

# **Evaluation**

## **Danida's Environmental Assistance in Southern Africa**

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>CBNR(W)M</b>	Community-Based Natural Resources (Woodlands) Management
<b>CBO</b>	Community-Based Organisation
<b>CPB</b>	Capacity Building Programme (for RDCs, Zimbabwe)
<b>CPC</b>	Cleaner Production Centre
<b>CPT</b>	Cleaner Production Technology
<b>CTA</b>	Chief Technical Advisor
<b>CZM</b>	Coastal Zone Management
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
<b>Danced</b>	Danish Co-operation for Environment and Development Agency (part of MEE – see below)
<b>Danida</b>	Danish International Development Assistance
<b>DEAP</b>	District Environmental Action Planning
<b>DESP</b>	Danida Environmental Support Programme (Malawi)
<b>DKK</b>	Danish kroner
<b>DNR</b>	Department of Natural Resources (in MMET, Zimbabwe)
<b>DTI</b>	Denmark's Institute of Technology
<b>ECC</b>	Environmental Co-ordination Committee (Zimbabwe - proposed)
<b>EDRF</b>	Environment and Disaster Relief Fund
<b>EMB</b>	Environment Management Bill (Zimbabwe)
<b>EPM</b>	Environmental Planning and Management
<b>EPSF</b>	Environment, Peace and Stability Facility
<b>ESP</b>	Environmental Support Programme
<b>ESPS</b>	Environmental Sector Programme Support
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GEF</b>	Global Environmental Facility
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>GOT</b>	Government of Tanzania
<b>GOZ</b>	Government of Zimbabwe
<b>HZM</b>	Hazardous Waste Management
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>JAC</b>	Joint Advisory Committee for Environmental Assistance to Developing Countries (Danced/Danida)
<b>LFA</b>	Logical Framework Approach
<b>LIFE</b>	Local Initiative for the Environment (Malawi programme)
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MEE</b>	Ministry of Energy and the Environment (Denmark)
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Denmark)
<b>MIFRESTA</b>	The Danish acronym for EPSF
<b>MIKA</b>	The Danish acronym for EDRF
<b>MITI</b>	Managing our Indigenous Tree Inheritance (Zimbabwe project)
<b>MMET</b>	Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism (Zimbabwe)
<b>MNRT</b>	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Tanzania)
<b>NAO</b>	National Audit Office (Malawi)
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NORAD</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
<b>NSREP</b>	National and Sustainable Renewable Energy Programme (Malawi)

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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NTC	Norton Town Council (Zimbabwe)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHS	Occupational Health and Safety
PAC	Programme Advisory Committee (Zimbabwe)
PAP	Process Action Plan
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSD (i)	Private Sector Development (Danida programme); or
PSD (ii)	Programme Support Document
R&D	Research and Development
RDC	Rural District Council (Zimbabwe)
RIPE	Reporting and Integrated Planning for the Environment (Malawi programme)
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAO	Southern Africa Office (in Danida)
SESD	Secretariat for Environment and Sustainable Development (Denmark's Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
SOER	State of the Environment Report
SPS	Sector Programme Support
TA	Technical Assistance
TOR	Terms of Reference
UASU	Urban Authority Support Unit (Tanzania)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

## Executive Summary

*Denmark's Environment, Peace and Stability Facility (EPSF) is a unique response to the environmental challenges of the poorer countries. Danida has, in a short period of time and in a very professional manner, built up programmes that largely address the objectives put forward in Danida's policy documents and guidelines, in close co-operation with its partners.*

*While the various programmes have quickly learned from the problems that have arisen, Danida should review its programming and implementation modalities in light of Partnership-based criteria. Analyses of roles, ownership, sustainability and thus impact may lead to important modifications.*

### Programming the EPSF

The Environment, Peace and Stability Facility (EPSF) is a unique and highly relevant response to the environmental challenges in the Southern Africa region. The seriousness of the problems and the lack of own resources to address them means that Denmark is providing relevant and largely non-fungible support to address major “market failures” in the field of sustainable development.

The EPSF is a very recent funding facility. This has meant that close monitoring of performance in addition to the actual programming has been necessary in order to continuously develop policies and procedures. Problems have occurred, some mistakes made, but these have been addressed quickly and used in the further programming of the EPSF. Programming and management of the EPSF have been very professional and transparent at policy, management and technical levels.

Document-intensive and Danida-driven finalisation processes may limit local stakeholders' possibilities for participation. The mission-intensive approach gives a disproportionate voice to Danish actors in setting the agenda and defining the contents of the process and product. The general signalling effect regarding roles and ownership may be unfortunate and not in line with current thoughts on partnership. Recent *trends* are towards more equitable relations. This process can be accelerated by adjusting roles between Danish and national actors through providing more responsibility to the latter.

The current constraints on EPSF programming pose problems. Allocating EPSF resources by project rather than as more flexible country frames contradicts current consensus on “best practice” approaches. The commitment frames combined with project budgeting creates rigidities both in budgeting and disbursements which work against local ownership and efficiency. More emphasis on complementarity and less concern about separability between EPSF and other Danish development co-operation resources would improve efficiency.

### Recommendations

- EPSF programming could strengthen local ownership by shifting responsibility and provide more time to national actors. Danish actors could take on more supportive and quality assurance roles, while Danida is more flexible on formats and timing.

- EPSF financing should move from annual commitment frames with individual project approvals, to more flexible country frames. As the programme matures, some over-programming should be permitted to improve disbursement rates.
- While the EPSF will continue to require its own programming (“separability”), it should be linked closer to other Danida-funded activities (“complementarity”).
- Sector Programme Support (SPS) Guidelines’ information needs should be relaxed. Danida could produce scaled-down own documents but provide more resources for broader, more collaborative and preferably government-managed documents on environmental matters. 10-15 page “core documents” built around the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) matrix could form the basis for dialogue with stakeholders, while “minimum information needs” documents in general should be encouraged.

## The Environment Support Programmes

*Programming:* The Environment Support Programme (ESP) programming has undergone rapid changes during the last two years, shifting focus from projects to strategic programme. They have been put together based on general principles and given existing project activities. This has caused problems, especially in Zimbabwe. But there has been rapid learning *between* and *within* countries: the coherence and quality of more recent ESPs are clearly superior to the first ones.

*National Frameworks:* These are largely weak, forcing Danida to take on a stronger role than it otherwise would have (or wants) in establishing the ESP documents. Danida should adapt the pace of programming and implementation to these realities on the ground. There are indications that Danida in some cases is pushing implementation too fast compared with what local actors are able to handle, absorb and sustain.

*ESP Contents:* The rigour and internal linkage of ESP objectives has improved. There may be a danger in emphasising too much coherence of *within*-ESP objectives, however. Focus should instead be at component level, where projects should develop links to each other, and support a limited set of common objectives at that level.

*Urban environment* has emerged as a significant area for EPSF support in all four countries that have active projects. This is often the component that is best developed and most coherent, few other donors are involved, and it can take advantage of the Danish resource base.

*Co-ordination* is strongly supported in ESPs. Reality on the ground is that there often is little of both government and intra-donor led co-ordination. Danida is highly supportive of improved co-ordination but in practice much of this has been focused on Danida-funded activities. This represents a short-coming, but the basic conclusion is that the positive aspects of the co-ordination experiences should be used to develop more *nationally*-driven efforts. In Zimbabwe, draft legislation proposing, among other things, the establishment of a national forum, can take advantage of the Danida-supported Programme Advisory Committee as a starting point for its own forum.



### Recommendations

- Programming should over time move towards a two-level approach: (i) An EPSF *strategy document* – preferably with the slightly modified name of *EPS*, Environment Programme Support, rather than ESP. (ii) An *appropriations document*, which today is the project document. Over time, this should instead be at component level, where funding is programmed based on sector-programming principles.
- Focusing programming at component level requires that more efforts are put into assisting national authorities develop meaningful framework conditions at this level. Component level programming would be consistent with considering environment as both cross-cutting and quasi-sector on its own: it can provide value-added to all activities at a (sub-)sector level – such as urban development – while also addressing specific issue within that (sub-)sector – such as industrial pollution.
- Danida should assist, wherever possible, national authorities to strengthen national co-ordination of environmental interventions.

## The Regional Programme

The current incentive structure for regional activities is difficult. Co-ordination and other transaction costs of regional implementation are very high, as are uncertainties regarding future benefits, their distribution, and fair burden-sharing of costs. The time commitment required goes beyond the time horizon of many regimes in the region while political disagreements impair regional collaboration. In general, the costs of regional collaboration tend to be under-estimated and future benefits over-estimated by donors. The conditions for a successful regional EPSF programme need strengthening. Today *capacity*, *political will* and *incentives* to support regional activities are weak.

### Recommendations

- Danida should focus on those issues where there is obvious regional support, such as shared water resources. It should not worry too much if these projects together do not constitute a coherent programme. This need for a *programme* is something that seems more keenly felt by Danida than by its partners in the region.
- Some environmental interventions can be made more efficient through a larger regional approach. Danida may therefore wish to devote some resources into identifying what these activities are, specifying which costs can be reduced or benefits improved through alternative approaches. This may imply funding more research and small-scale piloting, supporting possible “champions of change”, and clarifying how incentives can be improved and made more transparent to stakeholders.
- These kinds of interventions *can* easily become costly to administer and may take time to mature. Finding Danish actors willing and able to assist may be important for success. Danida may consider posting an officer in the region to specifically work on such a programme.

*Bottom Line:* If there are not strong, obvious and continued incentives for key stakeholders to maintain their dedication to a regional activity, donors should be careful not to push them too hard. Local ownership by consistent and persistent stakeholders is an absolute pre-condition for sustainability and hence for impact.

## The Projects

The first projects were selected on their own merits. Subsequent projects have either had programmatic considerations or frameworks in place when identified, or they in fact developed out of such frameworks.

Strong local ownership and clear concepts in place have made identification and early implementation smoother. Genuine participatory programming where sufficient time has been used to engage local stakeholders has been important to achieve this. The project design/consultation process is more difficult in urban areas, due to size, diversity and complexity of the community and its problems. Annual Reviews have proven to be an important component of continuous project programming. Because the EPSF programme is so recent and lessons are thus constantly being produced, this dynamic programming is highly laudable.

Differences in local ownership has led to different project designs for addressing similar problems. Zimbabwe has a programme that can generate lessons in this regard, since both in the rural and urban components, there are systematic differences that could potentially be traceable in terms of outcomes and impact.

Projects tend to have a “big push” approach of high resource concentration for technical assistance, activity funding, training, etc. These provide a “kick-start” to environmental action that some actors see as required for visibility, support, and thus momentum and sustainability – but may undermine local ownership and viability.

There has been rapid learning *within* and *between* countries. Tanzania’s Sustainable Cities programme over the course of only four years has produced four “generations” of project documents, where the latest ones are locally created.

Danida needs to pay more attention to *economic and financial viability* of projects, and also more emphasis on *institutional development* within the EPSF than has been the case so far.

While a large share of resources go to fund technical assistance (TA) in some countries, relatively little of EPSF funds are programmed and managed directly by low-income communities. Danida might in particular review more innovative ways of taking advantage of Non-governmental organisations’ (NGO) skills and experience. A more Partnership-based approach would in general hand more implementation tasks to national actors.

Danida uses both organisations and individual advisors to provide TA. It has been noted that one firm has won almost all the contracts in Malawi, while individual advisors are the preferred approach in Tanzania. Zimbabwe has chosen a mix of private, public and not-for-profit largely *national* actors.

Individual advisors hired directly by Danida face questions regarding primary allegiance and roles. This weakens legitimacy and effectiveness, particularly regarding policy advice. Danida could explore possibilities for using more public/quasi-public entities for twinning arrangements in the environmental field. Finally, strong Danida involvement in project implementation takes over too much project risk, weakening local responsibility for project success.

### Recommendations

- Danida needs to provide more time and a greater role for national actors in the identification and implementation of activities.
- Danida should critically review the role of technical assistance, the modalities for contracting it, and possible role conflicts for directly-hired advisors.
- There should be a *knowledge generation* dimension to ESPs where the role of national institutions is central. They should be given M&E and R&D roles to strengthen local institutional memory, policy debate, and institutional/framework development.
- More attention should be paid to long-term viability of EPSF-funded projects.
- More resources could go directly to civil society actors (NGOs, firms, etc.).

### General Conclusions and Recommendations

Regarding the main cross-cutting dimensions, the findings are the following:

- *Poverty*: The situation is uneven, but several country programmes have a structure and focus that ought to generate systematic improvements to the livelihood situation of the poor. Two dimensions merit monitoring: (i) the extent to which projects help to *empower* the poor to address structural aspects of their poverty, (ii) the *distributional* outcomes of the projects, to permit corrective action for biases against the poor.
- *Gender*: Danida has succeeded in making the gender dimension more visible in the projects. The operationalisation of objectives is uneven. More gender-disaggregated data and better gender profiles is improving possibilities for monitoring impact. A clearer differentiation between *practical* and *strategic* needs would further strengthen this dimension. The *trend* is towards better specified projects.
- *Democratisation, Human Rights, Good Governance*: Successful participatory programming often leads to better organisation of traditionally marginalised stakeholder groups. This provides a solid basis for empowerment through increased networks and trust (“social capital”). This is key to increased democratisation, demands for improved accountability and transparency in the public sector, and thus towards a more open political system. Innovative research and monitoring should be undertaken to test/verify these propositions/hypotheses.

Concerning Danish environmental priorities, the ESPs correspond to the objectives in Danida’s general environmental policy and the strategies prepared for the EPSF in general and for Southern Africa. The *de facto* exclusion of the agricultural sector and the prioritisation of the renewable energy sector in the ESPs are perhaps both unfortunate. Using the five standard Evaluation Criteria, this Report’s observations are the following:

- *Efficiency*: The EPSF programming exercise has been costly in terms of funds and time. Programmes and projects have largely been produced as expected, however, so the efficiency of what has been an extraordinary effort can be considered good. The cost-effectiveness can be enhanced by having the large-scale background work linked to more general efforts. Possibilities that may be worth exploring are noted, particularly supporting the government and local stakeholders in producing more “live” updated documents like SOERs or policy and action plans.
- *Effectiveness*: This requires clearer national statements of purpose in order to measure degree of attainment. The increased production of baseline studies and more stakeholder based identifications of priorities and objectives provides grounds for future effectiveness studies, however.

- *Impact:* Activities are very recent so it is too early to gauge likely impacts. The strong Danida role in programming and implementation and the focus on projects may weaken the probable impact, while a strengthening of component level work more in line with SPS guidelines, it is hypothesised, may help strengthen future impact.
- *Relevance:* The EPSF is seen as highly relevant both to the problems of the region, and with regards to the funding and skills it brings to Southern Africa.
- *Sustainability:* The Evaluation considers this to be the key issue, and perhaps the weakest aspect of the EPSF programming. Local ownership is key, and excessive focus on getting programmes and projects into place may have structurally weakened this. More rigorous risk analysis may provide further insights.
- *Ownership* seems to be handed over once *implementation* is to begin. It may instead be helpful to think that ownership should start once financial frames have been decided and *programming* is to be initiated.

Danida as an actor is strong, well organised, highly committed, with a strong skills base and substantial resources at its disposal. Its corporate culture is results oriented, hands-on, and wants full information. Danida can easily become overwhelming and take on roles that are perceived as overstepping partnership boundaries.

But the EPSF has had to confront the problem of the demand for environmental support being fairly “soft”. There are few credible national actors with a strong performance record in utilising such resources that are competing for access to EPSF funds. Instead, Danida has had to pursue an aggressive programming approach which can easily lead the programmes to become supply-driven rather than demand-based.

It is therefore important that Danida finds some quasi-market signals for resource allocation decisions. Dimensions of this can be the capacity and will to achieve results with the funds. NGOs, private entrepreneurs, civic organisations and special interest groups may be more effective than a public sector that is usually under-staffed, under-paid and over-stretched. The share of resources going *directly* to civil society actors is low, and Danida may want to change this.

It is important to get the *intervention levels* right: national (macro), *factor* or *sector* markets (meso-level), and *household/community* level (micro). A more careful analysis of the comparative advantage of different actors – public sector, firms, CBOs and other civic organisations – could help sharpen the focus of the interventions. The public-private goods dimension becomes important here since this will likely vary by intervention level. This analysis may hence improve our understanding of what constitutes more cost-effective instruments for interventions.

The quality of the EPSF programme is going to be a function of the lessons learned on the ground. This requires a conscious effort at generating new insights through structured monitoring and evaluation, M&E, and more free-standing research and development, R&D. National institutions should take the lead in identifying “best practice” lessons, develop criteria for monitoring and evaluation, and disseminate these lessons into the public domain for policy debate. Danish institutions can provide support and quality assurance. Key concerns should be looking at *roles, sustainability and impact:*

- Roles concerns division of labour between donor and partner authorities, between public sector and civil society, between central and local authorities and communities.

- Based on the above insights, what are implications for ownership, and from there to sustainability, both economic/financial, and in more general terms of continued production of activity benefits?
- Finally, how do different degrees of ownership and sustainability translate into impact on the ground – for households, communities, nation-states? Danida may consider comparative studies to see if for example criticisms of “excessive TA” seem warranted. Joint Scandinavian reviews of their environmental programmes in SADC countries may provide a basis from which to draw – or reject – such conclusions.

*Bottom line:* The Evaluation believes the key issue is *ownership*. Subtle aspects of own corporate culture and how Danida in fact operates and is perceived by its partners may impact substantially on this.

### **Recommendations**

- Based on the experiences gathered, Danida could specify a little better the objectives in the fields of poverty reduction (*distributional dimensions*), gender (*practical vs. strategic needs*), human rights and democratisation (including *social capital*).
- Danida should develop the EPSF as a more knowledge-driven programme through strengthening the roles of national stakeholders. In particular more resources could be used to strengthen local institutions to take on more M&E and R&D, including looking at issues of *roles, ownership/sustainability and impact*.



# 1. Introduction and Background

At the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, new and additional funding was requested by the developing countries to address environmental problems. Accordingly, in a resolution of December 1992, the Danish Parliament decided to allocate 0.5 percent of the Danish GNP to the *Environment and Disaster Relief Fund*, EDRF. It was to fund activities in both Eastern Europe and developing countries, but was to be an allocation over and beyond Denmark's existing development assistance.

In 1993, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, MEE, prepared a strategy for environmental activities in developing countries under the EDRF. It was directed towards two main issues: natural resource management, and pollution prevention and control. The Danish Co-operation for Environment and Development agency, Danced, was established to manage the EDRF-funded activities.

Danced concentrated on South East Asia and Southern Africa. These regions are also Danish development partners. In 1994 it was decided that EDRF funds used in partner developing countries should be managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida. In order to co-ordinate the efforts, a "Strategy for Danish Environmental Assistance to Developing Countries" was issued jointly by the two ministries in July 1996.

As part of the 1999 budget agreement, the EDRF was given a broader mandate and transformed into the *Environment, Peace and Stability Facility*, EPSF. Peace promotion and conflict prevention have hence been added, but the environmental dimension has been maintained <sup>1)</sup>. Half the funds are to be used on environmental activities, split evenly between Eastern Europe and developing countries.

In the Southern Africa region, Danced is administering the EPSF in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland while Danida is responsible for Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as regional activities. Due to the political situation no activities have started in Angola and Zambia. Danida is now to begin activities in Zambia following a programme/identification mission fielded in October 1999.

## 1.1 Objectives of the Evaluation

The **objective** of this Evaluation is an assessment of Danida's performance at the level of programming of EPSF activities in Southern Africa.

The **purpose** is to assess the relevance of formulated strategic intentions, the choices of priority areas and related concrete project activities, and the connection between strategic intentions and project activities as expressed in the Environment Support Programmes, ESPs.

1) *In order to maintain consistency throughout this report, the programme will be referred to as EPSF even though in the first phase it was known as EDRF (the Danish acronyms are MIFRESTA and MIKA, respectively).*



The **output** of the Evaluation is to be **recommendations**, where necessary, regarding adjustments in strategies, objectives, programming, institutional issues and implementation plans.

The Evaluation is primarily a *process evaluation* of how Danida programs the EPSF resources. Most activities are recent, so the Evaluation can only provide limited assessments regarding *implementation* of the EPSF and even less on *impact* of activities.

### 1.2 Scope of the Evaluation

The Evaluation is to assess three issues (the terms of reference are attached as Annex A):

1. *The programming process and ESPs in five countries.* The Evaluation should assess the use of Environmental Support Programmes, ESPs, to implement EPSF-funded projects: (a) the application of the Sector Programme Support approach when programming the EPSF, (b) the appropriateness of the combined programme/project approach; the coherence of ESP programming process and resultant ESP and projects with respect to regional context and problems; national priorities; needs of local communities and stakeholders; the cross-cutting nature of the environment agenda; and the coherence of the ESP programming process and resultant ESP and projects.
2. *Project activities in Tanzania and Zimbabwe.* The Evaluation should assess the project portfolio against the EPSF strategy looking at likelihood of achieving the strategy's objectives; assess project concepts, particularly with regards to adaptability to local and changing conditions and realities; assess the extent to which projects are designed to address poverty reduction, gender, democratisation and human rights.
3. *The regional programme.* The Evaluation should assess the coherence of formulation and implementation given Danish policies, regional context and problems, national priorities and willingness to co-operate across borders, and possible regional co-operating partners and problems that require regional solutions.

### 1.3 Methodology

The Evaluation is based on a mix of *document review, interviews, case studies, and discussions.*

An initial visit to Danida's head office was used to identify the documentation available and select the most relevant. A first round of interviews with Danida and Danced personnel was carried out. A desk study of the documentation was carried out in Oslo. Local consultants carried out two case studies each in Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

A field visit to Tanzania and Zimbabwe March 25 through April 15 included interviews with local stakeholders, visits to activities funded by EPSF, document reviews in the embassies, and discussions with Danish officials. The team-leader also participated in Danida's regional EPSF workshop in Malawi, where Danish officials from the other countries in the region participated.

A follow-up visit to Danida headquarters took place to further interview key actors in Danida, ensure more complete documentation in certain areas, and discuss the outline



of report. Once the *initial* draft report was ready, it was sent to Zimbabwe and Tanzania as well as Copenhagen for comments. The team leader then had a second visit to the region, where meetings with stakeholders and Danida officials provided important feedback on the draft. Based on this, a final draft was widely circulated for comments.

Since the focus is on resource programming, not on outputs, the emphasis has been on *qualitative* analysis, not quantitative. Careful document analysis coupled with semi-structured interviews and re-tracing of the programming in four case studies were to provide the flexible tools necessary for the analysis. But while the EPSF has left a visible document trail, the documents' primary purpose has been to present the *product* (project or programme) and not the process. Furthermore, the EPSF is very recent so changes are constantly taking place. Many of the more important changes come about during the first phase of a project, so that the understanding of the programming cannot stop with the finalisation of the project document.

The terms of reference for the Evaluation asked that focus be on Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This has meant that there is a bias in the evaluation regarding the analysis and presentation. One thing is that more material is presented from these two countries. The second is that since only document analysis has been possible for the other countries and the regional programme, the conclusions from this material are more uncertain.

#### 1.4 EPSF Resources

The EPSF has grown five-fold from the original allocation of DKK 77.5 million in 1997 to DKK 381 million six years later. Disbursements lag considerably. In 1997, they were only DKK 28.8 million but grew to DKK 88.5 million in 1999. As a *percentage* of funding they are growing, but the disbursement/allocation ratio remains well below 50 percent.

