of capacity building projects, preferably in the field of environmental control.
- Experience in development co-operation and/or international cooperation in the field of environment.

Additional merits for the Assignment:

- Experience from environmental assistance programmes in south-east Asia
- Experience from the Montreal Protocol implementation in Article 5 countries.

4.3 Time schedule and deliverables

During the week 0241 (7th–11th of October) the annual ODSOINET/SEAP meeting will be held in Stockholm. This will provide a good opportunity to discuss with a large number of stakeholders and interested parties in the programme. The tentative schedule for the evaluation will then be as follows:

- *Phase 1, end September:*
Propose evaluation methods and refinement of questions to be answered. Preparation for open discussions and in-depth interviews with the participants in the meeting. Compiling background information and a draft on Outputs versus Inputs. (Part one of the Assignment as per above)
An inception report should be delivered before end of September. Sida should respond to the report latest 2 October.
- *Phase 2, 2nd week of October:*
Conducting discussions and interviews. Preparing further questions and contacts to be taken either by the participants in the meeting or in their respective organisations at home. The network members change over time, due to changing positions, and this leads to a need to extend the number of interviewees. Other important people not present at the meeting might need to be contacted.
- *Phase 3* If deemed needed by Sida and the consultant plan a field visit to Asia, visit to UNEP office in Paris or ExCom meeting in Rome 18–22 November. All depending on inputs needed.
- *Phase 4, end November:*
Analysis and conclusions. Relevance of the current design of the programme. Recommendations for the future. 9 Draft report delivered in electronic format to Sida 28 November and to other recipients decided by Sida and the consultant.
- *Phase 5, start of December:*
Seminar at Sida (preliminary Dec 5 afternoon) with invited guests from Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, The Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chemicals Inspectorate, SEI and other interested parties. The consultant produces notes from the seminar.

Incorporation of comments from seminar and written comments received. Final report delivered latest 17 December. The final report shall be submitted to Sida electronically and in 20 hard copies.

The evaluation report shall be written in English and should not exceed 50 pages, excluding annexes. Format and outline of the report shall follow the guidelines in *Sida Evaluation Report – a standardised format* (see Annex 1). The evaluation report must be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. Subject to decision by Sida, the report will be published in the series *Sida Evaluations*.

The Evaluation Assignment includes the completion of *Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet* (Annex 2), including an *Evaluation Abstract* (final section, G) as defined and required by DAC. The completed data worksheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the final version of the report.

5. List of background documents to be provided by Sida

1. Terms of Reference and full reporting to date for each of the three projects to be evaluated.
2. The Montreal Protocol Guidelines for the Swedish bilateral Programme.
3. Evaluation on regional networks. UNEP.
4. Harvard University report: A Country driven approach to the phase-out of Ozone-depleting substances in Developing countries. Rasmusson, Artusio et al March 2001.
5. Sida's Evaluation Policy ÅF-International AB Internet www.af.se

Annex 2

List of persons interviewed by the evaluators in the Sida evaluation of Swedish support under the Montreal Protocol

1. Representatives of National Ozone Units in A5Cs

Mr Prudencio E. Calado, III	The Philippines
Ms Bongkoch Kittisompun & Ms Nongkran Sudjaritkittikul	Thailand
Ms Keobang A. Keola	Laos
Mr Lee Choong Min	Malaysia
Ms Yani Kusmulyani (only written questions)	Indonesia
Ms Suzanna Yap	Singapore
Mr Roslan Tajaah & Mr Sofi H. Sharbini	Brunei
Mr Myo Khant	Myanmar
Mr Pak Sokharavuth	Cambodia
Mr Luong Duc Khoa	Vietnam
Ms Nirupa Ram	Fiji
Ms Hana Mesic	Croatia

2. Swedish Stakeholders

2.1 Authorities

Ms Susanne Jacobsson UD	(The Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
Mr Rasmus Rasmusson	formerly at UD, now Globalkonsult
Ms Maria Ujfalusi	Swedish EPA (Naturvårdsverket)
Dr Husamuddin Ahmadzai	Swedish EPA (Naturvårdsverket)
Ms Pernilla Knutsson	The Ministry for the Environment
Ms Sara Stenhammar	Sida

2.2 The Swedish resource base

Ms Maria Delvin	SEI
Ms Katarina Axelsson	SEI
Ms Annica Carlsson	(formerly at SEI)
Ms Ingrid Kökeritz	IKZ-Miljökonsult
Mr Lars Nordell	KYS, Kylbranschens samarbetsstiftelse
Ms Birgitta Wasberg	Tullverket/Swedish Customs
Dr Anders Östman	Kemiinformation AB
Mr Klas Berglöf	Berglöf Kylteknologi AB