**Table 1.1: EPSF Allocations by Programme Area by Year (DKK million)**

1997	1998	1999	2000 *	2001 *	2002 *	2003 *
91.4	156.5	199.6	226.2	252.9	336	381

\*) *The figures for the first three years have been adjusted for actual programming levels. The figures for the period 2000-2002 are indicative frames.*

#### 1.5 Evaluation Criteria

The Danida-administered environmental assistance is to satisfy several sets of criteria:

- *General Danida development priorities* as laid out in *A Developing World. Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the Year 2000* (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, MFA, 1994).
- *General Environmental Policy Objectives* presented in Danida's "Environment and Development" (MFA 1988).

- *General EPSF Objectives* are developed in the “Strategy for Danish Environmental Assistance” (Danida/Danced 1996) while *EPSF Concerns in Southern Africa* were prepared the year before (Danida/Danced 1995).
- *Sector Programming Principles* are to be basis for EPSF programming (Danida 1998), with the exceptions that activities are to be identifiably different from Country Frame assistance, and activities should be programmed as individual *projects*.
- *General Evaluation Criteria*. The five standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria that Danida applies to all activities should be used (Danida 1999a).

This provides a somewhat overwhelming though not inconsistent set of criteria against which the EPSF funded activities ideally should be assessed. In the final chapter, a relevant set of these will be used when providing findings and conclusions.

### 1.6 Structure of Report

The evaluation report contains five substantive chapters: an analysis of the programming of the EPSF funds; a look at the content of the ESPs in the region; an analysis of the regional programme; a review of the activities particularly in Tanzania and Zimbabwe; and an analysis of achievements and challenges according to the evaluation criteria.

There are nine annexes. The first three give the terms of reference, the bibliography, and list of persons met and are contained in this volume. The CD-ROM contains reviews of the ESPs in Zimbabwe (Annex D) and Tanzania (Annex E), followed by four case studies re-tracing project programming: MITI, a community-based natural resource management project (Annex F), the urban Norton Town Council project (Annex G), both in Zimbabwe, followed by Sustainable Mwanza (Annex G) and Iringa community-based woodlands management (Annex H), both in Tanzania. The reader should go to these annexes for further information when the in the main report refers to these cases. In order to facilitate the referencing, a simplified system has been used that is explained in the introduction to Annex B, “Bibliography”.

There are thus four dimensions that the Evaluation attempts to cover: (i) individual projects, primarily through the case studies; (ii) individual country programmes, including the sub-level of components, with focus on Tanzania and Zimbabwe; (iii) the regional programme; (iv) the overall EPSF in the region. The latter is the main concern, where both differences and consistencies across and among the levels and programmes are to provide the basis for the overall conclusions regarding EPSF programme performance.

In order to cover these issues in the material presented, the focus in each annex is a little different. Financial viability is looked at more in Annex H (Mwanza), alternative models for technical assistance in Annex D (Zimbabwe ESP), etc. This means that the annexes are not immediately compatible, which may render them somewhat more difficult in the comparative analysis. The alternative was to standardise presentations. This was rejected for two reasons. The first is that it would necessarily increase the bulkiness of the report considerably. The second is that the projects and programmes are not alike and are at different stages in their development, so that the lessons to be derived vary. It was felt more valid to highlight what is interesting and perhaps unique about a particular activity rather than trying to “homogenise” different experiences into one common framework.

## **1.7 Evaluation Team and Acknowledgements**

The Evaluation was carried out by Mr Arne Disch, Scanteam, Oslo (team leader) and Mr. Anders Wirak, DECO, Oslo with the assistance of Mr. Dale Doré and Mr. Rob Cunliffe in Zimbabwe and Prof. George Jambiya and Ms. Halima Chande in Tanzania. Mr. Knut Samset, Scanteam, was quality assurer.

The Evaluation had to rely extensively on the assistance and support of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs/Danida staff, particularly in Copenhagen and the Royal Danish embassies in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The unstinting co-operation and willingness to “go the extra mile” in the midst of their own very hectic working days is very much appreciated.

During the field work, the team – like so many other donor-funded identification, pre-appraisal, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation missions – had to ask busy government officials, NGO leaders, community members and other stakeholder representatives to spare some of their valuable time to help us understand how the EPSF programming could be improved. For this we are somewhat embarrassed but profoundly grateful.

The Evaluation team is responsible for the analyses and conclusions of this report, as well as for any remaining errors contained herein. The opinions expressed here are those of the Evaluation team alone, and should not be attributed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs/Danida or any of its staff, or to any of the collaborating governments and organisations.

## 2. Programming the EPSF

The Parliamentary decision in December 1992 creating the EDRF was followed up in the Budget Bill the following year. A target of 0.5% of GNP for the EDRF was set for the year 2000. The programming of resources turned out to move slower than hoped for. During the discussions of the Government's position paper "Godt på vej" ['well underway'] in March 1998, the target date for reaching the 0.5% of GNP was therefore pushed forward to the year 2005 (see *inter alia* Auditor General 1999a, p. 6).

### 2.1 Principles for EPSF Support

Once it became clear that Danida was to manage the EDRF/EPSF activities in the six "programme countries" in the SADC region, a joint Danced/Danida policy mission took place in early 1995. Following this, stakeholder workshops were held in May 1995 in Harare and Copenhagen, where the basic principles for EPSF support were discussed. These consultations were used as input to the strategy paper prepared for the region (Danida/Danced 1995).

Based in part on this work, the general strategy for EPSF support was presented to the Finance Committee of Denmark's Parliament in May 1996. It underlined the following principles: (i) the assistance is to be developed in close co-operation with the recipient authorities based on local needs, priorities and ownership, (ii) it should have a holistic, regional point of departure, (iii) it should focus on a few environmental issues or complexes ("areas"), (iv) the role of women should be emphasised, (v) the assistance should take maximum advantage of local capacities, including the private sector, NGOs, etc., (vi) it should involve the Danish resource base to the greatest extent possible, and (vii) the assistance is in the form of bilateral grants (Danida/Danced 1996).

To ensure close co-ordination between Danida and Danced, a Joint Advisory Committee for Environmental Assistance to Developing Countries, JAC, has been established. A Secretariat for the Environment and Sustainable Development, SESD, is housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is to service the JAC as well as manage the multilateral assistance being provided by the EPSF. Overarching policy matters are thus deliberated by JAC while funding decisions are handled by each agency according to their internal approval regulations.

Danida faced some particular programming problems since it already had development assistance programmes in all its EPSF countries. The issue was how EPSF funds were to be handled compared with Danida's Country Frame allocations and its Private Sector programme. Parliament had therefore decided that the EPSF support was to be considered as an independent form of assistance. The EPSF should focus on 3-4 sets of problems preferably such that they *complement* assistance under the Country Frame, yet retains its own separate identity.

#### Summing Up and Findings

- Denmark's establishment of the EDRF/EPSF represents a unique response to the request from the developing countries for *additional* support to address their environmental problems. Denmark merits full recognition for this generous facility.

- The EPSF is still in a phase of rapid build-up and is to reach the 0.5% of GNP goal by the year 2005. This provides ample opportunity for adjustments and improvements to EPSF programming. Once the 0.5% goal is attained, further EPSF resource increases will be a function of Denmark's own growth rates.

## 2.2 Structure of the Programming

With the approval of the general EPSF strategy by Parliament in 1996, Danida organised EPSF identification missions to Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1996-1997. The missions were to plan future environmental assistance by analysing the problems and national environmental policies together with local stakeholders.

A first regional EPSF seminar was held in Harare in November 1997. One issue was the difference between a standard Sector Programme and the way the EDRF/EPSF funds had to be programmed. It was noted that the EPSF was expected to lead to concrete and documentable results, with less focus on general budget support and institutional development than in the classic sector programme. The financial frame was also limited to begin with, meaning that each country should initially only programme a limited number of activities (Danida 1997). Activities in the partner countries for the period 1998-2002 were discussed and planned. The actual distribution of funds across the countries was made when the Danish Ministry of Finance in mid-1998 communicated the total amount of funds available for the above-mentioned period.

### Programme Concept

The first programming missions produced an analysis of the environmental situation in the partner countries before going on to present implementable activities. The task was seen primarily to be to identify individual *projects* that could be funded by Danida (see mission Terms of Reference, TORs, in MAL.0.b, ZAM.0.a and ZIM.0.a) <sup>2)</sup>.

The programming thus largely consisted of three components: (i) an analysis of the environmental situation in the partner country, (ii) definition of three to four areas for Danish assistance from the areas that had been defined in the EPSF strategy documents, and (iii) identification of concrete projects for funding.

As programming experience accumulated, it became apparent that it would be advantageous to have a more *strategic* programming approach than just selecting some areas for attention <sup>3)</sup>. From this, the concept of an *Environmental Sector Programme*

2) *The Lusaka embassy, in a note of 12 November 1997, complains about the lack of programme approach in the Zambia document, but admits this is what the TOR asks for: "Rapportudkastet [skal] udfærdiges i henhold til Danida's Guidelines for Sector Programme Support. Ambassaden finder ikke, at rapporten bærer tilstrækkelig præg heraf. Der er for megen fokus på projekter og for lidt fokus på program. Det må dog i den forbindelse medgives, at TOR ikke er tydelige på dette punkt, idet der som 'output' anføres, at missionen skal formulere 'a set of project proposal documents' ". The Zambia TOR did in fact refer to the Danida SPS Guidelines while the TORs for Malawi and Zimbabwe missions did not, presumably because they are of an earlier date.*

3) *The TOR for a State of the Environment Reporting and Programme Identification mission to Malawi noted (p. 4) as early as 8 October 1997 that "GOM resources have been stretched to the limit ... due to lack of capacity dealing with many projects/donors...Danida's second generation environmental programme should ...iii) reduce shortcomings of a project approach, iv) and gain the benefits of a programme approach (in line with Danida's Sector Programme Support)".*

*Support*, ESPS, document emerged which was to be developed according to Danida's Sector Programme Support, SPS, guidelines (Danida 1998). These Guidelines are not being applied fully, as noted earlier, and in particular there is no financial allocation attached since each project has to be presented separately for funding.

With the ESPS, the more or less independent *areas* of support now were to be *components* of the programme. The ESPS was to have an objective and strategy towards which all the components were to contribute.

The ESPS *name* became the object of some debate because it indicated that environment was a *sector* like health or agriculture. Danida, however, has been careful to underline the cross-cutting nature of environmental concerns. After some consideration, the strategy document is now called the *Environment Support Programme*, ESP.

The ESP name, however, implies that Danida now has an environmental *programme*, while the basic idea is to support an environmental programme that the partner country owns. The early programming mission to Zambia refers to the (Zambian) ESP, noting how it springs out of the evolution of environmental planning in the country (ZAM.0.a, p. 8). In the case of Malawi, however, Danida's programme is referred to as "DESP" – Danida Environmental Support Programme. In order to clarify this ownership issue, Danida may consider calling its document *Environment Programme Support*, EPS, instead.

### **Programming the Projects**

The EPSF resources are programmed as stand-alone projects but following Danida's "Guidelines for Sector Programme Support", Annex 5, "Component Description". The only formal difference is that the EPSF project document has an added section on "Context" that situates the activity within the larger EPSF programme in the country.

Projects are usually identified through a local dialogue. A political agreement is then formalised during the Annual Consultations between the countries.

Once the preparatory work is in place, a pre-appraisal mission is usually fielded. These missions both review the work that has been done and then put together a draft project document. The TORs for the missions are drafted in the field, discussed with the local authorities and stakeholders, and then finalised by Copenhagen. Danida signs a contract with a Danish consulting firm, which in turn hires the national consultants it wishes to use. But the team is headed by a staff member of Danida's technical department. A full team typically includes the Danida staff member, two or three Danish and one or two national consultants. The firm is responsible for *drafting* the report and project document, but Danida is responsible for *finalising* them and thus accountable for their content.

The appraisal of the draft project document can be a desk study done in Copenhagen. In most cases missions are fielded as the questions outstanding often require a follow-up round of discussions and research. With the appraisal, the project document would be finalised and forwarded to Danida's Board for approval.

### **Programming the Strategy Documents**

While the projects largely follow the general Danida format and process, it has been more difficult to find the appropriate form for the strategy documents. Is the EPSF



funding a sector in the sense described in the “Guidelines”, or a cross-cutting dimension? Does the EPSF require a formal strategy document at all, and if so what would be the *status* of such a document? Should it be formally approved, and if so, by whom?

Programming the EPSF as a *sector* makes interventions concrete and thereby the value-added and importance of the EPSF visible. It allows for concentration with clearly defined objectives where expected outputs and outcomes can be monitored. This improves implementation and accountability. Together, this should help build ownership and support for implementation, both in the host and donor countries.

But environmental concerns are largely a *cross-cutting dimension*. If the EPSF is limited to “environment sector”-activities, it would miss the large *systemic* gains from improvements to framework conditions in the form of overall planning and programming that incorporate environmental/sustainability principles. Seeing the environment as a cross-cutting dimension opens up to more co-ordination and collaboration, in particular with other donors. EPSF programmes conceived as limited sector interventions would run a higher risk of being seen as “yet another donor programme”, further contributing to donor-promoted fragmentation. This concern is real, since the separability demand for the EPSF has put in place constraints that encourage isolation and self-containment.

The pragmatic answer chosen is to see the ESP as a hybrid. The document treats the environment as a cross-cutting issue that should permeate a country’s development efforts. At the level of components, it can address issues that are “purely” environmental, such as pollution abatement or urban waste management, or environment as a cross-cutting dimension such as environmental planning in rural development.

The agreement on preparing an ESP document was only reached early 1999, with draft guidelines ready early 2000 (MFA 2000). Finalised ESP documents are now to be presented at the bilateral Annual Consultations for discussion and approval in principle, such as happened with Tanzania’s ESP in March 2000. While the EPSF funds are programmed separately, they are included in the Agreed Minutes so that the host government has *one* Danida document to refer to when analysing donor assistance.

The ESP documents also go to Danida’s Board and the JAC for discussion. No *approval* as such is given as there are no funding commitments in the document, but the Board and JAC can give their opinion on the overall strategy and composition of the programme in the country as an input to the further development and dialogue.

### Summing Up and Findings

- The EDRF has been transformed into the EPSF, ending up with a broader mandate but where the environmental dimension has not been affected.
- The original programming concept was to identify a limited number of *areas* for support and then discrete *projects* for funding. This has been changed to a *strategic* programme document with *components* that require a more rigorous justification.
- This document was first termed the *Environmental Sector Programme Support*, but is now *Environmental Support Programme*. This name raises some *ownership* questions.
- The ESP document is to be based on Danida’s SPS guidelines while the activities are identified and funded as individual projects. The ESP document represents a policy

instrument for dialogue with both the partner countries and the Boards in Denmark concerning approaches taken and the choices made for EPSF resource allocations.

### 2.3 Implementation of EPSF Programming

The need for local ownership is stressed both in general Danish development assistance policies and the EPSF strategy documents. This ownership is to exist both at policy and decision-making level of government, and at the level of actual activity implementation. The first is to be ensured through a close policy dialogue with national authorities while the second is to be achieved through participatory identification and formulation work.

#### Programme and Activity Identification

The early policy dialogue was clearly managed by Danida, largely due to the fact that this was, after all, a new Danish programme, but also because Danida was under some time pressure to identify activities and make the EPSF become operational. The stakeholder meeting in May 1995 in Harare discussed the general principles for the EPSF but at a very general level and with a limited number of participants. The Agreed Minutes from the first Annual Consultations after the establishment of the EDRF/EPSF in both Zimbabwe and Tanzania indicate that Danida was taking the initiatives. This was also in part a function of the local partners not being very proactive. The Tanzanians noted that they did not really co-ordinate their own preparations for the EPSF till 1998, though they were always fully informed and involved in the planning (Annexes D and E).

Local identification and formulation work is commissioned by the embassies, which originally had DKK 500,000 and now DKK 1 million/year for such tasks (Danida 1997, 1999b). Relatively little of this is directly traceable in final project documents. These have all been prepared by the Danish consultancy teams. This is partly because some local work is not of satisfactory quality, but even more to do with national consultants' lack of familiarity with Danida standards. The original MITI document was good quality but not in the required format, leading to problems (Annex F). But the recent Sustainable Cities-documents for Moshi and Mwanza II in Tanzania are largely locally produced (Annex E). Project but in particular programme identification work has often taken considerable time. Interviews in Tanzania and Zimbabwe as well as the case studies confirm that this phase is generally perceived as open and listening.

#### Finalisation and Ownership

Once the process reaches the pre-appraisal stage, it changes. The Danida *system* clearly takes over. Process Action Plans, PAP, with tight deadlines are put in place largely as a function of when Danida is to present the final documents to the Board (Annex D para 6.2). The Evaluation was not able to identify any deadline in any process that was set in response to a local stakeholder need. In the MITI case, where the local partner was working under time pressure and it was important that decisions be taken quickly, this was subordinated to internal Danida processing (Annex F). The unfortunate delays in the MITI case were unique – it was one of the first projects being processed under the EPSF and thus a number of uncertainties existed – but the point is that the *structure* of the process is such that these kinds of cases can occur.

The formal structuring of information is Danida defined. The smooth processing within Danida hinges on the documentation providing answers to the questions that



the Danida programming manuals request. The Evaluation did not come across any documents that refer to information required by host governments for *their* programming or budgeting processes. There was no mention of information to be provided in a format that would simplify such processes for local authorities or fit with local budget planning schedules.

The cover page of project documents note that they are produced by “Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Danida”, has a Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs archival reference number, and states that “This document contains restricted information and is for official use only”. The latter warning is obviously not as limiting in practice as it may sound. But it must be interesting for a local government official to see that a document that is to represent a joint effort at addressing a problem in her country is subject to informational restrictions set by the donor. When this formalism becomes an issue, though, it should be addressed. Mwanza municipality felt a strong ownership to the Mwanza II document and wanted the municipality’s crest also on the cover page, which was denied (Annex H). Having a cover that reflects the joint task and ownership would seem a logical solution. Accessibility is not just a function of formal rights. The programming process is quite thorough as the Guidelines demand that considerable information is provided. The comprehensiveness and quality of the work in the documents was generally found to be of a very high standard. The downside, however, is that the pure magnitude of information not only is impressive but sometimes overwhelming. The Component Description for the Zimbabwe Urban EPM is about 250 pages, the one on Renewable Energy a little over 160 pages, the Malawi Urban EPM over 300 pages including annexes, etc. These documents often appear in one or two draft versions before they are finalised. For local stakeholders, this is a real challenge because few of them are used to such document-intensive interaction. The sheer volume combined with tight deadlines imposes a steep time cost, especially because it is often difficult to track the changes from the first draft through to the final version, which is after all the binding one. What would be helpful is to separate the informational segments which are largely meant for a Danish audience from the key project components which may be built around the LFA matrix. The discussions with most stakeholders could then focus on a distributed 10-15 page “core document”. Government officials would of course have complete versions, but could also be expected to comment primarily on the core components.

It may also be helpful to scale the documents and efforts more to what the expected results will be. Large-scale component descriptions with considerable technical detail may not be necessary for defining limited interventions at the project level. An approach that asks what is the minimum amount of information actually required to take a reasonably well-informed decision might cut the bulkiness considerably.

The pre-appraisal and appraisal missions are important occasions for stakeholders to interact with Danida officials and the Danish consultants who are responsible for writing the final project document. The ability to make meaningful contributions is largely a function of how well prepared the local stakeholders are, however. While government officials are made aware of the missions and formally are the ones who ought to alert and mobilise other stakeholders, this often does not happen. The participation from other stakeholders may thus become perfunctory. Missions would hence interview or have meetings with stakeholders who were not really prepared, so the dialogue would easily be less helpful – for both parties – than was the intention. . The end-of-mission debriefings may function the same way, with a 3-15 page debriefing

note distributed the day before or the same day as the meeting. Prior consultations with public officials would have provided government with a good idea of the major issues, but other stakeholders tend to be less well informed.

Most national consultants the Evaluation met said that they had been contracted at short notice by a Danish firm and then usually given specific tasks to carry out during the typical two-week mission period. None of them were asked to prepare local stakeholders, organise discussions such that local stakeholder would feel at ease or structured such that their concerns were at the top of the agenda, etc. With the exception of Norton, national consultants clearly were the junior partner and to some extent “raw material” producers: most of the information processing and writing was done in Denmark. To some extent this is the situation also for local officials and other stakeholders. While there is a logic to this – local capacity for providing quality work within short deadlines is limited – it does have an impact on how the final document is viewed.

There *is* considerable concern about ownership and participation within Danida. The project and programme preparation cycle is a rigorous and transparent process which key stakeholders now understand a lot better. Taking all the steps from identification through pre-appraisal and appraisal to approval provide stakeholders with several opportunities to interact and contribute. The initial identification phase has by and large been given good marks for listening, but the finalisation process defined by the PAPs tends to truncate interaction possibilities. While the relationships largely are partnership-based, today the majority shareholder in the joint venture is Danish. Reaching a stage of more equitable ownership in line with Denmark’s new “Partnership 2000” objectives (Danida 2000) is going to require some changes to the way these processes are conducted.

Project preparations that are run by stakeholders themselves, such as MITI and Mwanza II, are clearly the way forward. The Mwanza II document was in fact the outcome of a rapid local learning process that Danida has encouraged and supported. The trend is thus in the right direction, but can be supported even more through some shifts in the roles of both Danish and national actors. Local actors should be given more responsibility and time to run processes while Danish actors function more as quality assurers. This would be in line with the basic principle of the EPSF strategy of using national resources more, as well as “Partnership 2000”. This will require more flexibility on the side of Danida in terms of timing and document formats, in particular because there will undoubtedly be a need to go back and re-do local work that was not satisfactory. The long-run pay-off in terms of local capacity building and ownership should make it well worth it.

### **Summing Up and Findings**

- The programming of EPSF resources was Danida led during the first several years. This is changing as local authorities gain experience, though Danida as the owner of the resources still tends to be the pro-active party.
- The identification phase is seen as an open, collaborative stage of defining the EPSF funded activities. The appraisal/finalisation, on the other hand, is Danida driven and defined by the PAP, down to where Danida takes formal and unique ownership of the project document by virtue of the official front page.
- The current document-intensive finalisation process is daunting to local stakeholders. This can be made more manageable by reducing or standardising the background

sections (see 2.4, “Appropriateness of SPS Guidelines”), and by focusing the dialogue on a “core document” of 10-15 pages for wide distribution and comment. A “minimum informational needs” approach would often be advisable.

- Local ownership can be strengthened through more and better use of national skills, and by providing more responsibility and time for local actors to run processes. The Danish resource base could move more towards support and quality assurance.

## 2.4 Programming and Financing

Several aspects of the programming and financing of EPSF activities may be reducing the overall effectiveness of Danish resources.

### Project versus Sector programming

Danida, along with other donors, has adopted *sector programming* as its basic approach to development co-operation. This is based on “lessons learned” over a long period. The sector programming approach has as its basis the concept of *partnership*, where roles and responsibilities, accountability and transparency are key. This is in line with what is today considered “best practice” regarding donor-recipient relationships, and which has been codified by OECD/DAC in an eleven-point “checklist” (OECD 1998b). Among the recommendations are “mutual trust should be increased through ... systematic work on themes and sectors ... preferably led by the host government... Donors share the objective of ending the proliferation of projects and providing their aid increasingly in the form of programme and budget assistance” (op. cit., points 3, 6). In line with this thinking, Danida has been active in promoting the sector programme approach in the region, acting as focal donor for the agricultural programme in Mozambique, health programme in Zambia and local government reform in Tanzania, among others.

The EPSF funds are to be allocated by individual projects, however, and this is probably lowering the efficiency of resource use. The lesson that donors and recipients alike have learned is that projects by and large are not an effective way of promoting sustainable development, it undermines aid co-ordination and imposes high transaction costs on donor and recipient alike. A series of case studies on aid effectiveness by the Overseas Development Center noted that two of the four main factors undermining aid effectiveness were poor co-ordination of aid, and the proliferation of stand-alone projects – i.e., donors funding activities outside the government programs (van de Walle and Johnston 1996). The related case study of Danish aid in Tanzania gives a clear description of how poor donor co-ordination fragments and thus undermines Tanzania’s possibilities for managing aid effectively (Bagachwa et. al. 1998). The evaluation of Norway’s assistance to Tanzania found that the major problem was the extreme fragmentation of the program caused by Norwegian decisions (ECON 1999). And these case studies only underline the same general lesson provided by the Danida-funded “Helleiner commission” on aid to Tanzania (Helleiner et. al., 1995).

The decision to structure EPSF funding by projects was taken by Denmark’s Parliament. In the document, “Redegørelse til Folketinget om den hidtige anvendelse af Miljø-, Freds- og Stabilitetsrammen” (report to Parliament regarding the utilisation so far of the EPFS) of January 1999, Parliament decided to open up for more programmatic utilisation of EPFS resources. The Evaluation would strongly support this move, since the Evaluation has not been able to identify any analysis that shows why the EPSF is likely to have any more positive and lasting impact than other forms of

development assistance that was previously structured as stand-alone activities. The Evaluation therefore concludes that imposing the project funding structure on EPSF financed activities appears, *prima facie*, not to be an optimal solution.

### **Commitment Frames and Disbursement Targets**

Danish development assistance is voted by Parliament by country or programme (such as the Private Sector Development programme), but not earmarked by activity. It is up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in dialogue with the partner countries and based on the co-operation strategy for that country, to allocate funds and ensure their best usage. This flexibility has been increased with the sector programme approach, where indicative medium-term financial frames are voted rather than budgets for specific activities.

In the case of the EPSF, the Ministry of Finance allocates annual appropriations or Commitment Frames (“tilsagnsrammer”). Danida then allocates these funds across countries and is to ensure that total budgets for activities *approved* that year remain within that Commitment Frame – but also fully exhaust it!

During the early years of the EPSF, when these frames were limited, this created incentives to establish small or short-lived projects with restricted budgets. This constraint in practice no longer exists since the EPSF frame has been expanding quickly.

The project structure means that the budget of an activity has to be approved against that one year’s financial frame independent of expected disbursement profile. But insisting that the budget be approved for the entire project period leads to a rigidity in resource planning that most donor agencies want to move away from. It requires a detailed LFA-plan where all inputs are defined and linked to specific outputs up-front. This reduces the scope for flexibility, process-planning, and handing over the general responsibilities for resource management to local stakeholders. While sector programmes work with a frame allocation, the EPSF ends up with inflexible input-defined budgets. This puts time-limits on projects since budgets cannot be foreseen far into the future, though this is to some extent addressed through breaking longer-term projects into defined phases.

The Auditor-General’s review of the EPSF pointed to very low disbursement rates (Auditor-General 1999a, b). The pressures to increase disbursements will therefore increase. But commitment frames and disbursement targets are not compatible financial management instruments under the EPSF.

The same commitment frame in two countries can produce very different annual disbursement rates. One country could budget DKK 100 annually for five years while the other country could have DKK 250 annually for two years. If expenditures are to become closer to commitment frames, Danida has to programme shorter projects, perhaps even with a bias towards high and predictable expenditure items. Commitment frames prevent over-programming of resources – in fact this is one of its main purposes. In a world of great uncertainty, however, over-programming is a procedure used by virtually all funding agencies to ensure high disbursement rates.

Having individual projects with detailed budgets exhaust the commitment frame reduces disbursement flexibility. It gives no scope for a general funding reserve. It is difficult to re-allocate from slow to fast-disbursing activities, since the slow-disbursing

project will need its budget – it will just disburse over a longer time horizon than originally expected.

The combination of (a) commitment frames, (b) project budgeting, (c) disbursement targets, is likely to create contradictory financial management pressures. The easiest solution is to move the EPSF towards a more flexible funding structure, relaxing both the commitment frame and project budget approaches. While the EPSF resource frame is still under rapid build-up disbursement targets as a share of available resources is also not going to be feasible. But as the EPSF “matures”, presumably a disbursement-to-programming ratio will develop. To make this realistic, over-programming and flexible re-allocation possibilities should be established.

### **Separability and Complementarity**

EPSF activities are to be programmed such that they are distinguishable from general development assistance resources. At the same time, it is desirable that EPSF activities complement country frame funded ones. This dual demand for *separability* with *complementarity* has caused challenges for EPSF programming.

The EPSF as a separate allocation with its own objectives should not become a substitute for regular country frame activities. At the same time, it is clear that there are gains to be had from the two programmes taking advantage of their relative strengths. This was a key argument for having Danida administer EPSF funds in those countries where development activities are in place. Hence the desire for complementarity. The question is to what extent this “duality” in EPSF programming is feasible.

The feasibility of separability hinges on the notion of fungibility or “transferability”. This is the degree to which aid for a certain activity will only fund that specific activity (“stick” to it), or if it rather acts as general budget support by increasing total resource availability. This problem is particularly pertinent when it comes to government-to-government relations, where the donor funds activities carried out by the public sector. The argument is that as soon as a government realises that a donor is funding a given activity – such as environmental programmes – then it will re-allocate some of its own funds from this area to some other priority. Donors are therefore essentially expanding the total resources available to the partner country – they are not in fact funding a particular activity.

A recent study by the World Bank spends almost an entire chapter discussing this issue, ending up with the conclusion that “Donors should take it for granted that their financing is fungible because that is reality” (World Bank 1998a, p. 80). This says Denmark can not achieve meaningful separability between country frame and EPSF resources because partner countries can re-allocate resources such that fungibility occurs.

But one of the first major studies on development aid, *Does Aid Work?* (Cassen 1994), reached a somewhat different conclusion. While it agrees that fungibility is a real issue and does occur, it also notes that there are rigidities in the system and such fundamental resource scarcities in poor countries that it is still meaningful for donors, under certain circumstances, to target particular areas with their funds.

Another issue is if separability leads to inefficiencies in the programming. The answer to this is Yes and No. There would be inefficiencies if the two funding mechanisms had the exact same objectives yet different programming procedures. But while the country



frame has poverty reduction as its main objective with environmental sustainability as a key cross-cutting dimension, the EPSF has the reverse goal structure. There are therefore important complementarities that should enable them to attain synergies. But the goal hierarchy is not identical. The efficiency in resource programming must therefore be measured against attainment of the specific objectives that they are pursuing.

The Evaluation notes in a number of places that efficiency gains could be had if the two Danish programmes established closer links. But this in large part is due to overall inefficiencies in partner country planning. If the partner country had clear action plans in the various sectors so that genuine sector programming were feasible and Danish resources could enter as flexible funding, there would be no particular need for closer collaboration between the two funding mechanisms. Since this generally is not the case, any kind of joint programming – whether with Danish country frame resources or any other donor's programme for that matter – will generate some gains. The solution is to find areas of synergies while ensuring that each funding mechanism is firmly fixed on its own objectives. By and large Danida has maintained this balance, but erring more on the side of separability rather than flexibility and synergy-seeking solutions.

The bottom line on separability versus complementarity seems to be the following:

- For all the partner countries, poverty reduction is the main development objective. All donor assistance needs to be supportive of this, whether it is country frame or EPSF resources.
- The EPSF has as its main objective the attainment of environmentally sustainable development. This is clearly supportive of poverty reduction, especially over the medium term. At the same time, Danida's partner countries are among the poorest in the world. They generally have young political systems that are vulnerable and need to focus on immediate objectives. There is therefore limited political support for investments with long-term pay-offs, such as environmental concerns. The EPSF is thus addressing a serious "market failure" in terms of investments that may have a public goods and/or a global goods character.
- While fungibility is a fact of life, absolute resource scarcity coupled with relatively low own priority to environmental matters means that there is virtually no substitution of donor resources for public funds in this field. Given the long-term value-added that investments in environmental activities are likely to generate, the EPSF facility is producing possibilities for a more sustainable future for these communities.

### **Management and Time Constraints**

There are few examples of a new programme like the EPSF being planned from the ground up. While lessons from general development programming could be applied, many could not. The EPSF has a different objective, but in particular the constraints imposed on the resource planning process noted above made it clear to Danida officials that problems would be encountered and mistakes made. This meant that in addition to actually managing the programming there also had to be an active learning process running in parallel, so that lessons could be identified and immediately applied.

The programming has taken place under considerable time pressure while the financial resources have expanded quickly. Due to the commitment frame structure, each year every country has had to come up with a set of activities whose budgets jointly would exhaust the resource ceiling yet were all priority tasks. This in itself has been a demanding puzzle to solve. Close management using the PAPs as important steering instruments

has been necessary to achieve the year-by-year programming targets. This has, especially in the early stages of the EPSF, led to time-constrained processes with some resultant problems (Annexes F and G). As Danida has gained more experience and put more capacity in the field, planning horizons are becoming more realistic and actual planning practices are improving (Annex E).

The number of Danida staff put on the EPSF task was very small, both in Copenhagen and in the embassies. What made the programming at all feasible was the existence of close relations with authorities and key resource persons in the partner countries, and heavy reliance on the Danish resource base, particularly the consultancy milieu.

The preparation and finalisation of TORs, procurement and management of consultants, participation in field work, document processing while providing *substantive* inputs, the need for critical monitoring of both the process and programme to identify problems and address them, has put Danida staff under severe strain during long periods of time.

The Evaluation finds that Danida as an organisation but particularly those staff who have been working on the EPSF have acquitted themselves extremely well. Both at the level of organisation and individuals, there has been a thorough professionalism exhibited, and staff have shown a dedication over and beyond the normal call of duty.

There have been mistakes committed, but the learning from these has usually been rapid. The changes in policies, procedures and activities are built on lessons learned, and have almost without exception represented improvements. The annual seminars held in the region to discuss policies and principles for the future have been important for identifying changes and getting agreements to the way forward. The communication between field and head office seems to be good and the fairly frequent visits to the region, particularly from the technical division, has been important in maintaining this dialogue.

There have obviously been disagreements along the way. Some staff felt it took too long before agreement was reached in moving from project and area programming to more strategic planning with the establishment of ESP documents. Disagreements have emerged in terms of priorities in different countries. The relationship to Danced was at one point somewhat strained. Human resources committed to the embassies were too limited. While all disagreements have not disappeared – why would they or why should they? – they have been addressed, and management has largely been responsive.

The policy management also seems to be very good. The 15-member JAC meets four times a year. Half the time is spent discussing country programmes, the other half on a particular policy issue. The policy discussions are usually based on preparations carried out by a 4-5 person *ad hoc* group of the JAC with secretarial assistance from either Danida or Danced. The topics have included the evaluation of the Danced programme in South East Asia; results of the capacity building workshop organised at Snekkersten (Denmark) at the end of 1998; review of the renewable energy dimension in the EPSF; and so on. The composition of the JAC, representing a wide range of civic organisations, employers' and workers' organisations, is supplemented by observers from the political parties in Parliament. It therefore not only provides inputs from key stakeholders in Denmark, but also a channel for dialogue with the political decision-makers, which is extremely useful.

Overall, performance in terms of *managing* the EPSF must be said to have been very good. New policies and procedures have been developed quickly in response to lessons learned. Both at implementation (Danida) and policy (JAC and Danida) levels there has been a pro-active approach to learning that has given EPSF its dynamic character.

### **Appropriateness of SPS Guidelines**

EPSF resources are to be programmed according to the SPS Guidelines, Annex 4. Since the EPSF is to fund environmental questions not just in a particular sector but as a cross-cutting dimension, the information demands of the Annex 4 format make this virtually impossible. Many internal Danida comments request additional information, which is appropriate given the Guidelines but simply not realistic if the document is to remain manageable. The bulkiness derives from excessive information demands.

Danida is today over-investing in generating background information. This is both compared to what a reasonably well informed decision maker actually needs, and what is reasonable given the size of the programme itself. Three options for ensuring that required background information is available but at lower cost can be considered.

(i) The ideal is that the partner country produces a regular State of the Environment Report, SOER, or similar that is credible and comprehensive. Danida can contribute to this to ensure that coverage, relevance and quality satisfies its own informational needs. This makes the information more readily available to other actors including national groups. It would ensure that the informational bias is towards partner country needs and helps build local capacity for generating, analysing and applying such information. It strengthens local frameworks for environmental action including making the baseline for co-ordination clearer. Once in place, the ESP only has to refer to the SOER. This would also be in line with the recent Draft guidelines for EPSF support (MFA 2000).

(ii) If such national documents are not in place or not of sufficient quality, Danida could produce the documentation in collaboration with other donors addressing environmental issues. This would also strengthen possibilities for improved donor co-ordination <sup>4</sup>).

(iii) If even joint donor documents are not feasible (which is, unfortunately, often the case!), Danida should produce a “minimum information needs” background section. The ESP is primarily a framework document, not an appropriations related one.

Where the EPSF funded activities are more closely integrated with a *national* ESP, so that the ESP is becoming more of a genuine sector support, Sections 8, 9 and 10 – “Indicators”, “Sector Programme Support Management and Organisation”, and “Monitoring, Review, Reporting and Evaluation”, respectively – could be reduced to be in line with national standards. This is some ways off, but should be a goal towards which the ESPs should explicitly be moving.

*4) It is a sad fact of development co-operation that there is minimal learning across organisations. The fact that Danida has produced some excellent documents with valuable information is generally not picked up either by national authorities – they do not have the time to read all the donor paper – or other donors. Similarly with Danida: there are few references to other donor papers in Danida documents, with the exception of some World Bank documents.*



The Guidelines contain the contradictory conclusion that while the SPS document is to serve *both* parties as a management instrument, “when approved by Danida, the SPS Document becomes final” (Danida 1998, p. 66). The procedure established for the ESP – that it is presented and discussed with local authorities during Annual Consultations and with the Danida Board and JAC for comments – is a better solution.

Over the medium term, the ESP should be seen as an EPSF *strategy document*. It should be a short, focused statement of objectives and instruments similar to the Development Cooperation Strategy, rather than a major informational document. Instead the *components* of an ESP should be seen as constituting “quasi-sectors” that could be programmed according to the SPS Guidelines. A more complete argument, along with necessary pre-conditions for this to be realistic, is presented in the following chapter.

### Summing Up and Findings

- Structuring the funding of the EPSF in the form of stand-alone projects is not in line with “best practice” knowledge and contradicts Danida’s general programming principles. There is no analytical, programming or practical justification for it. The Evaluation finds, based on existing information, that this programming constraint is likely to reduce EPSF resource efficiency.
- Allocating resources in the form of annual Commitment Frames during the first phase created incentives to programme the EPSF in the form of small and short-term projects. This distortionary impact is now less.
- Commitment frames simultaneously with project planning means that inputs-oriented budgeting that can exhaust the resource ceiling is encouraged. This constrains resource-efficient planning and reduces flexibility in disbursements.
- Disbursement targets will create additional contradictions for financial management. As the EPSF programme matures, the best solution is to move from commitment frames and project budgets towards EPSF frames with disbursement targets similar to country frame resources, permitting some over-programming of resources.
- Fungibility between donor and partner country resources is low with regards to environmental matters. The EPSF as a funding facility is hence addressing important public/global goods issues that otherwise would not be realised, providing non-replaceable funding for key long-term investments. Closer links with Danish country frame and other programmes will generate more synergies and hence improved resources efficiency, however.
- The EPSF has been working under very tight time and human resource constraints. Limited time has been a key reason for programming weaknesses, though this constraint is becoming less serious. Lessons learned are leading to systematic improvements in project and programme design.
- Danida as an organisation and Danida staff have provided excellent management to the EPSF process and activities.
- The SPS Guidelines are too cumbersome for the EPSF. The documentation demands are too great for the ESP document, which should become a strategy document. The Guidelines could be more helpful at the component level, once it is possible to programme EPSF resources at this level rather than as projects.

## 2.5 Main Conclusions and Recommendations

EPSF is a unique and highly relevant response to the environmental challenges in the Southern Africa region. The seriousness of the problems and the lack of own resources

to address them means that Denmark is providing relevant and largely non-fungible support to address major “market failures” in the field of sustainable development.

The EPSF is a very recent funding facility. This has meant that close monitoring of performance in addition to the actual programming has been necessary in order to continuously develop policies and procedures. Problems have occurred, some mistakes made, but these have been addressed quickly and used in the further programming of the EPSF. Programming and management of the EPSF have been very professional and transparent at policy, management and technical levels.

Document-intensive and PAP-driven finalisation processes may limit local stakeholders’ possibilities for participation. The mission-intensive approach gives a disproportionate voice to Danish actors in setting the agenda and defining the contents of the process and product. The general signalling effect regarding roles and ownership may be unfortunate and not in line with current thoughts on partnership. Recent *trends* are towards more equitable relations. This process can be accelerated by adjusting roles between Danish and national actors through providing more responsibility and time to the latter. More attention should be paid to economic viability through a better planned integration into local programmes and budgets.

The current constraints on EPSF programming pose some problems. Allocating EPSF resources by project rather than as more flexible country frames contradicts current understanding of what constitutes “best practice”. The commitment frames combined with project budgeting creates rigidities both in budgeting and disbursements which work against local ownership and efficiency. More emphasis on complementarity and less concern about separability between EPSF and other resources would help efficiency.

### Recommendations

- EPSF programming could strengthen local ownership by shifting responsibility and provide more time to national actors. Danish actors could take on more supportive and quality assurance roles, while Danida is more flexible on formats and timing.
- EPSF financing should move from annual commitment frames with individual project approvals, to more flexible country frames. As the programme matures, some over-programming should be permitted to improve disbursement rates.
- While the EPSF will continue to require its own programming (“separability”), it should be linked closer to other Danida-funded activities (“complementarity”).
- SPS Guidelines information needs should be relaxed. Danida could produce scaled-down own documents but provide more resources, where feasible, for broader more collaborative and preferably government-managed documents on environmental matters. 10-15 page “core documents” built around the LFA matrix could form the basis for dialogue with stakeholders, while “minimum information needs” documents in general should be encouraged.

### 3. The Environment Support Programmes

Danida took the formal decision to prepare ESP documents early 1999. But ESPs for Malawi and Zimbabwe were already in place by late 1998 and Tanzania's was finalised early 2000. Malawi produced a new ESP for the period 2000-2004 in mid-2000 and an ESP review mission visited Zimbabwe in the autumn of 2000. ESPs for Mozambique and Zambia are under preparation while no ESP for Angola has so far been initiated.

The Draft guidelines for the administration and management of EPSF resources were only issued in March 2000 (MFA 2000). This is the first time that the ESP as such is mentioned in a Danida policy document.

#### 3.1 Programming the ESP

The programming principles foresee strong local ownership and close dialogue in identifying intervention areas. The result is to be activities that cover policy issues as well as concrete problems that the population is facing in areas of sustainable environment.

The dialogue on the programming of EPSF resources was formally initiated during the bilateral Annual Consultations in 1996. Informal talks had already taken place before this, among other things to agree to the TORs for the project identification missions that were sent during the second half of 1996/early 1997. Partner countries had prepared lists of projects they wanted the missions to consider for EPSF funding.

Once the decision had been taken to formulate a strategy document, Danida invested quite heavily in these processes. The ESP process for Zimbabwe, for example, budgeted a total of 18 work-months, to be done within a six-month period. Most of this was to be done in-country, and while two-thirds of the consultancy inputs were for Danish consultants, the process itself clearly was heavily recipient-oriented (Annex D).

#### 3.2 Producing the ESPs

The programming of the ESP documents has been difficult because it has in a sense been done "backwards". With the original demand for focusing on implementable projects, a number of countries – notably Zimbabwe – had a number of disparate projects on the ground when the process of getting the ESP put together was begun.

The ESP was supposed to be based on a set of "first principles" as established in the Guidelines, yet had to incorporate "the facts on the ground", which consisted of a number of projects that had been accepted largely on their own merits. Some principles for the programming had been in place from the beginning, however, in particular the general principles for Danida environmental assistance and the strategies for the EPSF (MFA 1988, Danida/Danced 1995, 1996). Apart from the generic environmental objectives that had to be fulfilled were the demand that Danida should focus on three to four *areas* and thus have a principle of concentration.

What was new with the preparation of the ESP document was that the areas were now to become *components* of a more general EPSF programme and strategy. They were therefore to have a more rigorous justification, and internal linkages and consistency. It is this last set of programming principles that have created some challenges.

#### **Structuring the Zimbabwe ESP**

Zimbabwe is “the early starter” among the Southern African countries. The project identification mission took place in June 1996, looking at the policy and capacity situation in the country, and reviewed about a dozen project proposals (ZIM.0.a). The mission recommended supporting three of them (Annex D).

The mission began developing four areas that the EPSF funding was to focus on, but this work was only completed once it had been agreed that a strategy document was to be produced. Danida then fielded a mission to develop “a coherent EDRF programme for possible Danish assistance to Zimbabwe” (Annex D). In July 1998, a draft ESPS/ESP framework document was produced that contained four components: (i) *National level support*, with focus on strengthening the Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism, MMET; (ii) *Rural District Environmental Action Planning*, DEAP, including an NGO-project “Managing our Indigenous Tree Inheritance”, MITI (Annex F); (iii) *Urban Environmental Planning and Management*, with support to selected cities and towns; and (iv) *Industrial Environmental Management*, which was to focus on cleaner production technology and occupational health and safety.

During the second half of 1998, an intensive review process led to a number of changes to the structure of the programme. It was felt that it was better to integrate the national level support into each separate component rather than have it as a stand-alone activity; the MITI project was to be more tightly integrated with the general DEAP process; and a fourth component on renewable energy was added (Annex D).

#### **Structuring the Tanzania ESP**

There had early on been agreement that the EPSF should focus on addressing resource degradation and management in both rural and urban areas. The rural component was narrowed down to community based natural resource management and wetlands management. The latter was an outcome of the Ramsar Convention that Tanzania had adhered to. In the urban areas, Tanzania had developed a Sustainable Cities programme it wanted Danida to support.

There was originally a proposal to have renewable energy as a component. This was changed to a “window of opportunity” to be explored rather than a full-blown component on its own. Another early possibility, coastal zone management, was rejected largely because there were already so many donors supporting this area (Annex E).

The main structure of the Tanzanian ESP was thus basically defined well before the formal ESP process began, with the only real change being a slight narrowing down. While preparatory work for the ESP began in 1998, the list of projects to be included and the areas for the ESP were only agreed to during meetings in March 1999. Two missions followed these meetings, leading to a draft document late fall 1999, a revised document in January 2000 and formal discussions and approval during the Annual Consultations in March 2000 (Annex E).