3. Multilateral agencies

Dr Omar E. El-Arini, Chief officer	The Multilateral Fund
Dr Ansgar Eussner, Evaluation officer	The Multilateral Fund
Mr Andrew Reed, Economic affairs officer	The Multilateral Fund
Mr Steve Gorman, Task Team Leader, Montreal Protocol Operations	The World Bank
Mr Viraj Vithoontien, Senior Environmental Specialist, Montreal Protocol Operations	The World Bank
Mr Rajendra Shende; Head, Energy & OzonAction Branch	UNEP, Paris
Mr Thanavat Junchaya, Regional Network Coordinator for South-East Asia and Pacific	UNEP, Bangkok
Mr Leo Heileman, Network Coordinator	UNEP, Paris
Mr Geoff Tierney, former Network Manager at UNEP	(formerly at UNEP)
Ms Victoria Gyllerup	previously at UNDP in Beijing (now at Sida)
Dr Suely Machado Carvalho	UNDP, New York
Ms Dominique Kayser	UNDP, New York

4. Others

Ms Maria Nolan	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK
Mr Jukka Uosukainen	Ministry of the Environment, Finland
Mr Victor Buxton	consultant, Canada
Mr Stephan Sicars	Gtz (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH)
Mr Paul Horwitz	USEPA

Annex 3

The Resource Base for Bilateral Swedish Support to the Phase-out of Ozone-Depleting Substances

Halons

Rissteknik – Martin Uulas
Albacon – Bo Hjort
Stockholms Brandförsvär

Refrigerants

Berglof Refrigeration Technology Ltd – Klas Berglöf
EcoManagement SE – Peter Norberg
ÅF
AKA Filling and Reclamation Center, Norrköping
York Refrigeration
OPIC.com AB
IKZ Miljökonsult – Ingrid Kökeritz
IVL
Electrolux
HVAC & Sanitation schools certified by INCERT for technicians in companies accredited by Swedac, Borås
Swedish Refrigeration Association, KYS (Code of Good Practice)

Illegal trade

Tullverket
IKZ Miljökonsult
Maria Ujfalusi, NV

General and Policy Issues

Per Rosenqvist
Marianne Pettersson, Köldmediakungörelsen
ÅF
Swedish Refrigeration Association, KYS (Code of Good Practice)
SAKAB AB
Pricewaterhouse Coopers – Global Sustainability Services
Maria Ujfalusi, NV
IKZ Miljökonsult
GlobalConsult – Rasmus Rasmusson

Solvents

Per-Erik Karlsson
Anders Östman
IVF – Per Johander Ericsson
Husamuddin Ahmadzai
Ulrika Hagbarth, NV

List received from SEI in October 2002, slightly translated

Annex 4

Brief CVs of the evaluators

Dr. Per Sevastik is a Senior Consultant at ÅF-International. He has a doctoral degree in international law from the faculty of law, Uppsala University and a LL.M degree from Harvard Law School. His thesis is entitled “Informal modification of treaties in the light of subsequent customary international law and practice: An assessment of the ‘innovative’ evolutions of the UN Charter”. He has extensive experience from working with legal reform issues and the rule of law in developing countries as well as international law. He served as legal adviser to Sida/DESA for the strengthening of the rule of law in Vietnam and Lao PDR. Prior to his assignment with Sida he worked as project director for a World Bank financed and sponsored credit finance scheme in the Philippines. Experience from Cambodia includes an appraisal related to the Mekong River Commission’s environmental programme. He has for Sida studied environmental issues in India and procurement related issues in Botswana.

He has written books and published articles in the area of Human Rights and also edited and co-authored Legal Assistance to Developing Countries – Swedish Perspectives on the Rule of Law. He has recently evaluated UBV’s work in Sweden, lectured international law at the Fudan University in Shanghai in China and is currently evaluating Sidas Contract Financed Technical Cooperation in West Africa.

Mr Peter Adler has an M.Sc. in chemical engineering from the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. He worked for eleven years at the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, where he worked with broad environmental issues in industry, such as permitting, waste issues and phase-out of ozonedepleting substances. Among other things he represented Sweden at meetings of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, where ODS-phase out projects are assessed, discussed and decided upon.

He also worked with the development of the EU regulation on substances that deplete the ozone layer: participating in the negotiations in the Council of Ministers and preparing Swedish positions and proposals.

As a consultant, Mr Adler has worked in various projects for industry in Sweden concerning waste management, environmental permitting, environmental impact assessments, inspections and also chemicals issues. He has worked in development co-operation projects in the Philippines, Malaysia and El Salvador.

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