#### **Structuring the Malawi ESP**

The project identification mission to Malawi in 1996 proposed six projects: (i) District Environmental Action Planning in Lake Malawi districts, (ii) vocational training in natural resources management, (iii) national water resources action plan, (iv) Lake Chilwa wetland conservation and development, (v) bilharzia control in selected Lake Malawi communities, (vi) cleaner industrial production and occupational health (MAL.0.b, p. 55). A year later, after internal discussions in Danida and consultations with the authorities, projects (iii) and (vi) were dropped and replaced by (a) assessment of alternative energy technologies, and (b) support to production of State of the Environment reporting. The alternative energy project had been discussed by the 1996-mission but not included in the priority list (MAL.0.c, p. 2).

During the Annual Consultations in January 1998, it was agreed that the EPSF would support an Environment Fund for micro-projects and strengthening the network of environmental focal points. In order to accommodate both the demands for a more structured programme, and the changes in suggested project activities, the support was structured into two components: *Reporting and Integrated Planning for the Environment*, RIPE, and *Local Initiatives Facility for the Environment*, LIFE (TOR, "Pre-appraisal of the Environmental Sector Programme, Malawi".TSA-6/Danida, 05 August 1998).

By November 1998, the programme was restructured once again. In the ESFS document, the programme has four components: (i) community based natural resources management, CBNRM, (ii) renewable energy, (iii) urban environment, and (iv) capacity development. RIPE and LIFE were integrated into the new programme structure. The Lake Chilwa, Lake Malawi and bilharzia projects were in turn restructured to be harmonised within the CBNRM component (MAL.0.i).

The new ESP for the period 2000-2004 contains three components and two stand-alone projects: (i) CBNRM, which includes a DEAP project previously funded under the country frame's Agricultural Sector Programme; Lake Malawi DEAP; Bilharzia control; Lake Chilwa project; and capacity development at national and district levels. (ii) Urban EPM in four of the twelve districts covered by the CBNRM. (iii) Renewable energy in four of the districts covered by the CBNRM. These three components thus have a geographic coherence, and all are also supportive of and consistent with the country's decentralisation programme. The two stand-alone projects are training at the Natural Resources College, and support to Environment Funds.

#### **Structuring the Zambia ESP**

The three-month identification mission in 1997 proposed that Danida focus on (i) soil degradation, (ii) wildlife depletion and biodiversity, (iii) urban environment degradation (in Lusaka), and (iv) deforestation and forest degradation (ZAM.0.a, p. 2). The activities themselves were to concentrate on on-the-ground implementation since there had been a tendency to support general planning and skills upgrading as ends in themselves.

Due to the political situation in the country, Denmark held back on the programming, and also did not initiate any projects. By 1999, the political situation was considered positive enough to again move ahead with EPSF programming, and a national consultant was hired to review and update the programme proposals. His report focused on wildlife management in the Kafue region, and urban environment development (ZAM.0.c).



Finally an identification and programme formulation mission towards the end of 1999 prepared an ESP draft which suggests four areas: (i) urban EPM, (ii) farmer-based natural resources management (soil, water and vegetation), (iii) sustainable natural resources management, and (iv) capacity development in environment (ZAM.0.g). A programme document is now being finalised and a first project is expected to be presented to the Danida Board by the end of the year 2000.

#### **General Observations**

The Mozambican programme, like most of the others, has undergone considerable changes. It now consists of three components: (i) coastal zone management, (ii) urban EPM, and (iii) cleaner industrial development and waste management (MOZ.0.d). With the exception of the Tanzanian ESP, the programmes have thus gone through some iterations before settling on the final structure. The reasons for these changes are several.

The TORs for the various missions are quite extensive, and the work done in the field has been thorough. The mission reports contain comprehensive lists of policy, legal, and other relevant documentation consulted. A lot of time has gone into identifying and talking with a wide range of stakeholders. Finally, there are often explicit criteria used for identifying the components. In the case of the Zambia, for example, the latest mission refers to five criteria, which are fairly similar to those used in other countries: (i) Zambian policies in place, in particular the National Environmental Action Plan, (ii) Danida policies, (iii) other donor interventions (i.e., where Danida might fit in), (iv) potential for results in the medium term (four years), and (v) strong poverty orientation.

By themselves, such criteria are not able to explain the changes in ESP priorities that have taken place. They have been caused by more pragmatic factors. The first is that as programming progressed and Danida learned more about the situation on the ground, some early options were ruled out as less interesting than originally thought. The second was that priorities changed when Denmark's Parliament upgraded the importance of renewable energy, which explains the sudden appearance of this component in a couple of programmes. The third is that as lessons were learned from the programming of the ESPs, modifications were introduced.

One major reason that such changes could take place is that the partner countries themselves usually did not have clear policies, much less operational action plans that Danida could use as their point of departure. On the other hand, partner countries have over the years learned the painful way that even when they do make proposals, if they do not fit with the donors' own concepts, they usually won't fly. Local authorities therefore largely sit back and let the donors' programming process unfold and then negotiate an acceptable programme at the end. This pragmatism seems to have led to ESPs that both sides are largely satisfied with.

The ESP documents provide little information on what Danida considers "lessons learned" and thus why final choices were made. This might indicate that not much learning has taken place, but this would be an incorrect impression. Particularly the problems the Zimbabwe ESP process had in constructing a coherent programme with such a large number of disparate activities on the ground were quickly recognised.

For Tanzania, developing the programme at a somewhat slower pace than the one in Zimbabwe has allowed such lessons to be taken on board. The second Malawi ESP is also restructuring activities into more coherent components based on the lessons learned. The fact that Malawi felt a need to have a revised ESP only two years after the first one was in place reflects a consciousness regarding the importance but also inadequacy of that first ESP. That Danida then was able to produce a revised ESP within a reasonable time span was due to the lessons learned, both concerning the ESP as a programming tool, but also regarding the specific programming needs in Malawi.

The *urban environment* has emerged as an important area in most programmes. The first reason is that while the “brown” environment is an important and rapidly increasing problem, not many donors are involved. The second explanation is the Danish resource base, particularly when it comes to pollution abatement/cleaner production technology. But the third reason is the learning process. Since Danida’s technical department has had a leading role in defining all ESPs, this small group of people has been able to monitor and learn from what is happening. Suggestions that Zimbabwe (Norton) should look at Sustainable Cities projects in Tanzania is a typical outcome of this “sharing experiences”.

The regional seminars have also been instrumental in discussing lessons and drawing conclusions. Management and staff from both the technical department and SAO in Copenhagen join the regional ambassadors and their embassy staff, and representatives from Danced also participate. One area that for example has been discussed is capacity development, where the programmes in Malawi and Tanzania include support to decentralised environmental management. The recent evaluation of Danced’s efforts in this area in the Southern Africa region was quite positive and presented at the last regional meeting and may provide further lessons in this area (Danced 2000).

There are some perfunctory references to the regional dimension in several ESPs, but these are included more because it is “politically correct” to do so rather than because this has been a genuine factor in developing the ESPs.

#### **Summing Up and Findings**

- The ESPs were developed within two sets of constraints: the formal ones defined by the Danida/EPSP policies, and the ones represented by “the facts on the ground” in terms of projects under implementation. The ESPs could hence not be based only on “first best principles” (with the exception of Zambia where no projects have been initiated), but had to take into consideration choices already made at the project level.
- There has been considerable learning both within and across countries. Zimbabwe has incurred many of the “learning costs” for the other countries in the region, and these have been applied in other countries’ ESPs. Malawi as the first country in the region has also completed a second round of ESP programming.
- The urban environment has emerged as a key dimension in the ESPs while the regional dimension has largely been unimportant for the national ESPs.
- The ESP processes contained in some cases quite substantial changes. Most of this was due to pragmatic modifications based exactly on “local lessons learned”. But the introduction of renewable energy was a policy initiative from Copenhagen. In general, Danida has been in the driver’s seat in producing the ESPs, and this first set of ESPs are more Danida products than joint ones.

## 3.3 National Programming Context

Existing national frameworks for environmental action often are generally weak. This is with respect to the legislation in place, the structure of the public sector, and its capacity.

### Legislative Frameworks

There is usually not an overarching piece of legislation that addresses the problem of sustainable development and its relationship to other key issues. The result is that environmental questions *de facto* play second fiddle to issues like economic development.

The situation is improving slowly, however. Malawi in particular seems to have succeeded in integrating the environmental dimension into its decentralisation process. In Mozambique the legal instruments used to establish the Ministry for Environmental Co-ordination addresses a number of the major concerns. As with many new ministries, the actual implementation and respect for what the law entails remains to be seen. In Zimbabwe, a comprehensive piece of legislation has been developed through a thorough and participatory process. The finalisation of the Environmental Management Bill, EMB, has been agonisingly slow, however, with the final outcome still uncertain (Annex D).

### Organisation of the Public Sector

The structure and organisation of the environmental authorities reflect what is usually a poor state of the public sector in general. There are overlaps in terms of jurisdiction and unclear “grey areas” with regards to responsibilities. This is aggravated by the fact that the environmental authorities often are politically weak and thus not able to address their concerns when they come into conflict with more powerful interests. In Zimbabwe the Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism is the proponent of the EMB, but where the EMB is explicitly *not* to cover issues in the mining sector where some of the more serious environmental problems exist. The fact that the ministry responsible for both mining and the environment makes such a clear priority is not atypical <sup>5)</sup>.

But the *static* situation is often not the biggest problem. In Zambia, the identification mission noted that “It has been most difficult to get a clear picture of the public sector concerning the environment, both in regard to their mandate, activities, staffing and their financial sustainability. One reason is that the environment is a cross sectoral subject and practically everybody does something that relates to the environment. But two factors ... complicates the issue: One is the ongoing civil service reform and the other is the privatisation process. ...the Forestry Department, for example, will have a new mandate is likely to become a semi-autonomous body...[which] apparently will have to generate its own revenues...The Department of Natural Resources ... is supposedly to be dissolved” (ZAM.0.a). This situation is not unique to Zambia. The wholesale transformations of the public sector in most of these countries, usually including some form of decentralisation, makes it difficult to design capacity building and institutional development efforts.

5) *The government restructuring early 2000 turned the ministry into the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, MET, but when the EMB was proposed it still included mining.*



#### **Capacity in the Public Sector**

The capacity to legislate, monitor, evaluate and enforce is by and large weak at all levels of the public sector. The various ESP documents raise concerns about the few staff who are in place, the relatively poor technical skill levels present, the high turn-over, etc. Much of this reflects the general situation of the public sector in most of these countries. It seems clear, though, that the circumstances with regards to bodies that have special responsibilities for the environment is particularly difficult. This in part reflects the fact that environmental matters are a fairly recent issue – organisations and capacities are still being created – and partly that environmental concerns are not at the top of the political agenda in countries struggling to address extreme poverty.

Several ESP preparatory documents try to provide an analysis of the capacity in place. The most systematic is perhaps the local consultancy report for Zambia where the emphasis is on capacity assessment of possible implementing agencies, largely NGOs but also the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (ZAM.0.c). In Zimbabwe, the original identification mission provided a run-down of the problems that the sector was facing and concluded that it was weak. Because there was a vibrant NGO community and private sector, the mission suggested that Danida primarily work with the NGO community when it came to “green” issues and with the private sector on “brown” issues. Alongside this, Denmark should then assist the public sector develop its capacity to effectively carry out its responsibilities, so that over time environmental issues could be anchored in the public sector where appropriate (ZIM.0.a).

Most documents express concern with regards to the current situation but also that the situation is not likely to improve noticeably in the short to medium term.

#### **Summing Up and Findings**

- The national framework conditions for ESP programming are largely poor, though are slowly improving. This weakens possibilities for genuine national ownership and leadership, and has forced Danida to undertake more comprehensive analyses and general programming exercises than otherwise should have been necessary.
- Public sector capacity is particularly weak in the environment field, making Danida also look to non-public entities for activity execution. Institutional development and capacity building in the public sector is important but also difficult to design due to the fundamental changes and uncertainties in the public sector.

### **3.4 Contents of the ESPs**

The background information produced for the ESPs is generally comprehensive and of a high quality. There is a good description of the environmental problems and challenges in the partner country, a presentation of the current legislative and organisational situation, who the other main actors are (NGOs, civic organisations, private sector, donors), the Government’s commitments with respect to international environmental agreements, and recent developments and likely trends over the coming years. As noted in the previous chapter, the effort put into this section could perhaps be scaled down by making it part of a larger exercise with government and/or other donors.

#### **Objectives of the ESPs**

The formal rigour with which the objectives of the various ESPs are formulated, varies somewhat. The Tanzanian ESP presents a logical and consistent hierarchy of objectives

where it is easy to see how lower-level goals are to contribute to the higher-level ones. In the case of Zimbabwe, given the nature of the programme in place, it has been more difficult to come up with such a unified goal-hierarchy.

The general objectives of the ESPs one would assume to be fairly similar. There are some differences, however. The Tanzanian ESP talks of “improved and environmentally sustainable use and management” while Zambia focuses more directly on poverty reduction by talking about “improved welfare” (Annex E and ZAM.0.g, respectively).

One issue is the programming rigour, and to what extent this is in fact important. The other is the *content* of the objectives: what should in fact be the primary objective of Danish-funded environmental activities in extremely poor countries?

While it is important that an EPSF-funded programme be internally consistent, it is of greater importance that it is consistent with national objectives and action plans. The ESPs by and large try to link to what exists of national programmes and policies. Due to weak national frameworks this is often not of great help. But Danida should not compensate for this through an exaggerated internal coherence in an ESP. It may make a lot of sense for one or another component not to be rigorously linked to an overall ESP objective if instead it has established a strong relationship to an important national programme or policy. This would also be in line with the ESP becoming a *strategy* document rather than a holistically rigorous *programme* document.

Regarding the poverty reduction versus environmental sustainability, the starting point is that Denmark as a donor and the partner countries in Southern Africa all have poverty reduction as the overriding concern. The EPSF, therefore, represents a particular contribution to this, but is to attain this by focusing on its stated primary objective as set forth in the policy documents. The binding constraint is simply that it should be in line with poverty reduction. Distributional consequences of environmental interventions, for example, are therefore important. Whether this “meta” goal is explicitly included in the ESP or not is not so important. What is of concern is that the ESPs focus on the policy objectives established for the EPSF, and pursue these well.

#### **Coherence of Components**

The demand for a totally logically consistent programme, it is argued above, may be “over-determining” the Danida-funded programme. But the Evaluation believes that the *within*-component coherence is important, in order for Danida to be able to programme its resources efficiently. Here the different country ESPs vary.

The Malawi and Tanzania programmes seem to have internally quite consistent components that are mutually supportive of the objectives given at that level of the programme. The Zimbabwe programme is quite inconsistent, however, while the Mozambican programme still has too few activities to be able to say much about it.

#### **The Zimbabwe Components**

The problems with the Zimbabwe programme are at several levels. One thing is that the activities *within* components often are not linked. Within the industrial environment component, the cleaner production technology, CPT, project and the occupational health and safety, OHS, project have *some* areas of commonality and have established a pragmatic working relationship. But the focus of the projects are different, and they do

not spring out of a strategic analysis of what the major challenges in the field of industrial environmental management are.

Similar holds to a certain extent for the rural EPM component. The MITI and DEAP projects were developed independently of each other. While they both address rural EPM with a focus at the community level and there are some linkages between the two, they do not spring out of a common analysis and systematically try to develop synergies.

This situation is not surprising, given the history of how the projects and components came into being. One should then perhaps not bother, *ex post facto*, to try to impose some formal consistency and logic in the ESP document when this really is not there. But furthermore this diversity may not be a bad thing if it can be used to expand the range of lessons learned and thus provide an improved basis for future sector or sub-sector policies. A case in point is Zimbabwe's Urban EPM, where different programming approaches, different co-ordination/networking activities, and different priorities can provide an opportunity for testing the appropriateness of alternatives.

What is more serious is that the activities may not be focusing on the overarching problems *within* the sector as presented in the Danida documents themselves. In the renewable energy field, fuelwood is the main energy source for the vast majority of the rural poor yet Danida is focusing on relatively high-tech technologies. The link to poverty reduction is tenuous at best (see Annex D). While donors should assist introduction and development of new technologies, there should be a basic cost-benefit review that shows that in a resource-scarce country it may make sense to invest at least some resources in these areas. That kind of analysis is missing.

In the industrial environment field, the CPT project addresses environmental audits, some upstream production improvements to cost-effectively reduce resource use and pollution – but these are not the major problems in the industrial sector. The Harare City Council has identified air pollution, part of it from industry, as a key concern. Yet as part of the Urban EPM it is focusing more on additional measurements rather than interventions (which evidently are supposed to come in a subsequent phase).

In the rural areas, tenurial rights/access to land, and land productivity (degradation) are key issues (and where intelligent incorporation of HIV/AIDS concerns is required for sustainable solutions). Given the existence of considerable NGO experience at the community level, the community-focus by a public-sector DEAP project is questioned. Instead it is suggested that a more careful analysis of the comparative advantage of the public sector, and the public/private goods nature of various rural EPM interventions, could lead the project to focus on a different set of issues (see Section 5.2).

There is also a question about the extent to which the EPSF programming has been too focused on its own objectives and not analysed lessons learned from other actors and previous activities. The rural planning project, DEAP, is based on previous experiences of rural planning *in the environment field* but is not well integrated into Government's main Rural District Council capacity building programme, for example. The Urban EPM has not fully built on lessons of financial sustainability and management from the Urban II programme and is not integrated with the new infrastructure Capital Development Programme which addresses key issues affecting the poor. There have been discussions between the parties, but possibilities for closer links have in part been

hampered by the project approach. This has also been a stumbling block in Mozambique, where Danida is one of four donors supporting MICOA. The other three – UNDP, Netherlands and Norway – provide support to a joint basket managed by UNDP, but where Danida so far has not been able to join due to its project structure.

This situation is different from the one found in Tanzania. The Sustainable Cities programme was developed by Tanzania with assistance from UNDP/UNCHS and also ICLEI's "Model Cities Programme". Building on the piloting in Dar es Salaam, *Sustainable Mwanza* was the first project in a serially developed component. Within four years there have been "four generations" of project documents. The "fourth generation", for Moshi and Mwanza II, are largely locally produced (Annexes E, H). The CBNWM project in Iringa builds to a large extent on previous and on-going activities in the area (HIMA, MBOMIPA) and experiences generated elsewhere in the country (Duru-Haitemba forest in Arusha and Mgori forest in Singida district – see Annex I).

#### **Programming and Components**

Looking at the complexity of issues the EPSF programming has to face, the Evaluation believes that the key concept should be the *component*. The *components* give Danida the flexibility to address several important environmental matters in a country in a fairly comprehensive manner, such as within the *sustainable cities*-concept.

One way of conceiving the EPSF programming is thus to consider the components as equivalent to sectors, and programmed and funded as such. The ESP document becomes, as noted earlier, equivalent to a country strategy document, with a set of fairly general objectives to which the different components contribute but without an exaggerated stringency in terms of linkages. Projects should become less important. This approach would solve several dilemmas that the programming is encountering today:

- The objectives at the ESP level are sometimes too general to help identify the specific activities to fund – an observation made also by the State Auditor's report on the EPSF (Auditor-General 1999a). Yet if the ESP document is seen as a general strategy for environmental support in a country, the objective of the support is at the general sustainable development-level, in accordance with national policies and priorities.
- Allocating funds at the project level leads to "over-planning" and dangers of micro-management. This both makes Danida pay too much attention to the project level, and distorts the ownership towards the donor.
- The programming should focus at the level of the components. The Urban EPMs in Malawi and Tanzania, for example, provide a solid basis for a rigorous yet comprehensive approach to an issue. Co-ordination and joint monitoring and development of success criteria etc. are also more meaningful at component than at project or overall ESP levels.
- Funding at component level gives flexibility to budgeting and disbursements. Projects are "lumpy" investments that tend to become over-dimensioned and thus less likely to be sustainable. With a component budget, re-allocations for improved disbursement flows can be attained, focusing on attaining component objectives rather than project-level goals.

The proposal is thus that the EPSF is programmed only at two levels:

- At the *strategic* level, the ESP becomes a short, focused policy document.

- At the *activity* level, there should be only one *appropriations* document. Currently this has to be at the project level. Over time, focus and resources should be shifted to the component level, based on sector programming principles.

Component programming requires that policies are defined, national action plans that permit insertion of donor support are available, etc. This is generally not the case today, but with Tanzania's Urban EPM – the Sustainable Cities concept – many of the key principles are largely in place. But EPSF planning resources could be used more actively to achieve this. In the case of the Zimbabwe Urban EPM, for example, the suggestion has been made that the variety of approaches, priorities etc. be used to systematically develop lessons as a basis for future policies (Annex D). The current Component Committee could be transformed into a policy-focused Working Group, much like it did prior to the EPM component being established.

The ESP can in the meantime contain *skeleton* component descriptions, to ensure that projects focus on a few key issues. But investing a lot in component descriptions when basic pre-conditions for sector-programming are not in place, may be more of a hinder than help as it may force an artificial unity on activities before the foundations are clear.

### Summing up and Findings

- The goal-hierarchy in the Malawi and Tanzania documents is good and consistent. The proposal of turning the ESPs into a strategy document implies, however, that the need for such planning rigour may be unnecessary. It is more important that the components of the programme support meaningful *national* objectives than being squeezed into an over-structured *Danida*-programme.
- The quest for coherence should rather focus on *within-component* consistency, at two levels: that the projects have strategic links to each other, and that each project addresses key concerns of the component. Due to the history of the programming in Zimbabwe, this is often not the case with the projects and components there, which should be addressed. In the other countries, these problems are much less.
- EPSF programming should focus on two levels: the ESP as strategy document, and an appropriations documents which over time should be sector-programming at component level. This requires that pre-conditions be established, and EPSF planning resources could be used for this.

## 3.5 ESPs and National Environmental Action

One challenge for the EPSF programmes is to become properly inserted in the national context. This was raised at a Roundtable Discussion on Malawi's own ESP. One person noted that Malawi now had a National Environmental Action Plan, a Public Sector Investment Programme with environmental projects included, and a national ESP. How were actors expected to be able to harmonise these disparate approaches? – to which the moderator had to admit that this required additional work (MAL.0.h, p. 6).

### Malawi DESP and Local Development

Inserting a donor-funded programme into this complex situation requires care. In the case of Malawi, Denmark has been quite successful as the ESP document is seen to be fully compatible with the framework provided by Malawian Government policies and documents (MAL.0.f). This is a function of the fact that Malawi *has* both policies and documents in place that allow donors to ensure the required co-ordination.



Malawi had prepared a National and Sustainable Renewable Energy Programme, NSREP, in 1997. UNDP and Danida provided assistance to prepare a Programme Support Document, PSD, that provides a strategic framework for the realisation of the NSREP. The renewable energy component in Danida's DESP thus takes the NSREP and the PSD as its point of departure. The project identification mission that Danida sent to Malawi in May 1999 therefore had as two of its three objectives "(i) to identify and assess the modalities of merging the current Danida-supported renewable energy technologies project within the PSD with the activities to be undertaken under the UNDP/GEF initiative; (ii) to assess the institutional and financial arrangements for implementing a parallel-funded Danida project with the PSD and UNDP/GEF activities, and to recommend the optimal option" (MAL.3.g, p. 13).

Denmark early on also decided to assist Malawi's decentralisation programme. This is being done both with resources from the general country frame and from the EPSF, a good example of complementarity between these two Danish funding sources at the level of policy and principles. The EPSF programme is therefore to be implemented at the lowest administrative level possible. Each of the three components are thus structured so that most activities support the communities directly. Each component is to provide assistance at the national level, but only to the degree necessary for national authorities to support district- and community level implementation. The Danida approach builds on four principles that were supported at Malawi's ESP Roundtable: (i) funding should get to the end-user, (ii) decentralisation to the districts and communities should be supported, (iii) participation should be used in all activities, and (iv) the private sector should be part of the donor support (MAL.0.i, pp. 3,14).

The Malawi programme document notes that "the key underlying concept .. is national ownership... The Environment SPS will be nationally executed. To secure greater national ownership of the components and projects, and to obviate the risks of a proliferation of *ad hoc* structures, existing institutions and committees and planning and reporting systems will be utilised wherever possible... The reporting procedures should be built around existing GOM reporting formats with necessary amendments to meet Danida's standard requirements for progress reporting and financial monitoring... The EAD [Environmental Affairs Department] will engage a full-time accountant who will be specifically responsible for reporting of the overall financial status of the Environment SPS to the Director, EAD, and the ... Embassy... The National Audit Office [NAO] is responsible for carrying out the audit. If the NAO does not have the capacity, annual audits will be undertaken by a mutually agreed upon Certified Public Accounting company on behalf of the NAO" (MAL.0.i, pp. 72, 74-75).

The above intentions are in line with the OECD/DAC's principles for good partnership referred to earlier. But Malawi's poor capacity to implement its decentralisation policy is causing problems for the EPSF programme. The most recent progress report notes that the Danida programme may be "ahead of the decentralisation process. The projects are based on government structures which are non-functional or poor. ...If there is no capacity for the basic and core functions of a local government, it becomes quite difficult to tackle advanced issues like the environment. Based on the experience gathered so far, it may well be that ... it will be necessary to build a sound decentralised district administration including well functioning technical departments before actually addressing cross cutting environmental problems" (MAL.0.j).

#### **Zimbabwe Implementation**

One conclusion of the 1996 identification mission was that the Zimbabwean public sector is weak and implementation should therefore be done by other actors. This the programme has largely achieved in all four components. In the rural EPM, the MITI project is directly implemented by a local NGO. Renewable energy activities are to be joint between the Department of Energy and various specialised NGOs. In the urban EPM, the Norton project is implemented directly by the local Town Council with funds going through the Ministry of Finance. A local NGO, E2000, is playing a key role in two urban projects where one of its main tasks is to facilitate activities between the parties involved, including the local council. It is also implementing a networking project to strengthen the learning between urban councils.

The consultation that takes place in the context of urban projects is clearly more complex than for rural ones, both because of the size and diversity of an urban community compared with a small rural village, but also because the issues themselves are more difficult to handle, often requiring considerable technical expertise and funding to solve. At the same time, Danida has generally taken care to respect and thus strengthen the legitimacy of elected bodies and representative organs, rather than going the “populist” route of bypassing elected officials in the name of “direct stakeholder consultation”<sup>6)</sup>. The price paid in the case of Norton town council may have been that the consultation with other stakeholders was too perfunctory, leading to some problems during the start-up phase of the project (Annex G).

#### **Tanzania Implementation**

In Tanzania as in Malawi, resources are to be focused at the lower administrative levels. The projects are being implemented by the respective local authorities at community or municipality levels. The participatory project design and therefore early involvement of stakeholders in both urban and rural projects are in line with national policies and intentions. Experience so far indicates genuine participation and ownership, though improvements need to be made to aspects of the planning (Annex I).

The support at national level is largely in the form of component advisors. The ones in place are located in the relevant departments of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The activities are thus well anchored in the respective institutions and plans.

#### **Co-ordination**

Improved co-ordination is an important objective in the ESPs. This is to ensure that EPSF resources are not allocated to areas where other donors already are providing sufficient support, but also to improve overall programming since many actors are involved: donors, ministries, local civic organisations. Actual co-ordination is often poor both among donors and by the national authorities. There is no coherent “sector programme” for environmental activities similar to those being developed in areas like health, education, etc. in the region, and the responsible ministries are often weak and thus have limited ability to provide clear guidance.

6) *The highly touted World Bank study Assessing Aid (1999) has a political analysis that borders on the naïve. It talks about “ideas being important” as if local actors are ignorant and that donors can introduce new ideas through direct stakeholder consultations rather than seeing certain choices as a function of political power and genuine conflicts of interest.*



In Zimbabwe the UNDP was to act as focal donor, but over the last couple of years has in practice not done so. In Tanzania donor meetings take place, but the embassy had to carry out a survey of donor-funded activities when identifying which areas to support, since no updated study existed. In Malawi, however, co-ordination between UNDP, USAID and Danida has led among other things to a geographic division of labour.

Danida often suggests the establishment of co-ordination mechanisms that will link the projects to national decision-makers and other actors. For a number of reasons, most of these mechanisms only cover the Danish-funded activities. Most projects have a project steering committee, while Zimbabwe also has Component Committees for the urban EPM and renewable energy, and a Programme Advisory Committee, PAC, at the national level. The PAC is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the MMET with participation from the other line ministries where EPSF-funded activities are being implemented, the NGOs involved, and the Danida advisors. While Malawi has similar committees at component level, in Tanzania Danida and the Tanzanian authorities agreed to only have steering committees at project level.

In Zimbabwe, participants recognise the weakness of the PAC, since it can only address issues in the Danish-funded programme. Despite this, the PAC is appreciated because so far this is the only forum where policy and implementation issues can be discussed – the Government has not established such a forum. The draft EMB, however, is proposing an Environmental Co-ordination Committee, ECC, and Danida should assist in transforming/expanding the PAC into this more encompassing ECC.

Danida is currently funding most of the organisational back-stopping of the committees. While the meetings are chaired by nationals, the preparations and follow-up, particularly at component and national levels, are largely ensured by Danida-funded personnel. The ownership/leadership for the time being therefore seems to rest largely with the donor.

There are two issues to consider regarding co-ordination, whether at project, component or national levels. The first is the danger of pushing local authorities into donor-driven committees which over time may institutionalise donor-segmentation rather than open the door to more genuine partnerships – i.e., the PAC in Zimbabwe needs somehow to be transformed and enlarged. The second is doing a cost-benefit review of the co-ordination structure seen from the partners' point of view. What are the gains to local authorities from this co-ordination, are there any indicators of the local demand for such committees (how many were initiated by local actors? How many of the meetings are being called by them?). What would be the cost to the public sector if all donors requested the same level of co-ordination intensity?

#### **EPSF and Country Frame Separability**

The issue of separability appears in most countries. In Zimbabwe, the agricultural sector support to small-scale producers could have been linked to the DEAP project, but there is virtually no connection between the two. One consequence is that the fuelwood issue had to be put aside within the renewable energy component (Annex D). The synergy between the Private Sector Development programme and the CPT project is obvious. There the parties have in fact established good *informal* links so that co-ordination in practice takes place, but *structurally* this is not programmed as such, leaving this as an *ad hoc* arrangement.

The DESP review mission to Malawi in March 2000 notes that “Danida supports a range of activities within the agricultural and education sectors in Malawi... Various synergies ... might be developed by focusing on important concerns such as health and sanitation; energy such as alternative and/or improved fuel wood use; forestry including woodlots; agriculture particularly small scale farming; education in environmental related issues..” (MAL.0.k, p. 4).

The JAC carried out a mission to South Africa and Mozambique in October 1998. One of the general comments of the mission was the need for better synergies between the general country frame activities and the EPSF funded ones, as well as the obverse: the difficulties of being able to draw a clear distinction between them (JAC 1998).

### Summing Up and Findings

- The Malawi case shows the importance of national frameworks being in place for EPSF-funded activities to be successfully integrated into national efforts.
- Despite supportive frameworks, implementation in Malawi may be at a pace that local capacity cannot match, posing questions regarding realism and sustainability.
- The ESPs stress support to co-ordination, but much of the efforts only cover Danida-funded activities. A critical review of cost-benefits to local stakeholders may lead to improved co-ordination approaches.
- “Separability” is a constraining factor for efficiency at programming level.

## 3.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

*Programming:* ESP programming has undergone rapid changes during the last two years, shifting focus from projects to strategic programme. They have had to be put together based on general principles *and* given existing project activities. This has been a problem especially in Zimbabwe. But there has been rapid learning *between* and within countries, where the coherence and quality of more recent ESPs are clearly superior to the first ones.

*National Frameworks:* These are largely weak, forcing Danida to take on a stronger role than it otherwise would have (or wants) in establishing the ESP documents. Danida should adapt the pace of programming and implementation to these realities on the ground. The case of Malawi points to how strong local frameworks facilitate the integration and thus increased relevance of EPSF activities. But even in Malawi there are indications that Danida may be pushing implementation too fast compared with what local actors are able to handle, absorb and sustain.

*Urban environment* has emerged as a significant area for EPSF support in all four countries that have active projects. It is often the component that is best developed and most coherent, few other donors are involved, and it can take advantage of the Danish resource base.

*Co-ordination* is strongly supported in ESPs. Reality on the ground is that there is little of both government and intra-donor led co-ordination, and most of this is information sharing rather than operational. Danida has been supportive of improved co-ordination. In practice much of this has become limited to Danida-activities. While this represents a serious short-coming, the basic conclusion is that the *positive* aspects of the co-ordination experiences should be used to develop more *nationally*-driven efforts. In Zimbabwe, draft legislation proposing, among other things, the establishment of a national forum,

can take advantage of the Danida-supported Programme Advisory Committee as a starting point for its own forum.

#### **Recommendations**

- Programming should over time move towards a two-level approach:
  - An EPSF *strategy document* – preferably with the slightly modified name of EPS (Environment Programme Support) rather than ESP;
  - An *appropriations document*, which today is the project document. Over time, this should instead be at component level, where funding is programmed based on sector-programming principles.
- Focusing programming at component level requires that more efforts are put into assisting national authorities develop meaningful framework conditions at this level. Component level programming would be consistent with considering environment as both cross-cutting and quasi-sector on its own: it can provide value-added to all activities at a (sub-)sector level – such as urban development – while also addressing specific issue within that (sub-)sector – such as industrial pollution, solid waste management, etc.
- Danida should assist, wherever possible, national authorities to strengthen national co-ordination of environmental interventions.

## 4. The Regional Programme

In the EPSF strategy document for Southern Africa, the regional dimension is the point of departure: “The present strategy covers regional environmental assistance, which has been defined as being directed towards problems and activities which (i) are of a trans-boundary nature, or (ii) are common to several countries and lend themselves well to co-ordination. The initiation of specific regional activities will be contingent upon the areas of intervention being given high priority by at least three countries” (Danida/Danced 1995, p. 20). This is confirmed in the general EPSF strategy presented a year later: “Environmental assistance will be planned from a regional perspective, in order to facilitate holistic and coherent initiatives in the prioritised regions” (Danida/Danced 1996, p. 7). The Southern Africa strategy document then goes on to say that “In a few cases, bilateral activities may also be implemented to solve environmental problems which have not been given priority in a regional context but which are essential to the individual country and its development plans” (op. cit., p. 21).

The basic assumption underlying this strategy was that the environmental problems in the region were structurally fairly similar. Applying a regional and thus more consistent approach was therefore to generate considerable efficiency gains both for Danida as a donor but primarily for the partner countries.

It quickly became apparent that this approach over-simplified the situation on the ground. Instead of developing *one* regional programme with implementation of components in the various countries, as the original strategy formulation could be interpreted to mean, national programmes have been developed that have limited direct links to one another, and a *separate* regional programme has instead evolved.

### 4.1 Development of the Regional Programme

The first Danida mission to programme regional assistance took place in January 1997. It confirmed what had already been noted in the strategy itself: the capacity to implement environmental activities at regional level was weak, and there were few actors with any legitimacy to take on such responsibilities. Within SADC, for example, there is no one office responsible for environmental matters. These problems are rather to be addressed as part of sectoral responsibilities that have been distributed to the various secretariats.

While many of the environmental problems were similar across countries, they seldom were trans-boundary in nature: soil erosion, deforestation, pollution etc. were more efficiently addressed within each country. The mission therefore concluded that in most areas, national activities would be the most appropriate. The major exception concerned common waterways, where there was a recognised need for regional collaboration.

#### Hazardous Waste Management Mission

Despite the somewhat pessimistic conclusions from this mission, Danida has continued to invest in the regional dimension, though with a more focused approach. In 1998, a joint Danced/Danida mission on hazardous waste management, HZM, took place. This issue is recognised as trans-boundary, as the often illegal transport of hazardous waste

and its management in general in the region constitutes a threat to the environment. It is symptomatic for the challenges that regional initiatives face, however, that the mission report notes that “this identification mission was originally arranged on the initiative of Danida without a request from any of the eleven target countries in question” (REG.d). In line with previous missions’ findings regarding capacity to implement, the report says that “furthermore, since the mission was specifically charged with identifying regional activities, a forum for implementation of one or more of the immediate objectives has to be identified or established regionally. The mission has found that no candidate is in place at present....One such obvious candidate could have been SADC Environment and Land Management Sub-sector. However, most of the countries and other stakeholders, including the international donor community, did not see SADC as a realistic forum for regional co-operation on HZM” (op. cit., p.iii.4).

The report points out the very different capacities and framework conditions in place in the various countries, and thus the heterogeneous starting point for joint action <sup>7)</sup>. It ends up proposing a regional training centre in South Africa to support implementation of the Basel Convention (which addresses the treatment of hazardous waste).

#### **“Best Practices” in Biodiversity**

The following year, Danida fielded a mission to look at “best practices” on biodiversity in the region. While the HZM mission covered the entire region, this mission looked at the five countries covered by Danida. The impression from the report is that this mission was also not based on any strong requests from the countries covered.

Regarding the specific regional dimension, it believes “a regional approach should only be used when there are clear cross-border interests and a comparative advantage of a regional rather than national or local approach. The regional approach has comparative advantages in: training; sharing of lessons learned on common or similar issues; regional networks on site-based surveys of biodiversity directly linked to concrete management actions; development of trans-boundary natural resource management areas for shared eco-system, river basins and wildlife migratory routes” (REG.j, p. vi).

The report points out that in four of the five countries where Danida funds general development activities, agriculture is one of the sectors being supported (Zambia is the exception). It suggests that biodiversity issues should be addressed in these programmes, and that a review could be undertaken after two years to see what lessons have been learned from this. That is, the report supports the notion that the link between EPSF and country frame resources could provide positive synergies (op. cit., p. vi).

It then suggests that “Danida further emphasise the inclusion of biodiversity as a crosscutting issue in mainstream development aid...[B]iodiversity as an integral part of all natural resource programmes ... will probably contribute as much or more to biodiversity conservation than specific and separate ... initiatives” (op. cit., p. vii).

#### **Strategic Water Management**

In early 2000, Danida funded a review of the options for support to the water sector (REG.l). It gives an overview of the needs for regional collaboration, the experiences so

*7) Various tables visualize this: ratification of Basel and Bamako conventions (table 1, p. 5), degree of support from donors (table 2, pp. 7-8), environmental legislation (table 3, p. 13), etc.*

far, Danish-funded activities, and future options. Danida can build on more than 10 years of support to ZACPlan, the Zambezi river basin plan involving eight countries. Under the EPSF, Danida also supported a SADC consultancy fund on integrated water management (REG.a), and the so-called “Water Weeks” promoted by SADC in 1999 as a follow up to the signing of the “SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses”.

### **Review of Future Options**

Finally, Danida is going to take stock of its regional activities through a desk study during the course of 2000. The objective is to define the strategic and operational considerations for future regional assistance. The inception note/concept paper prepared by the consultant puts a strong poverty focus on the approach to analysing the issues – that is, once again highlighting the links to Danida’s general country frame activities and the need to ensure strong coherence and synergy between the two sets of Danish-funded activities in this poor region. In addition, the consultant wants to look at the problems of ownership, human resources and institutional issues (REG.n). The study is to be ready by the end of the year 2000.

While the country-specific programmes have developed fairly quickly, the regional programme both in terms of general strategy and concrete activities is lagging. Four activities have been approved: (i) Support to SADC shared water resources management (consultancy fund and support to the implementation of the SADC Water Protocol – REG.a, REG.i). (ii) Support to a regional training centre in Cleaner Production and Coastal Zone Management in South Africa (REG.g). (iii) Support to a regional training centre in HZW treatment in support of the implementation of the Basel convention (REG.e). (iv) Support to a Pan-African project on combating water hyacinth (REG.b).

The activities in Malawi and Mozambique around Lake Malawi/Niassa are seen as constituting components in a regional “cluster” that could be complemented by a similar project in Tanzania. This will provide the participation of three countries that the strategy itself has defined as the “threshold value” for such clusters to be considered a regional activity, though currently Tanzania does not seem interested in this concept. The other activities being considered for approval focus on strengthening regional water resource management, with smaller programmes addressing biodiversity and mining.

### **Regional Strategy**

The responsibility for the regional programme lies with Danida’s Southern Africa office, SAO, in Copenhagen. This is largely for practical reasons since no single embassy has the capacity or can be said to be a logical home for such a regional programme. But SAO is clearly frustrated at the difficulties of putting together a truly regional programme. The current one, as is clear from the above, consists of a set of independent projects where each one has been identified and accepted on its own merits.

In a series of memos prepared towards the end of 1999, SAO lays out the problems of establishing regional activities, but also tries to develop a more programmatic approach. It notes again that most environmental problems are best dealt with at the national level since this is where the problems appear and this is where they can be addressed.

But there are also a series of economic and political realities that reduce the support for more regional activities which these memos do not fully take into account:



- The financial and human resources available for environmental issues in the region are extremely limited, and the little that is available is allocated to national tasks.
- Most ministries responsible for environmental matters are politically weak. They have problems mobilising support for addressing these problems at national level. Convincing cabinet colleagues to join forces with neighbouring countries is much more difficult. The fact that some governments in periods have quite strained relations makes this even more complicated. Since pay-off to investments in environmental matters can be quite far off and very diffuse (public goods-aspects), this makes it less interesting for politicians with short time-horizons and a felt need to produce tangible results quickly.

SAO nonetheless highlights the need for a more genuine regional *programme*. One reason is that more focused programming will lead to better utilisation of available funding. It will furthermore produce a framework that the embassies can refer to when identifying new regional initiatives. In order to make this more realistic, however, such a programme should build on the *national* programmes. The argument is that it is necessary first to establish *national* capacities before regional activities can be implemented.

The framework SAO proposes contains six criteria for selecting areas for regional EPSF support. (i) Identifiable net benefits from the Danish assistance, taking into consideration the truly *regional* aspect of the activity, what other donors are doing, etc. (ii) Regional priorities and the existence of well-functioning institutions and networks. (iii) Regional activities already underway under the EPSF. (iv) Possible synergy among the regional activities themselves. (v) National activities funded under the EPSF that can be complemented by regional activities or themselves can be clustered into a regional activity. (vi) Consistency with global initiatives. Based on these criteria, an internal memo of 8 December 1999 suggests three components for the programme: (i) Water resources management. (ii) Natural resource management including biodiversity conservation. (iii) Urban environmental management including industrial development concerns.

The notion of “clusters” or “chaining” national activities into a regional activity is also discussed. The Lake Malawi/Niassa example is given. This is seen as constituting a “bottom up” programming experience, where regional programming would develop as local authorities see the advantages from such collaboration. These proposals became the basis for preparing the TORs for the review of the regional programme (REG.n).

#### **Summing Up and Findings**

- There are few environmental problems that are truly of a trans-border nature. Most issues are more efficiently dealt with at the national level.
- There are few if any institutions that have the legitimacy and capacity to implement *regional* activities or programmes.
- The one issue that all actors agree has a genuine regional character, is shared waterways and issues surrounding these.
- Once again the issue of separability arises, where proposals arise for closer links with country frame-funded activities.
- Danida has focused its identification work on more specific issues, but even there (HZM, bio-diversity), there is minimal support from local governments.
- The few activities that currently make up the regional programme are stand-alone activities with no internal linkages or consistency.



- *Political* support for regional activities is weak.
- The proposal to “chain” local level activities in contiguous countries into a “regional project” has so far not been successful.
- Danida is in the process of defining the principles for a more truly regional programme. This has led to identifying three areas of support: water resources; natural resources including biodiversity; and urban EPM including industrial development. Other issues such as OHS and environmental education may also be included.

## 4.2 The Future of a Regional Programme

Regional programming in general is difficult. A recent evaluation that the EU carried out of its development activities noted that the *regional* dimension was the weakest (EU 1999). The Danida documents have noted the poor framework conditions. There are few regional agreements or regulations that are relevant for environmental issues. There are few environmental issues that engage political leaders across boundaries, the exceptions largely being bilateral activities such as trans-boundary parks/reserves, in addition to the joint waterways.

### Regional and National Programme Links

Pushing national programmes to include or even take cognisance of regional dimensions is generally not helpful unless there is a strong local constituency in favour. The idea of “clustering” around Lake Malawi/Niassa is an example of where this may work, basically because the national borders make less sense than the traditional economic interaction based on the Lake. Calling this a regional activity is somewhat misplaced, however, since its logic lies in the local interaction, not in any trans-national policy or systematic interaction at government level. This means that such clusters or chains should not be used as a rationale for any super-structure (i.e., formal regional programme body) on top of any successful localised activity.

The basis for such localised arrangements may be weak and dependent on key persons for implementation. If these individuals change, the arrangement may collapse unless there is a broader basis that ensures continuity, even in the face of adversity and political challenges from opponents. Danida therefore needs to verify that there are strong incentives for key stakeholders to “stay the course”.

### Danida and Danced

The division of labour between Danced and Danida does not facilitate an efficient regional programme. Geographically, the Danced-Danida divide cuts across programme tasks. In the water sector, for example, the Incomati basin includes Mozambique which falls within the Danida programme, and Swaziland and South Africa under Danced.

The two organisations have somewhat different thematic focus and skills. Danida is more concerned with rural development and Danced with general capacity development, for example. But the issues in the region do not divide so neatly, since differences *between* countries may often be less than *within* countries along key dimensions. Rural poverty in Namibia and South Africa (Danced countries) is not necessarily very different from that in Zimbabwe (Danida), while the urban problems of Harare (Danida) are closer to some found in South Africa (Danced) than those of Maputo or Lusaka (also Danida).

The dialogue *between* Danida and Danced is obviously not as close as the discussions *within* each organisation. This is not for lack of good will between the two agencies but for simple organisational behavioural reasons. This means that structurally there are inefficiencies in information flows concerning regional questions that will remain.

### Requirements for Successful Regional Activities

Key to successful regional activities are *political will* and *capacity to implement*. The capacity is weak and will remain so for a long time. But lack of political will is a more serious issue. But there are good reasons why local actors do not push hard for regional activities. In the first place, there obviously are divergent commitments to regional activities. Part of this is political fundamentals – some countries fear hegemony by stronger actors and are sceptical to the possibilities of being able to design “win-win” outcomes.

Trans-national activities have high co-ordination and other transactions costs, plus the incentive structure for regional co-operation is asymmetric along a series of dimensions:

- Information costs, ability to process the data and act on the information varies in part as a function of the general level of development. The intrinsic costs and benefits of environmental information thus vary systematically across actors.
- The specific nature of environmental problems varies, and thus the net benefits of a given piece of information or action will have different impacts on the various actors.
- There is basic uncertainty as to what the future positive pay-offs will be in terms of size and distribution of benefits across countries. Future pay-offs require consistent and sustained collaboration. 30 years of SAD(D)C do not provide a lot of grounds for optimism in this regard.

### 4.3 Conclusions and Recommendations

The current incentive structure for regional activities is difficult. Co-ordination and other transaction costs of regional implementation are very high. Uncertainties regarding future benefits, their distribution, and fair burden-sharing of costs are also high. The time commitment required goes beyond the time horizon of many regimes in the region while political disagreements impair regional collaboration. In general, the costs of regional collaboration tend to be under-estimated and future benefits over-estimated by donors.

The conditions for a successful regional EPSF programme thus need strengthening. Today *capacity, political will and incentives* to support regional activities are weak.

#### Recommendations

- Danida should focus on those issues where there is obvious regional support, such as shared water resources. It should not worry too much if these projects together do not constitute a coherent programme. This need for a programme is something that seems more keenly felt by Danida than by its partners in the region.
- Some environmental interventions can be made more efficient through a larger regional approach. Danida may therefore wish to devote some resources into identifying what these activities are, specifying which costs can be reduced or benefits improved through alternative approaches. This may imply funding more research and small-scale piloting, supporting possible “champions of change”, and

clarifying how incentives can be improved and made more transparent to stakeholders.

- These kinds of interventions can easily become costly to administer and may take time to mature. Finding Danish actors willing and able to assist may be important for success. Danida may wish to consider posting an officer in the region to specifically work on such a programme.

*Bottom Line:* If there are not strong, obvious and continued incentives for key stakeholders to maintain their dedication to a regional activity, donors should be careful not to push them too hard. Local ownership by consistent and persistent stakeholders is an absolute pre-condition for sustainability and hence for impact.

# 5. The Projects

The projects are the linchpin in the EPSF programme. Project identification, contents and implementation and their changes over time are hence key to understanding the way EPSF programming has taken place and how it is evolving.

## 5.1 Project Selection and Development

### The MITI Project

The forest resources project in Zimbabwe, known by its acronym MITI (“Managing our Indigenous Tree Inheritance”), was developed by SAFIRE, a local NGO. MITI is co-financed by the Netherlands and Denmark. The project finalisation took much longer than anticipated, and with a number of steps which SAFIRE found both unnecessary and confusing. Their main complaint is that the compliance with Danida document formats and processing procedures delayed up-start considerably and weakened their ownership of a project they had spent a lot of effort developing (Annex F).

Though the *beginnings* of the MITI project were inauspicious, subsequent developments have been positive. The annual reviews have become important events for systematically analysing the organisation and achievements of the activities. The annual review caused some concern to begin with, as they clearly were a Danida demand. Danida also uses a Danish consultant while the Dutch either use a local embassy staff member or a locally hired consultant acting on their behalf. The Dutch take decisions on the spot whereas the Danish consultants report to Copenhagen and SAFIRE thus has to await their response.

In practice, the annual reviews have proven to be very helpful as the external consultants have seen their job primarily as quality assurers and supporters for management. During the first annual review, the entire LFA structure was reviewed and brought back closer to SAFIRE’s original proposal, so that ownership was restored. It also showed that even though the project was approved with a “Danida LFA structure”, Danida was open to modify this. Most important, however, is that the project is allowed to move ahead based on what local stakeholders believes are key concerns and how fast they can implement.

### Urban Projects I: Sustainable Mwanza in Tanzania

The first project approved in Tanzania was the Sustainable Mwanza project. Basic principles for the Sustainable Cities-programme had been tested in Dar es Salaam, and Mwanza authorities had begun a local consultation process. Danida provided resources to accelerate and deepen the preparatory process through carrying out environmental and gender baseline surveys and supporting a more thorough dialogue. As with MITI, local ownership was clear, though local preparations were not as far developed (Annex H).

The processing of the project was quite rapid. One reason was exactly the lessons from MITI. The MITI delays had caused considerable unhappiness within the Danida system, and there was a determination not to repeat that experience. The fact that Danida came in virtually at the start of the Mwanza project design may have contributed: they were in some sense freer to ensure that information, project

components etc. were in line with the format Danida required for their processing. The fact that MITI had a project ready and wanted it to roll given *their* project document caused Danida problems.

The Mwanza project thus builds on a set of local decisions. Tanzania had decided on the *Sustainable Cities* concept as a model for urban environmental development. All external assistance is therefore to fit into this overall framework. Mwanza Municipal Council, MMC, had established environmental problems as a serious concern and had initiated a process of consultation. While Danida contributed substantially to the content of the project, the MMC has always had ownership of the Sustainable Mwanza *concept* as such. The political management of the project is thus clearly locally anchored.

#### **Mozambique's Coastal Zone project**

Mozambique's first project was a coastal zone management, CZM, project. It had three components: capacity building in the Ministry of Environmental Co-ordination, support to a coastal zone regional office in the Gaza province, and support to urban coastal development on the Ilha de Moçambique (MOZ.1-1.a). The project began in 1997.

The mid-term review in April 1998 supported a number of aspects of the project: the support to the Ministry, the idea of assisting the Ministry's decentralised approach by establishing three regional offices, and the establishment of inter-institutional technical committees wherever environmental activities were being implemented (MOZ.1-1.g).

The mission supported the idea of funding pilot projects, but noted that some of them did not constitute lessons that can be replicated elsewhere. A key pilot was on the Ilha de Moçambique, a small densely populated island community that is unique in Mozambique. As a result, the Ilha activities were moved to the Urban Environment component. The mission also recommended that over time the project hand over responsibilities to local authorities and line ministries rather than have them remain within the Ministry. Finally, the mission noted the lack of realism with respect to time in the original project concept. The fact that a number of project activities were considerably behind schedule the mission found neither surprising nor worrisome, given the Mozambican context, and proposed a one-year extension. During this period, the second phase of support for CZM was prepared, resulting in a five-year project as of the year 2000.

#### **Zimbabwe's DEAP Project**

The District Environmental Action Planning project, DEAP, had been initiated in eight districts with UNDP support. It builds on a participatory methodology, and the results attained during the first period were seen as positive in terms of mobilising the local population and the activities identified and implemented. The Government wanted to expand it, and had decided that the Department of Natural Resources, DNR, within the Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism, MMET, was both to act as focal point on environmental matters and be responsible for the DEAP.

Rural EPM was to be an important component of the EPSF programme. By supporting the DEAP Danida would thus also be helping the DNR develop its role and capacity.

Improved rural planning is a logical priority for an ESP in a country where nearly 70 percent of population is rural and dependent on primary sector activities for income. Land degradation and over-exploitation of the natural resource base particularly in the

so-called communal areas of Zimbabwe where the vast majority of the rural poor live, are recognised as serious issues. There is considerable local interest and ownership for improvements and a great need for external assistance. Danida therefore chose to both support DEAP as a process and programme at the national level, and implementation in four poor districts in the dry western part of the country.

While DEAP thus seems an excellent programme to support, both the project inception report and the September 2000 review mission noted the problems that have become apparent (ZIM.1-1.b & c). The framework document and management arrangements have not been put in place, so operations never took off. The community-based approach is too expensive and thus not sustainable, and is better suited for activity design rather than identification of problems, which can just as well be done at district level. The current planning tends to generate project shopping lists rather than environmentally focused interventions. The planning should probably also be based on ecosystems rather than administrative units. There are finally all the problems of lack of implementation will in the Ministry and capacity in the DNR that has delayed project start-up considerably.

### **Iringa Community-based Natural Woodlands Management**

Zimbabwe's DEAP project tries to address community-based activities from the district level and through the public sector. The Iringa project has used this pathway only in the project identification process, as the project proposal was largely developed by the forest department in Iringa District. It was based in part on the experiences with general natural resource management in the area, and partly in response to new legislation that emphasises joint forest management between the public sector and local communities (Annex I).

Once the basic parameters for the project was established, a more concrete programming process took place. Village natural resources committees were established, local action plans were to be designed, while a number of inventories and studies were carried out to establish the resource situation, benchmarks, etc. The first Annual Review identified some problems with these processes, but they have to do with the complexity and lack of clarity on certain issues, not with the structure of the processes as such (TAN.1-1.d).

The Iringa project therefore seems to have been able to address some of the weaknesses of the DEAP. (i) The starting point is national legislation that clearly empowers local communities to take a stronger role in managing the local resource base. (ii) Basic project design was done at district level, the action planning at community level. (iii) The project area was defined based on ecological characteristics (specified forest areas) rather than administrative boundaries. (iv) There were tendencies also in the Iringa project to come up with general shopping lists rather than environment oriented plans – till this was corrected for. (v) Clear benchmarks will permit monitoring of progress, where in principle community involvement is going to be important.

### **Urban Projects II: Norton Town Council in Zimbabwe**

While Sustainable Mwanza built on both a national and local process, the Norton project in Zimbabwe came about through a Danida-initiated course of action. Urban EPM was seen as an important area for support, and a workshop was organised in February 1998 to identify areas for intervention. A working group was established, and by July 1998 a first draft component description was prepared. The process slowed



down, however, so Danida decided to identify projects that could provide “lessons on the ground”.

Norton was proposed as one city for inclusion as it is a rapidly growing urban area with serious environmental problems. Norton Town Council, NTC, was approached, and NTC officials responded positively to this idea. But there had been no request from the NTC itself for inclusion in the ESP.

Local consultants were hired to assist in designing the project. The time given for the work was very short, which constrained the consultation process. There were meetings with participants from the informal sector, for example, but these were *ad hoc* and not linked to any more continuous dialogue or permanent structure for feed-back and discussion. When the Evaluation visited Norton in May 2000, it transpired that stakeholders had not been clear on what their roles were supposed to have been, and did not know if their ideas and concerns had been taken into account. The project document was thus largely defined by Danida-hired consultants following Danida guidelines. The lack of more systematic up-front consultations revealed its weakness when progress at one point was severely threatened by stakeholder disagreements. By the time of the Evaluation’s discussion meetings in September 2000, the process had clearly improved and a structured dialogue and consensus-building process was in place.

The observation by Danida’s 1996 identification mission that the private sector had more capacity for addressing “brown” issues, is true in Norton. But while the private sector has shown interest in the project, it has also made clear its frustrations with what it considers to be overly slow and public sector oriented activities with emphasis on capacity building rather than producing concrete improvements to key environmental problems.

### **Urban Projects III: Malawi**

The background study for the Urban environment component focuses very much on technical aspects. The exhaustive (and exhausting!) 300-page documentation provides a thorough descriptive overview of the situation in the urban centres selected for review (MAL.4.c,d,e), looking at eight dimensions of urban environment for possible Danida support. The socio-economic *analysis* is weak, however, and the organisational and institutional analyses likewise, while the sociological and political dimensions are almost completely lacking. While a number of local organisations and NGOs were interviewed, the stakeholder seminar organised in August 1999 counted 26 participants, of which 18 were from the public sector and six from private companies.

The debriefing note by the formulation and pre-appraisal mission of March 2000 does not raise any questions in this regard. It notes the criteria for selecting the four urban centres included in the first phase of the project, which are largely technical (urban growth rates, density, environmental impact). The Evaluation was not able to see from the documentation any discussion of the *Sustainable Cities* concept in terms of ownership, partnership with the local stakeholders, financial and other sustainability, etc. which were important in the Tanzanian and Zimbabwean programmes (MAL.4.f). But the political and sociological dimensions of urban EMP were explored in the pre-appraisal report, and were also addressed in concluding the appraisal of the project in September 2000.

### Urban Projects IV: Bindura

The Zimbabwean NGO “Environment 2000”, E2000, had begun a facilitation process in Bindura municipality based on a request from stakeholders there. Starting with groups of poor urban households rather than with the council has led to a different process and project structure. One result is that Norton is considered part of the “Danida Urban EPM” while E2000 sees Bindura as part of its Urban Development programme. The EPSF is only one of several sources of funding, so that E2000 sees Danida supporting an E2000 programme rather than the E2000 project being part of a Danida programme. This is not least of all because the facilitation process had been going on for *three years* before Danida funding entered the picture.

One critical question is how representative the stakeholders that E2000 is working with, are. The issue is the legitimacy and validity of the environmental priorities identified. The project document notes that “due to the existence of big mining establishments in and around Bindura and improper waste management measures, environmental health risks are common. These range from pollution of the air and watercourses, soil erosion and siltation, and destruction of the general environment... (P)oor sanitary facilities and substandard housing ... in high density residential areas compose a health risk”. It then states that “the Council has more recently identified the following as the major environmental problems: Council sewage facilities releasing substandard effluent into streams; illegal dumping of waste; chemical pollution from the mines; poor sanitation in high density areas; and air pollution from the mines”. Despite this, “during public consultations [i.e., with the Danida mission], the residents have singled out the ever-increasing production of waste, and thus solid waste management, as the most crucial environmental issue” (ZIM.2.e, project 4, pp. 2-3). E2000 has focused on this issue, and one reason is a strategy choice of addressing one issue at a time, doing it well, and then moving on to subsequent issues as stakeholders wish to shift focus. The project has a management elected by the stakeholders and where Council is involved and provides backstopping services. The Council, however, is not the main “owner” of the project.

### Summing Up and Findings

- “Early starters” – MITI and Mozambique’s CZM – were selected as good projects on their own merits. Subsequent projects have either had programmatic considerations or frameworks in place when identified – Mwanza and DEAP – or in fact developed out of such frameworks, such as Norton and the Malawi Urban EPM activities.
- The MITI project took 18 months to approve, which created problems for the local ownership, till this issue was addressed during the first Annual Review. While this was not typical project processing, Danida quickly learned from this, and subsequent approval processes have been much smoother.
- Strong local ownership and clear concepts in place have made identification and early implementation smoother in the case of the Mwanza compared with Norton.
- Mwanza also went smoother than MITI because MITI not only had concepts but also their own formal project document structure in place. A project document with a different format created problems in relationship to the Danida standards.
- The DEAP, MITI and Iringa projects all focus on community development. DEAP in addition is to develop capacity and systems at national level. This more ambitious approach has so far not succeeded largely due to the lack of a clear framework and government commitment. While the framework in Tanzania is much clearer than in Zimbabwe, Danida in Tanzania still chose a more limited and community-focused approach, similar to MITI.

- The project design/consultation process is more difficult in urban areas, due to size, diversity and complexity of the community and its problems. The Norton project may have a too heavy public sector focus, with other actors having to be invited in by council rather than being equal partners. In Bindura, the co-ordinating responsibilities of the duly elected council may be neglected too much in favour of (random?) stakeholder involvement. “Getting it right” is simply difficult!
- Differences in local ownership can thus lead to very different project designs for addressing similar problems. Zimbabwe has a programme that can generate lessons in this regard, since both in the rural (MITI vs. DEAP) and urban (Norton vs. Bindura) components, there are systematic differences that could potentially be traceable in terms of outcomes and impact.

## 5.2 Project Contents

### The MITI Project

The MITI project focuses on more efficient yet sustainable exploitation of local natural resources through establishment of viable enterprises. It therefore has looked at issues such as tenurial rights to what have traditionally been common goods (forest based raw materials); the role of traditional leaders in this regard; etc. It is addressing organisational alternatives of exploiting them: what kinds of tenurial rights can be delegated to what level of society, and should rights be given to private firms, or to households, or to community structures? There may be a conflict between developing entrepreneur-based *firms* as the basis for sustainable livelihood development rather than the more traditional working with poor households.

The latest review raises some tough questions about MITI’s approach. The focus on enterprise development neither provides a holistic approach to environmental issues nor can encompass the majority of the rural poor. The costs and realism of new product development and marketing need to be reviewed. Over time some of these issues undoubtedly can be addressed. But they show how quickly even core contents of a well-thought through locally developed project may need to be changed – that *programming* remains a constant process (Annex F).

### The DEAP Project

There is a question of what exactly the value-added of the DEAP process consists of. The environmental issues at village, ward and district level are different in terms of the need for public intervention. Public sector interventions are usually justified in terms of public goods provision and correction of market failures. These issues, however, are usually not very relevant at household and village levels, yet it is supposedly the self-interest at these levels that should drive the DEAP’s participatory processes.

Another dimension to the value-added question is what the more specific *content* of the DEAP should be. Zimbabwe has produced a number of good studies and policy papers beginning with the *National Conservation Strategy* of 1987. One would have expected there to be some explicit strategy where DEAP was one of probably several instruments used to address key problems in the rural areas, such as land degradation, HIV/AIDS<sup>8</sup>), etc. It is in this way that the *national* character of a programme like DEAP can generate large-scale societal benefits. Since this is missing, there is a question if the DEAP has become too much process and too little content. While MITI is generating lessons at

enterprise and product marketing level, the DEAP is still struggling with basic issues of methodology – without it being clear which issues the methodology should address.

The September 2000 review suggests that DEAP should shift focus from communities to eco-systems. This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. But this does not address the more fundamental question regarding what the comparative advantage of the public sector at the district level and below is. The observation that it is difficult to get communities to focus specifically on environmental interventions raises furthermore the difficult question of whether the environment should be seen as a *sector*, with its own projects, or a *cross-cutting dimension* that should provide value-added to more traditional sector activities. If the latter, then the DEAP should focus a lot more on strengthening the other planning and budgeting activities undertaken at RDC level.

NGOs and CBOs in Zimbabwe have 10-20 years' experience with community work. While the DEAP works with such civic organisations at community level, the resources are still channelled through the public sector. The experience in Zimbabwe and a general "best practice" lesson would seem to be that the public sector should focus more on establishing an appropriate "enabling environment", while Danida may wish to consider a funding facility for communities and NGOs/CBOs that can be accessed directly, outside the DEAP project.

### **Zimbabwe's Urban Projects**

The Urban EPM *component* in Zimbabwe is in many respects good. It contains a networking project between the various activities to ensure better and more rapid learning. It has a mix of NGOs, private sector, local administrations and civil society stakeholders. Several projects have interesting mobilisation models. The relevance and efficacy of project activities seem variable, though (Annex D).

The solid waste recycling in Bindura (and Victoria Falls) seem like second-order issues when one sees the life situation of the urban poor: lack of access to safe, reasonable, dependable water and energy; solid and particularly liquid sewerage disposal for households and informal sector activities. These issues are addressed through infrastructure investments covered by the large-scale multi-donor urban council Capital Development Programme. Danida's Urban EPM has so far not developed any formal links to this. But the priorities in Bindura are an outcome of the consultation process. E2000 focused on getting the poor to think through their situation and see what can be done to address it. They concentrated on issues where own actions can be carried out rather than get involved in infrastructure programmes that are beyond what they themselves can handle. But the *mobilisation* behind this process may lead towards a more active citizenry. The expectation is thus that the process itself will empower the

- 8) *Danida has identified AIDS as a central issue for its assistance. The current "best practice" is seen to be an integrated community development approach and not as an isolated health issue. This means all planning processes should include HIV/AIDS as an explicit concern. DEAP does not. This is in part because DEAP has defined itself as a "pure" environment process – but it then runs the danger of not linking up with key challenges facing the community. HIV/AIDS will undoubtedly affect communities' long-run ability to address problems like the environment, so it would seem important that the DEAP assist communities conceive long-term sustainable strategies that are built on realistic assessments of opportunities and constraints.*

population to bolder action as experience is developed. This process orientation appears appealing, but needs to be monitored to see if it in fact does provide sustainable results.

The Harare project is to address air pollution. While the problem, its location and main causes are largely known, the project consists largely of high-tech air measuring equipment. What is required, one would have thought, are actions to address the issue, not more measurements. This project is supposedly also to mobilise stakeholders, but the process that is foreseen based on new measurement results and with a heavy council role sounds less convincing.

The Norton project had discussed possibilities to try out more market based policies: better management of landfills through appropriate pricing, improved conditions for informal traders through using fees to upgrade infrastructure, and “polluter pays” principles for industries. The EPSF funds were to be seed money for a sustainable revolving “green fund”. The current economic situation in the country unfortunately makes the introduction of such changes impossible for the time being.

### **Sustainable Mwanza Project**

The Sustainable Mwanza project has succeeded in mobilising many of the resource poor stakeholders. Nine Working Groups, WGs, have been formed, six of which have Action Plans that have been approved and thus can obtain funding from the Danida-financed Environment Development Fund, EDF. The activities that are undertaken cover a wide range of issues that the population itself feels empowered to address through their own efforts and with EDF funding. As with the Bindura/Victoria Falls projects, these are therefore often small-scale localised and perhaps second-order. But the mobilisation has led to increased interest and *ability* to put pressure on the municipal authorities to deliver on the larger public infrastructure issues. The WGs are thus acting as channels for popular participation in municipal resource allocation decisions, which is an important step in the direction of increased accountability and transparency in the public sector.

The Mwanza project is an example of the “big push” approach that Danida is pursuing in many of its projects in Tanzania. Considerable resources for technical assistance, training, funding (EDF) plus strong political and administrative backing from the embassy provide what the embassy and members of the local administration consider a necessary “critical mass” of inputs. This is required because without this concerted effort, changes will not occur. There is a need to “kick-start” in order to gain momentum, since without this there will be no sustainability and hence no impact.

Because environment is now more important, the Mwanza Council is working to assist WGs get funding for their Action Plans from other funding sources in addition to the Danida EDF. Environment is thus being “mainstreamed” into Council concerns in a way that was not foreseen only a few years ago.

At the same time, there are suggestions of pushing greater responsibilities from the Council down to the WGs. While an interesting concept, it raises some difficult questions. There is a need to have a clear understanding of what are council (public sector) and what are WG/private sector tasks. There is a tendency to push public goods/externality issues onto private actors in the name of “participation” and “privatisation” when the real issue is often lack of resources in the public sector. Allowing public offices



to compete for EDF funds, which is not being opened for, may also not be helpful. These issues should be closely monitored for lessons in the future.

Mwanza is now to enter a second phase, where more resources will go to the EDF – that is, community activities. The project document for this phase has largely been produced by the Council, building on lessons it has learned. This document is in fact considered the “fourth generation” document within the Sustainable Cities programme, since the projects have been developed serially, each new document building on the lessons of the previous round. The Sustainable Cities component has therefore had a very structured and successful learning dimension that is leading to improved content and ownership.

### **Pesticide and Urban Projects in Mozambique**

The safe disposal of outdated pesticides is a major project in Mozambique. While the objective of the project has remained constant, the project has had a turbulent history. The burning of out-of-date pesticides in a cement kiln in Matola right outside Maputo raised fears among some environment groups that severe air pollution problems might arise. After several studies and considerable debate, there seems to be an acceptance that the technical solution proposed in fact is environmentally sound. During this period, however, the economics of the project have changed due to less availability of burning capacity in Matola. The likely result is now that the pesticides will be re-exported to another country, probably in Europe, for final destruction.

While the furore over the project has caused some embarrassment, Danida should take satisfaction from the fact that (a) environmental groups in Mozambique are awake and vocal enough to take on such a difficult topics, and (b) they can make a difference.

This is an important lesson for one of the more ambitious goals of the enlarged Urban EPM component in Mozambique. It intends to assist the Ministry address the environmental problems of the “mega”-projects that are moving ahead in Mozambique. The MOZAL aluminium smelter and others raised concerns that such large-scale investments may come at the expense of sustainable development <sup>9)</sup> and maximisation of net benefits to the Mozambican society (MOZ.3.a) <sup>10)</sup>.

The description of the urban environment in Mozambique is classic. There is rapid urbanisation, insufficient physical infrastructure that provides poor services to only a fraction of the urban population, and where the poorest have the worst service and thus pay the highest real price for clean water, safe sanitation etc. The urban authorities do not have the technical skills or the financial resources to maintain and upgrade the current services. The decentralisation process taking place is causing uncertainty about the future fiscal situation of urban authorities (MOZ.3.a). The issues that the Urban Environmental Management component wishes to address are thus highly relevant, but there is no sustainability in technical, organisational and financial terms. Danida and Mozambican authorities are aware of this, yet have not been able to design a believable programme to address these problems. While this is not surprising – this is the

9) See MOZ.3.a, p. 7, which suggests national authorities develop a principle of “the polluter pays” with the capacity to enforce this.

10) The first multi-donor review mission to look at macro-economic support to Mozambique raised this concern in its report to the donors and Government. See Jytte Laursen et. al (1998).



overarching problem of all assistance to Mozambican today – some more resources ought to be spent looking into these matters.

### Malawi Community Funds

In Malawi, financing for community activities on a grant basis is going to be channelled through an 'environmental window' of the District Development Fund in the 11 districts that Danida is otherwise supporting. The micro-activities that can be funded will have to be part of the District Development Plan, of which District Environmental Action Plans are an integrated part. The funding will hence support local level initiatives that have been generated through the decentralised participatory processes that the Government is trying to promote and Danida wishes to support. The funding mechanism will also provide support to the overall organisational strengthening and institutional development that Danida supports through its overall development co-operation.

The other part of the funding will go through the Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust, which is a more general grant-based facility for activities throughout the country.

### Summing Up and Findings

- There is a need for clearer criteria for division of labour between public and civil society actors when such alternatives exist. Role confusion (DEAP) lessens impact.
- Projects tend to have a “big push” approach of high resource concentration (“critical mass”) for technical assistance, activity funding, training, etc. These provide a “kick-start” to environmental action that some actors see as required for visibility, support, and thus momentum and sustainability – but may undermine local ownership.
- Some projects have seemingly identified second-order issues compared with the key challenges. The Harare air pollution project is to measure rather than address the pollution. The Bindura project focuses on solid waste recycling, based on what stakeholders feel capable of addressing. It is, though, generating political mobilisation and thus increased demands for more efficient environmental action over time. The technology-focused Harare project will not have the similar mobilisation impact.
- Public sector led-mobilisations in Zimbabwe (Norton) seem to have led to less participation by other actors, largely because the council itself is a main party to the project rather than a neutral facilitator. In Tanzania this dual role has not created the same problem, probably because the process was slower and a more genuine one.
- The pesticide project in Mozambique highlights the need for intensive dialogue when new technology is to be introduced. The disquiet that was generated by the approach seems unfounded, but points to the increased awareness in the region regarding such issues – a point that is much in favour of the EPSF as a programme.
- Annual Reviews have proven to be an important component of continuous project programming. Because the EPSF programme is so recent and lessons are thus constantly being produced, this dynamic programming is highly laudable.
- The Malawi community funds project may be important in developing instruments for getting resources to end-users. It ought to be of concern to Danida that so little of EPSF funds are programmed and managed directly by low-income communities.
- The diversity in the Zimbabwe Urban EPM can generate lessons for programming in an uncertain context, including testing market-based policies, alternative mobilisation approaches, etc. In Tanzania the serially programmed Sustainable Cities-projects based on a standardised concept is leading to very rapid learning and improvements.

### 5.3 Project Implementation

The major challenge the EPSF programme has faced on the implementation side, is the lack of technical skills and managerial capacity. One way to address this is to use external technical assistance, TA. This is politically controversial, however, and the question is if it may undermine local ownership and hence sustainability.

#### Technical Assistance as Implementation Choice

The TA models vary across countries. In Malawi, Danida is relying heavily on consulting firms (though it also uses international and local advisers). In Tanzania, most of the TA is in the form of individual advisors hired directly by Danida. In Zimbabwe the picture is more differentiated, with less Danish expertise and more use of local skills and in a variety of forms. The variation is partly a function of the availability of local skills (Zimbabwe), partly the recommendations/preferences by the local embassy.

In Malawi, one Danish consulting firm has been awarded contracts covering the Lake Malawi, capacity development and vocational training projects (MAL.0.k). The same firm was involved in a number of planning tasks: preparation of the first Status of the Environment Report; preparation mission for the Capacity Development in Environment; preparation for the LIFE project; preparation mission for DESP; member of the preparation mission for the Lakeshore district environmental management project; technical assistance to the Karonga/Chitipa DEAP (originally not EPSF funded) (MAL.2-1.c). The relationship between Danida and the Danish consultant hired to help define tasks for which consulting services are to be purchased in the future, are already very close. The firm *did* win the contracts in competition with others, but the potential conflicts of interest between *advisory* and *implementing* roles is of concern.

In Tanzania, Danida expects to have 12 advisors in place by the end of 2001. This includes financial officers in some of the projects. The intention is to reduce this number to a total of only three component advisors over time.

Two of the objections raised to standard technical assistance projects is that (i) they are inefficient in skills transfer, and (ii) systems and responsibilities that have been developed by expatriate personnel tend not to be sustained after hand-over. This was the conclusion of the large Nordic study on the matter at the end of the 1980s which led most of the Nordic countries to begin reducing their TA use (Forss et al. 1988). This finding was repeated in UNDP's study on the same issue some years later (Berg et. al. 1993). Excessive use of TA was a major complaint in Tanzania as reported in the Danida-funded "Helleiner-report" (Helleiner et. al. 1995). This point of view was also expressed by staff in the ministries of finance in both Tanzania and Zimbabwe to the Evaluation.

The project approach, by focusing on more concrete output production, tends to exaggerate the felt need for technical assistance. This bias is further strengthened if the project design is heavily donor-managed, as the EPSF has been (Berg 1993, Disch 1993). *Structurally*, therefore, the EPSF programme is biased towards high TA intensity, which seems to be reflected in both the Tanzania and Malawi programmes.

Adding to this picture is the strong administrative and political support projects often get from Danida. Participation on project steering committees by fairly high public officials can only be explained by the fact that this is expected/requested by the donor.

Several projects mentioned the considerable support they get from the embassies, which is appreciated – the embassies act like real partners. The embassies pay close attention to what are, after all, often quite risky ventures, since they have a stake in their success. By having such a strong and high-profile role on the implementation side and providing so many resources, probability of success is enhanced. But the downside is that Danida may be taking on too much of the risks. The distribution of risk is usually a good indicator of ownership, and by making these projects virtually risk-free (at least in the short run) to the implementor, Danida is making a fairly strong statement about its own role in the ventures. The real risk is the long-run one of sustainability, however, which will be looked at later (see section 5.4 below).

The alternatives are not obvious. The problem of relying too heavily on local systems is evidenced by the experience of NORAD, where fundamental weaknesses in project finance management was only uncovered 18 months after the close of the fiscal year (Annex E). But there are possibilities for building in control and incentives without having to rely as heavily on Danida advisors as is being done in Tanzania <sup>11</sup>). The point made by one embassy, that it is not aware of evaluations pointing to improved efficiency through alternative models, is worth noting. There is also the point raised in discussions in Tanzania that external TA personnel are sometimes perceived to be “guarantors” of independence and objectivity in decision-making. This goes both for resource allocation decisions and financial management. This certainty encourages more stakeholders to come forward and compete, because they have greater confidence that the playing field is in fact level. This leads to two questions: (i) What happens when the TA eventually has to end? Will more transparent and equitable structures and processes have been institutionalised such that they will remain in force? (ii) Is expensive TA the only or the most cost-efficient way of bringing about such sustainable improvements?

Zimbabwe has the most interesting mix of public, private and not-for-profit actors involved in activity implementation. This is in part a function of the richness in skills which exists in Zimbabwe and which countries like Malawi and Mozambique cannot match. But it also seems the outcome of a conscious choice to diversify the partnership in the country. An interesting aspect is the differentiated yet complementary roles the various actors play, where E2000, a local NGO, has a largely *promotional/facilitating* function vis-à-vis local stakeholder groups.

Two sets of comments have been provided on technical assistance in the Mozambican programme. The first one was from the mid-term review mission looking at the CZM project. It noted that three out of six professional staff in the Coastal Zone unit in the Ministry were Danida-funded and that the Unit reported directly to the Minister thus by-passing normal organisational channels (the unspoken suspicion is that this “privilege” is due to the considerable donor funds – not only Danish – in this unit). The mission further commented on the fact that Danida was paying local staff more than other donors, thus acting as “wage leader” in the sector. The mission was not happy about this and suggested that Danida reduce its compensation package to levels of those paid by

*11) One model that could be looked at is to use local audit firms as quality assurers and for control purposes. The incentive to the project is that once certain performance standards are met, the intensity of the external auditing, which has to be paid for from project funds, would decrease. Having in-depth audits every six months with performance bonuses and penalty clauses spelt out for staff members could be worth exploring.*

other donors (MOZ.1-1.g, Annex 1 recommendation 15). The appraisal team looking at the HZM project felt the use of expatriate personnel should be reduced, and instead a fund for hiring local short-term technical assistance personnel put in place. Since this project is process oriented, this kind of flexibility and relying on local skills is more appropriate (MOZ.2-1.f, p. vii). But this issue is a difficult one in Mozambique exactly because of its extremely limited supply of local skills. Danida needs to review this issue from a holistic labour market perspective to ensure that it does not create distortions of the kind raised above: attracting skilled labour by pushing up their price when attracting them to limited donor funded activities (Disch 1993).

### **Advisers versus Agency Contracts**

Technical assistance is hired in the form of individuals or contracts with organisations. Danida relies a lot on firms, but one question is if other agencies such as public institutions could become interesting partners.

Based on interviews with Danida staff, the preference for using firms or individual advisors seems to depend on two issues. The first is cost effectiveness, the other is the proximity Danida may want to activity implementation. Concerning the latter point, it has been noted that Danida advisors provide a much better channel for understanding what is actually happening in a project. This is in part related to financial management questions, but also the content of project activities.

The costs of hiring individual advisors is considerably lower than purchasing the same services through a firm, due to company overhead. Another factor noted by one embassy is that a firm has no incentives to implement efficiently but good financial reasons for maximising own involvement. This lack of congruence of incentives and objectives between the parties may at times represent a dilemma.

By hiring firms, however, Danida may be purchasing a wider range of services that in the end may be more cost-effective. In Zimbabwe, the Danish Institute of Technology, DTI, has been given the contract for the CPT project. The contract covers the services of the senior advisor, who in turn can call upon more specialist services from the DTI in areas where he himself is not conversant. The DTI also quality assures what he is doing through monitoring visits by senior management.

In Zimbabwe, Danida has a Chief Technical Adviser, CTA, for the entire ESP. The ESP covers an unusually wide policy span: urban, industrial and rural EPM, renewable energy, organisational and institutional development. This post may perhaps be funded for a five-to-ten year period. Individual advisors normally stay in post two to four years. It might make more sense to have an *institution* as the contracting party that can ensure institutional memory, consistency, and quality assurance over time.

Under such circumstances Danida may wish to consider twinning arrangements rather than purely commercial contracts. In the field of environmental management public and quasi-public institutions play an important role in donor countries. It would seem logical to find institutions that have an own-interest in the field that could compensate for the incentives-divergence that Danida is experiencing in its relations with consulting firms <sup>12)</sup>.

### The Roles of Danida Advisers

The role of Danida advisers is problematic in several respects. The first is the standard problem of TA personnel taking on responsibilities that are beyond their TOR, out of interest in doing as good a job as possible. The ESP progress report of Malawi states that “to a large degree DTA [Danish technical assistance] is in an implementing role in the CBNRM projects” (MAL.0.k, p. 6). A similar comment is made by one of the Danish advisers when discussing the role of sector advisers: “advisors are forced into executive roles...Advisers also feel the pressure to ‘produce’, to show something concrete (and positive) for our inputs” (Kiernan 1999). That is, advisers become a *resource*. They *substitute* for (missing) local skills – the first step towards non-sustainability. Danida advisers are generally strong both technically and as persons. They tend to dominate processes and attract responsibilities due to their effectiveness and skills.

But Danida advisers face particularly contradictory or complex situations:

- They are hired directly by Danida. The other Scandinavian countries would usually provide the local institution with funding to do the hiring themselves. The Danida approach creates a problem of “dual subordination”: the advisers have responsibilities both to the host government and to Danida.
- Since the funding is from Danida, the host government assumes that the primary loyalty is to Danida, since Danida is the *de facto* employer, no matter what the contract says. This issue was raised by senior staff in both Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
- Job descriptions in some cases state that the person should advise both the government *and* the embassy – an unfortunate mixing of roles.
- Danida advisers may have direct implementation responsibilities, especially during the preparatory phase. This may include financial management and even resource allocation decisions. In such circumstances the advisor thus takes on a Danish civil servant role vis-à-vis the host government.
- Component and national ESP advisers/CTAs are to provide policy advice. It is not obvious that it is appropriate for a donor agency to have its own direct employees provide policy advice to a partner country decision maker.

*Bottom line:* partner country stakeholders sometimes see Danida advisers more as Danida than *advisors*.

The higher up in the system, the more complicated the situation. The policy advisory role is particularly sensitive. Experience seems to be that decision makers prefer advice from senior personnel with decision-making rather than a purely technical background.

An argument can therefore be made (Annex D) that policy-sensitive positions such as component and national CTAs should be offered through agency rather than individual contracts. These would provide arm’s length dealings between Danida and agency personnel. A contract that specifies the services to be delivered will create a more partner (demand) driven relationship. The contract incentive structure can ensure greater consistency between recipient and supplier objectives. A wider variety of services,

12) *This is not a simple issue, since public institutions generally do not have the mandate or organisation to handle long-term commitments abroad. Over time, however, such contracts should be possible, particularly if Danida can ensure long-term funding that will make it worthwhile for the institutions to establish the additional capacity required to do the job.*



including some limited but very high-level inputs, can be provided, similar to DTI's contract in Zimbabwe. Though this will be more expensive than individual contracts, if successful policy advice in fact can be rendered it will probably be very cost-effective.

Another issue is the appropriate role of NGOs in implementing EPSF-funded activities. In Zimbabwe, NGOs can be engaged in three different ways. MITI is implemented by SAFIRE through a direct contract with Danida. E2000 functions as a sub-contractor to MMET to provide facilitation and other services in Bindura, etc. And NGOs can apply for community-level funds through the DEAP. Danida may wish to review successful modalities for exploiting the considerable experience that NGOs represent.

### Summing Up and Findings

- The project approach combined with Danida-defined design processes will tend to increase the TA-intensity of EPSF-funded activities.
- Danida uses both firms and individual advisors, which have their different advantages and weaknesses. It has been noted that one firm has won almost all the contracts in Malawi, while individual advisors are the preferred approach in Tanzania. Zimbabwe has chosen a more balanced mix of private, public and not-for-profit *national* actors.
- The TA cost-share of projects is high in the Tanzania and Malawi ESPs. A Partnership approach would hand more implementation tasks to local actors.
- Advisors hired directly by a donor face questions regarding primary allegiance and roles. This weakens legitimacy and effectiveness, particularly regarding policy advice.
- Danida should review more innovative ways of taking advantage of NGOs.
- Strong Danida involvement in project implementation takes over too much project risk, weakening local responsibility for project success.
- Danida could explore possibilities for using more public/quasi-public entities for twinning arrangements in the environmental field.

## 5.4 Economic and Financial Viability

The DEAP project recognises that the current approach implies such a high recurrent cost per district environmental plan that the approach is not sustainable (Annex D). A programme review mission that visited Malawi in March 2000, primarily to look at the CBNRM component, noted that "a large proportion of project funds will be used on allowances, fuel, etc, particularly where the line ministries are to be involved in environmental activities" (MAL.2-1.d. p. 2).

There is little discussion of the insertion of the projects into local budgets and budget processes. Local financial contributions tend to be vague, if they are at all included. Perspectives in terms of when and how the project will be handed over and integrated into local institutions' responsibilities are weak. A case in point is the Mwanza project. Danida's support over the coming two years will be equivalent to 50 percent of Mwanza's *total* annual budget. Mwanza's own contribution is only 2.5 percent of the costs – yet the Council insists it will incorporate the project activities fully within two years (Annex H). The first Annual Review of the MEMA projects (which includes the Iringa CBNRM) also notes the lack of economic viability of the project at its current financing levels (TAN.1-1.d), and thus the impossibility of replicating it on any significant scale.



But these observations are simply short-term public finance concerns – the *expenditures* are too high. There is no analysis what the project investments are going to lead to, so it is not possible to know if overall returns to the investments might still make sense from a general economic perspective.

One project that intends to look at financial and economic viability of its activities, is MITI. The enterprise promotion approach will permit at least some estimates of rates of return. The very high costs and uncertainty regarding success in marketing new products means perspectives are unclear, however, as underlined by the recent review mission (ZIM.1-2.m). The fact that the project expects to generate lessons that are valid well beyond the project area and even beyond Zimbabwe improves this somewhat. But the long-term viability of the project is obviously a question that requires attention.

More attention to the long-term viability of EPSF-funded activities is required, to avoid the perennial problem of donor-supported projects becoming “islands of excellence” that later on wither away, lessening the value of the original investment. The *time horizon* required for establishing viability can be quite long. The point is therefore that there should be a reasonably well established process, with realistic benchmarks underway, that points towards economic and financial viability. At some level, the quite considerable EPSF resources need to be justified based on the total net benefits they are generating for the partner societies.

## 5.5 Knowledge Generation and Institutional Development

Since environmental activities are still in their infancy in the region, Danida can play a larger role in generating new knowledge and finding more efficient ways of disseminating these insights. This could constitute a new *dimension* to the ESPs in the region, and thus confer an important programmatic value-added.

### The MITI Project

SAFIRE is using a relatively large share of the MITI resources for knowledge generation and dissemination (Annex F):

- It is learning from other activities in the region through study tours, active communication through networks of contacts, and scanning of literature.
- MITI is open to research by external research organisations, and both institutions and individuals have used MITI as an object of their research efforts.
- SAFIRE has collaborative agreements with several research organisations both in the region and abroad. It is contributing to general research activities which at the same time are of importance to its own core activities.
- SAFIRE is commissioning research directly, to answer questions of particular interest to the project.
- SAFIRE is pioneering the use of credit guarantees for natural resources-based enterprises.

The project’s Steering Committee and the Annual Reviews are important vehicles for discussing and disseminating lessons learned. SAFIRE staff are used as resource persons for teaching courses at various institutions in Zimbabwe, and have been used by Danida as a resource for development of similar activities in Malawi and Tanzania.

### Generating New Knowledge

In almost all the projects, there are aspects that are new or extensions/testing of what are currently *thought* to be “best practice” but which may have shortcomings that should be addressed. Some projects, like the Lake Chilwa and the bilharzia projects in Malawi, have important formal research components (MAL.1-1.d, MAL 1-2.c). Tanzania’s Malagarasi-Muyowosi project has used sophisticated technology for the benchmark study while the Lindi project has used fairly advanced social science approaches to identify benchmarks and stakeholder views (Annex E).

All the projects have in principle an active monitoring component based on the LFA matrix. The review mission looking at the CZM in Mozambique noted, however, that “little systematic monitoring or evaluation of the pilot projects is taking place, which will make it difficult for the experience gained to be used in other contexts...the team *recommends* that a monitoring and evaluation system of all activities be established” (MOZ.1-1.g). A similar point is raised by the identification mission for the Urban Environmental component, “considering the absence of monitoring facilities for all areas of urban environment ... A functioning monitoring system would also provide the municipalities ... with overviews of the ‘present state of affairs’” (MOZ.3.a).

In part because of the novelty of environmental problems and hence the lack of consensus concerning monitorable indicators, several of the documents note that the principles for elaboration of indicators should be *simplicity, utility, disaggregation, securing feedback, and integrating socio-economic and bio-physical* data. It is also suggested that a local organisation be contracted to provide a monitoring and evaluation service (see for example MAL.2-1.b). This is thus obviously an area where a lot of work can be shared and where lessons learned should be made available to others as quickly as possible.

In March 1998, the JAC discussed and agreed on the importance of involving the Danish research and development community more (Danida/Danced 1998a). This could be particularly relevant in a “knowledge generation” component of the EPSF.

### Capacity Building and Institutional Development

This learning should be used to systematically strengthen capacity and institutional development. Capacity building is central to recipient governments being able to assume leadership in environmental development, as is noted in all the ESPs. Usually the capacity building term refers to two levels. The first is with respect to individuals working for an organisation – human resources (“human capital”) or skills development. The second concerns the organisation itself.

The terms organisational and institutional development are often used interchangeably but it may be helpful to use Douglass North’s distinction. *Institutions* are said to be norms and rules that guide and constrain behaviour of individuals and organisations – “the rules of the game” – while *organisations* are important actors or “players of the game” (see Douglass North 1990, pp. 3-5). Organisational development thus refers to the ability of a particular organisation to more efficiently carry out its tasks.

Institutional development is more the transformation/improvement of framework conditions/constraints that actors bear in mind when making decisions. Institutional development is thus much wider than organisational development. Successful institutional development is critical to overall progress since the development of societal frameworks and rules that guide and assist decision making in general are key to overall efficiency improvements. This has been noted several times when it comes to the

efficiency of programming the EPSF resources: the lack of national frameworks increases transaction costs to both Danida and the partner country and lowers overall efficiency of resources.

Institutional development is more complex than traditional capacity building, however. It requires a systemic approach and knowledge, and this is particularly true in the environmental sector which is cross-cutting. Successful institutional development can have a profound impact in an entire nation, however, as rules are established, enforced and accepted (“polluter pays” principles are applied in a transparent manner; professional EIAs are to be undertaken in connection with all major investments; etc.).

Denmark has a unique opportunity to assist efficient institutional development regarding sustainable development in the Southern Africa region. It is engaged in all the SADC countries; it is funding a wide range of activities that are generating lessons at all levels and in many sectors; it has a funding level which allows for systematic research over time; and it has a commitment to the problems that no other actor has shown. It may be worthwhile looking at the effort at generating knowledge and the capacity to both produce it and use it. The hypothesis is that Danida might become more efficient at supporting knowledge production through improving the monitoring, evaluation and research work. Furthermore, capacity building could become more efficient by moving resources from individual training to institutional development processes.

#### **Role of Local Actors**

Danida is today an important “content provider” to the EPSF programme. The programming responsibilities of Danida’s technical department and the SAO, the hiring of Danida advisors and the buying of skills from the Danish resource base all contribute to strengthening Danida’s insights and ability to make contributions to both programme structure and project content. This process is quite conscious, deliberate, professional – Danida *wants* to improve its skills base, to become a more relevant dialogue partner.

The learning taking place in the partner countries is less structured. This is mostly due to the lack of national capacity and strategy for systematic learning and institutional memory. But Danida could support this more by restructuring some roles and funding more local monitoring and evaluation, and research and development (M&E+R&D) efforts in the environment fields.

Monitoring and evaluation are typically tasks that donors and partner governments find relatively easy to design jointly when putting together sector programmes. This could be done much more in the case of EPSF programmes. Having local institutions as the lead agency in annual reviews, with the Danish consulting firm providing support and quality assurance, could be a big forward. Finding the organisations that have the capacity and incentives to carry out such tasks professionally is clearly not easy. Designing this as an explicit part of an EPSF programme and providing a three- to five-year perspective might make this more realistic. Included in such contracts could be more research-based tasks. Developing monitorable indicators in various fields is one obvious area. Other more practical issues related to efficient and effective monitoring and evaluation could undoubtedly also be found.

These issues are general and go beyond the particular project or even programme. Some tasks might have cross-national validity and interest and could lead to a solid basis for

collaboration across the region (and of course linking up with similar institutions abroad, including the Danish resource base).

There are more complex issues linked to the EPSF programme where it may be worthwhile to involve local institutions. One is the issue of public/private roles in environmental action – what is an efficient division of labour in various contexts? How can NGOs become more involved? What kinds of contracts can address incentive divergence (“agent-principal” problems)? The ownership issue is a recurring theme – but how can this be measured, and how can it be tracked through to outcomes and impact? Can better cost-benefit analyses be carried out? Can better insights generated locally contribute to strengthening genuine participation and management of the programming, implementation and evaluation of EPSF-funded activities? – Having one or more independent research-based institutions monitor and analyse results is important for generating more independent assessments for the public debate on how to improve EPSF resource utilisation.

### Summing Up and Findings

- Most if not all EPSF funded activities are generating lessons, but there is a lack of systematic recording and analysis of these. Developing *knowledge generation* as an explicit dimension of the ESPs can be a value-added dimension to the ESPs.
- The projects are to have LFA-based monitoring, though this is lacking in some cases. One reason is the lack of consensus regarding good monitorable indicators – a problem Danida might wish to invest resources in, as this is a general problem for all actors in the environmental field.
- A further possibility is systematic strengthening of local institutions outside the public sector that can act as focal points for institutional memory, can critically assess lessons learned, and provide independent analyses for public debate as inputs to more demand-led participatory policy change.
- These suggestions lead to a more general proposal of Danida focusing more attention on institutional development within the ESPs. This is somewhat contradictory to the idea that the EPSF should generate more immediate results. But successful institutional development can generate systemic benefits that will far outweigh what individual projects can achieve. More importantly, institutional development is the key to sustainability, as national frameworks by definition are locally owned and represent more permanent and predictable guideposts for all decision makers.

## 5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The first projects were selected on their own merits. Subsequent projects have either had programmatic considerations or frameworks in place when identified or in fact developed out of such frameworks.

Strong local ownership and clear concepts in place have made identification and early implementation smoother. Genuine participatory programming where sufficient time has been used to engage local stakeholders has been important to achieve this. The project design/consultation process is more difficult in urban areas, due to size, diversity and complexity of the community and its problems. Annual Reviews have proven to be an important component of continuous project programming. Because the EPSF programme is so recent and lessons are thus constantly being produced, this dynamic programming is highly laudable.

Differences in local ownership has led to different project designs for addressing similar problems. Zimbabwe has a programme that can generate lessons in this regard, since both in the rural and urban components, there are systematic differences that could potentially be traceable in terms of outcomes and impact.

Projects tend to have a “big push” approach of high resource concentration for technical assistance, activity funding, training, etc. These provide a “kick-start” to environmental action that some actors see as required for visibility, support, and thus momentum and sustainability – but may undermine local ownership and viability.

There has been rapid learning *within* and *between* countries. Tanzania’s Sustainable Cities programme over the course of only four years has produced four “generations” of project documents, where the latest ones are locally created.

Danida needs to pay more attention to economic and financial viability of projects, however. The EPSF should also become a more knowledge driven programme through strengthening local capacity for M&E and R&D. This should lead to more emphasis on institutional development within the EPSF than has been the case so far.

While a large share of resources go to fund TA, relatively little of EPSF funds are programmed and managed directly by low-income communities. Danida might in particular review more innovative ways of taking advantage of NGO skills and experience. A more Partnership-based approach would in general hand more implementation tasks to national actors.

Danida uses both firms and individual advisors to provide TA.. It has been noted that one firm has won almost all the contracts in Malawi, while individual advisors are the preferred approach in Tanzania. Zimbabwe has chosen a more balanced mix of private, public and not-for-profit *national* actors.

Individual advisors hired directly by Danida face questions regarding primary allegiance and roles. This weakens legitimacy and effectiveness, particularly regarding policy advice. Danida should explore possibilities for using more public/quasi-public entities for twinning arrangements in the environmental field. Finally, strong Danida involvement in project implementation takes over too much project risk, weakening local responsibility for project success.

### Recommendations

- Danida needs to provide more time and a greater role for national actors in the identification and implementation of activities.
- Danida should critically review the role of technical assistance, the modalities for contracting it, possible role conflicts for directly-hired advisors, etc.
- There should be a *knowledge generation* dimension to ESPs where the role of *national* institutions is central. They should be given M&E and R&D roles to strengthen local institutional memory, policy debate, and institutional/framework development.
- More attention should be paid to long-term viability of EPSF-funded projects.
- More resources should go directly to civil society actors (NGOs, firms, etc.).



## 6. Achievements and Challenges

Section 1.5 gave the general sets of evaluation criteria against which EPSF programming is to be assessed. These are spelled out in more detail below, along with the evaluation of their attainment.

### 6.1 Danish Development Priorities: The Cross-cutting Dimensions

Danida's overall priorities are stated in its strategy document (MFA 1994) where the overarching objective is *poverty reduction* through (i) economic growth with re-distribution policies, (ii) social sector/human resources development, and (iii) based on popular participation. In addition come three key cross-cutting issues: (a) gender equality, (b) environmentally sustainable development, and (c) promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy. The relevant issues here are poverty reduction, gender equality, and promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance.

#### Poverty Reduction

The *regional* programme is small, focusing on specific issues where sufficient political consensus will permit effective implementation. Poverty reduction does not enter as a major concern and will therefore not be a main outcome. But the Tanzania and perhaps in particular Malawi programmes have tried to address the concerns of the poor. Malawi is pushing resources down to community level, getting synergy from planning and livelihood/funds activities working together. Tanzania is also poverty relevant as the programme contains community-based livelihoods/management of resources in both urban and rural communities. The programmes of both Zimbabwe and Mozambique contain relevant components but not the same systemic consistency.

In the Zimbabwe programme, the impact on life situation of the poor is either indirect (DEAP, OHS), marginal or none (renewable energy, CPT), or limited (the urban EPM activities, with possible exception for Bindura and Victoria Falls). The only project that addresses the livelihood issue directly, is the MITI project – though questions have been raised how wide-spread the project in fact will impact due to its enterprise focus.

More important in the long run is the issue of *empowerment* – the ability of stakeholder groups to themselves address the structural constraints to their poverty situation. This is linked to the issue of good governance and organisational issues, addressed below, but generally is a strong aspect of the EPSF programming.

There is little socio-economic analysis of the programmes or components, whether in terms of growth or distributional impact – i.e., net benefits or relative benefits to the poor. There are a lot of *assertions* that such benefits are likely to occur but some of these are clearly incorrect, such as in the case of renewable energy in Zimbabwe (Annex D). Danida's desk appraisal of the Malawi renewable energy component noted that the probable impact of the project on poverty reduction is minimal because the technologies being developed depend on market demand for their sustainability, and this can hardly come from the poorest segments of the population. It also notes that while there are a few concrete direct benefits to women these are rather limited (MAL.3.g, pp. 6-7). Concerning *distributional* impact of the projects, the analyses assume fairly homo-



geneous beneficiary groups, or that there are no fundamental conflicts or competition for resources. The Iringa project (Annex I) is an exception, with a good discussion about the conflict lines that exist, and the early danger signals of major beneficiaries wanting to exclude weaker groups from access. Other projects may want to look at this analysis.

### Gender Equality

Danida gets high marks for the gender dimension in its programming work though the *operationalisation* can in some cases be improved. In Zimbabwe, the urban and rural sustainable components have gender-promoting dimensions where Danida was supportive/instrumental (MITI) in getting these in place. The renewable energy component, however, largely consists of high-tech activities (“boys’ toys”) that ignore women’s chores and access problems.

In the Malawi programme, women have been mentioned explicitly as among the primary stakeholders in the ESP document: “women producers, women-headed households and women’s groups will, in particular, be targeted for support”. This is not very well followed up in the objectives and provisional framework for core indicators for monitoring the programme, however. The only mention under Performance Indicators is that “status of women improved” where the means of verification is “number of women represented on [various level] development committees” (MAL.0.i, table 8, p. 70).

In Mozambique’s Lake Niassa project document, five of the 11 ‘key guiding principles’ contain gender concerns: “(i) special efforts shall be made to solicit views, opinions and consent of both women and men for activities to be undertaken, (ii) special effort shall be made to include both women and men in decision-making processes concerning project activities, (iii) in the selection of micro projects, considerations in relation to poverty alleviation and gender issues shall be made, (iv) both women and men shall be involved in the management of micro-projects, and (v) in recruiting project-employed staff, efforts shall be made to rectify the present gender imbalance among staff at both provincial and district level.” Following this, when discussing gender aspects in section 2.4.2, the document states that “gender awareness is a key qualification for project staff” (op. cit., p. 7). In later sections, there is only limited mention of gender except that under 4.3.5 ‘Training and workshops’, the last kind of training envisaged is “Gender sensitivity” (op. cit., p. 17). In Annex 2, which provides a list of possible kinds of micro-projects that can be funded, a number of them are addressing women’s concerns. One of the criteria for accepting a proposal is that it is “submitted by an Environmental Committee with equal representation of men and women” and that the project “will benefit the poor and vulnerable groups”, presumably including women (op. cit., annex 2 p. 2).

In Tanzania, gender profiles are being prepared as part of the Sustainable Cities projects, and are now in place before the appraisals. They provide solid benchmarks for monitoring performance. Similarly in the Iringa and even more so in the subsequent Lindi project, where gender is a more integrated dimension (Annex E).

More gender-disaggregated data are being generated. It remains to be seen how far this will lead to gender-supportive outcomes. Some women consultants in the region believe not enough is being done to *empower* women and pursue a consistent gender perspective with regards to important issues like women’s tenurial rights. They note that activities such as solid waste recycling in urban Zimbabwe is a low-income activity that can safely be handed to women as no men will touch it. The EPSF thus funds a reinforcement of

the tendency to push women into marginal activities that have no real future, and women accept because they have fewer options than men.

The Evaluation sees this criticism as to some extent valid. But these new activities open up options that did not exist before, and if resource poor women find these possibilities worth exploring, they are positive. If they in practice turn out to enhance not only their choice menu but also their livelihoods, then this is a genuine gender needs contribution. While somewhat uneven, considerable attention is paid to the gender dimension, and concrete examples on the ground show how to address it. There is a need to concretise and operationalise/specify desired gender outcomes in a number of projects, but the *trend* is towards improvements in more recent projects as experiences are gained. A clearer differentiation between *practical* and *strategic* needs in the gender goal hierarchies would further strengthen the EPSF work in this field.

### Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance

Danida has generally used participatory approaches in the programming of the EPSF. This has been most successful where there was strong local ownership of the programme up front. The difference between the Norton and Mwanza cases can largely be attributed to the fact that the Mwanza council had already identified environmental issues as an area for council intervention. Local consultations were therefore already underway when the donor came in.

Successful participatory programming has succeeded in reaching out to groups that often are marginalised by normal political structures and processes. In other cases there has been a tendency to focus on the public sector, as with the DEAP and Norton in Zimbabwe. Here the role of stakeholders has remained less clear with more attention on “building capacity” without analysing why this is the most efficient way of addressing the environmental problems that the stakeholders face.

In the more inclusive projects (Bindura, Mwanza, Iringa) there has been considerable focus on helping stakeholders *organise* themselves. This is key, as investments in *social capital* – relations and networks of trust that reduce uncertainty, information costs and hence vulnerability and risk – according to several studies is more important to the poor than investment in human capital (health, education) <sup>13</sup>. *Politically*, social capital – the establishment of new or stronger relations and the ability to organise to defend own interests – is also more important than individual capital. It is reflected *inter alia* in the increased demands for public sector accountability, as in Mwanza (Annex H), and represents important progress towards a more open and competitive political system.

Improvements regarding respect for human rights by the state is a longer-term problem where it is not realistic to expect immediate changes or results. What is key is that

13) See Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1994) for general theory and Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and Grootaert (1999) for empirical studies.

14) The work that Grootaert and others are doing in the World Bank on “Local-level institutions” and which has produced the most empirical work on social capital so far, has in fact largely been funded by Norway and Denmark. There should therefore be a good basis for extending this work to look at the EPSF programme in Southern Africa, in that a link could be established between the World Bank team and the (Danish?) research milieu that Danida could contract for an EPSF study.

resource-poor are being empowered to organise themselves through the projects, and this is happening in a number of cases.

Danida thus scores well on this dimension. From the documentation, however, it seems that the choice of approach is based primarily on concepts of popular participation rather than larger issues of political organisation, empowerment and social capital formation. It would therefore be interesting if Danida could fund research and documentation on these questions, as the empirical work so far in these areas is weak<sup>14)</sup>. This might lead to improvements in future programming in these areas.

### Summing up and Findings

- *Poverty*: The situation is uneven, but several of the country programmes have a structure and focus that ought to generate systematic improvements to the livelihood situation of poor stakeholder groups. Two dimensions merit monitoring. The first is the extent to which projects help to *empower* the poor to address structural aspects of their poverty. The second is the *distributional* outcomes of the projects, to see who benefits the most, to enable corrective action for possible biases against the poor.
- *Gender*: Danida has succeeded in making the gender dimension more visible in the projects. The operationalisation of objectives is uneven. More gender-disaggregated data and better gender profiles is improving possibilities for monitoring impact. A clearer differentiation between practical and strategic needs would further strengthen this dimension. The *trend* is largely towards better specified projects.
- *Democratisation, Human Rights, Good Governance*: Successful participatory programming often leads to better organisation of traditionally marginalised stakeholder groups. This provides a solid basis for empowerment through increased networks and trust (“social capital”). This is key to increased democratisation, demands for improved accountability and transparency in the public sector, and thus towards a more open political system. Innovative research and monitoring should be undertaken to test/ verify these propositions/hypotheses.

## 6.2 Danish Environmental Priorities

### General Environmental Priorities

Danida's general environmental policy, as presented in its 1988 “Plan of Action”, gives three general objectives: to (i) combat global environmental problems, (ii) support developing countries attain sustainable development, and (iii) help developing countries in specific areas. These objectives are all clearly being addressed by the country EPSF programmes, though to what extent the second objective, of attaining sustainable development, is being pursued in an efficient manner, will be discussed below.

### EPSF Priorities

The joint “Strategy for Danish Environmental Assistance” (Danida/Danced 1996) has as its objectives to (i) ensure an environmentally sustainable utilisation of natural resources and the conservation of nature; (ii) prevent and limit air and water pollution and soil degradation, and (iii) promote sustainable use of energy. The environmental assistance should be planned from a regional perspective in order to facilitate holistic and coherent initiatives. Based on previous experience, the priorities of the partner countries, and availability of Danish expertise, the following target areas were selected: (a) urban development and industrialisation, (b) sustainable use of energy; (c) agriculture;

(d) water resources; (e) forest and wood resources; (f) biological diversity; and (g) coastal zones.

The year before, the strategy for the Southern Africa region was issued (Danida/Danced 1995). The three main issues are somewhat different: (i) natural resource degradation; (ii) sustainable urban and industrial development; and (iii) coastal zone management.

The ESPs in the four countries that have activities in place all fall within these objectives and target areas. The composition of the ESPs vary in part as a function of what the national priorities are and what the needs are given what other donors are funding. But none of the ESPs have included activities that are outside the scope of the EPSF objectives and target areas.

The seven areas have been supported in different ways, however. Water resources are treated only in the regional programme, and biodiversity as such is also most explicitly addressed there. The most important environmental area is agriculture, though, due to the problems of environmental degradation and the overwhelming number of people that is affected by it. This is not an explicit area in any ESP since Danida is heavily engaged in the agricultural sector through the normal country frame programmes. The separability demand on the EPSF is thus creating barriers to entry into a key environmental field.

Renewable energy area was not included in the Southern Africa strategy but was introduced later by Copenhagen. To what extent this has been a fortunate addition can be questioned. In Malawi, this area is attempted integrated with the general support to lakeshore communities. It may therefore in the end turn out to be a meaningful value-added dimension. In Tanzania it has been defined as a “window of opportunity”. The embassy has not committed itself to this area as a priority component, but has set aside resources to carry out exploratory work. If worthwhile activities are identified, Danida might consider supporting them. In Zimbabwe, where it has been established as a separate component, it presents the most problematic area, and is hard to justify based on the overarching concerns of the EPSF and Danida in general.

### Summing up and Findings

- The ESPs correspond to the objectives in Danida’s general environmental policy and the strategies prepared for the EPSF in general and for Southern Africa.
- The *de facto* exclusion of the agricultural sector and the prioritisation of the renewable energy sector in the ESPs are perhaps both unfortunate.

### 6.3 Sector Programming Principles and EPSF Programming

The EPSF activities are to be based on Danida’s principles for Sector Programme Support, SPS (Danida 1998). These include, among other things, national ownership of the development effort; long-term time horizon for support (typically 10-20 years); full integration of all Danida-funded activities within that sector; co-ordination with other actors. The exceptions to SPS principles for EPSF programming have been discussed above: (i) activities identifiably different from Country Frame assistance, and (ii) resources should be programmed as individual projects.

### **National Ownership of Development Efforts**

During the first couple of years, both project and programme definition were Danida managed, though in Malawi national frameworks were coming into being. In Tanzania the authorities have taken a stronger role over time and the principles for the Tanzania programme and the projects are based on national priorities. Once the EMB is passed in Zimbabwe, the authorities will have a clearer basis for environmental action. The recent restructuring of cabinet, with a Ministry for Environment and Tourism, may also be a positive change. The same is true of the establishment of a Ministry for Environmental Co-ordination in Mozambique. The general trend is thus in the direction of stronger national involvement and ownership.

National frameworks remain weak in most countries, however. It is difficult for national authorities to truly own a donor-funded programme if they do not have their own policies, programmes and priorities established and are able to ensure that the donor-funded programme fits into national efforts in the right places. It may be easier to address this issue at the component level. In the case of Sustainable Cities in Tanzania or renewable energy in Malawi, national policies or at least practices and priorities existed that allowed for more meaningful programming of Danish resources. This is thus an additional argument for focusing EPSF programming at the component level: the national ownership is often stronger and more real.

### **Longer Time Horizon, Broader Scale of Effort**

The EPSF in principle is to provide long-term support. Because of the commitment frames, early programming led to short-term interventions, though with the prospect of being followed by subsequent stages. This is not as supportive as SPS programming that Danida otherwise does, and which partner governments much appreciate. As EPSF funding increases, this constraint will become less serious.

The fact that EPSF must be programmed as projects creates barriers to more broad-based collaboration with larger programmes, however. In Zimbabwe the Urban and Rural EPMs could potentially link up with more broad-based efforts, which might enhance resource efficiency. As stand-alone projects rather than framework funding for the sector, this is less easy to achieve.

Programming at the component level can provide more broad-based support to a sector. This is happening in all the countries. In Malawi, the various components are mutually supportive, as wetlands management through to urban EPM and renewable energy are all concentrated in eleven districts around important bodies of water in the country. National support is scaled to support local level activities.

### **Integration and Co-ordination**

The fact that EPSF resources in fact have to be programmed separately from other Danish-funded programmes (“integration”) has already been commented on extensively. The lack of more broad-based co-ordination has also been looked into. The bottom line is that the EPSF diverges from the SPS Guidelines on both points. The Evaluation has argued that both contribute to lowering overall efficiency of EPSF resource use.

### **Summing up and Findings**

- *National ownership*: National authorities are taking a stronger role, but progress is slow. As long as partner governments do not have national frameworks in place, the



conditions for genuine national ownership are weak. It is easier to accomplish this at component level, and this is in fact happening in a number of cases.

- *Time horizon:* The commitment frames still represent a stumbling block for longer time commitments, though this constraint is lessening. The project planning limits the scope for supporting more broad-based (sector) programmes, thus probably lowering total resource efficiency.
- *Integration and Co-ordination:* Integration is hurt by the EPSF programming guidelines, while the project approach creates problems with respect to co-ordination.

### 6.4 Evaluation Criteria

Danida's *Evaluation Guidelines* uses the five standard OECD/DAC criteria for assessing development interventions:

- *Efficiency:* a measure of the productivity of the intervention. This typically means measuring the relationship between inputs and outputs. In this case, the output is largely defined to be the programming process as well as the programme results.
- *Effectiveness:* a measure of the degree to which the objectives of the intervention have been or are likely to be reached. This can be reviewed in terms of whether the outputs will lead to the desired outcomes of (or for) the beneficiary groups. In this case, the issue is whether the processes and programmes produced will support national and stakeholder objectives that have been defined as the goals for EPSF support.
- *Impact:* a measure of total long-term effects – negative and positive, foreseen and unexpected – that have come about as a result of the interventions. This is a broader, more societal analysis than effectiveness, and a more complex issue to look at in this case since it assumes enough “results on the ground” to allow for such analysis.
- *Relevance:* a measure of the degree to which the interventions are in line with donor and partner policies and priorities. In this case, the question is the appropriateness of the EPSF programming to Danida and host government policies, needs and priorities.
- *Sustainability:* the degree to which the positive impacts produced will continue after external assistance ceases. The question here will be what can be said about the way Danida has programmed EPSF activities in terms of the likelihood that the benefits of these activities will continue after EPSF funding ceases.

#### Efficiency

The efficiency or cost-effectiveness of the EPSF programming can be viewed two ways. The first is to what extent the programming done could have been achieved in a less costly manner. The other is to see if the programming could have led to better results.

Danida has taken a very thorough approach, and in principle allocated ten percent of the 1999-2002 EPSF allocation for planning – an unusually high share. It has contracted considerable local but primarily Danish consultancy expertise. It has mobilised internal resources by strengthening the embassies in the region over time, and has also increased slightly the number of staff in Copenhagen working on the EPSF.



The end result has been an extraordinary effort at getting in place comprehensive programmes in four out of the six programming countries, a draft overall programme in the fifth country, and a limited regional programme.

The end results in the case of the four country programmes must largely be said to have been successful. The Zimbabwe programme suffers from being the “early starter” and a series of changes are recommended. In all countries the objective of getting a coherent programme in place is either achieved or can be done so with some adjustments. The regional programme remains a problem, but this the Evaluation considers is because the basic conditions for regional interventions are poor.

The monetary costs have been high. More extensive use of national consultants could have brought costs down, and could also have improved the quality of local consultations in several instances. The trade-off, particularly in the first phase, would undoubtedly have been higher time-costs. The Danish-led consultancy teams have generally been very good at producing high-quality reports on time. Now that time constraints are less, future programming can undoubtedly be structured such that national skills are used more.

The programming could probably have produced more wide-ranging impact, however. The Evaluation believes that Danida’s EPSF programming has been exemplary in its thoroughness and the mass of information that has been generated. This could clearly be of use to a wider audience. The Evaluation has earlier suggested that utilising such exercises for a more general environmental document owned and distributed by the national authorities, such as the State of the Environment Report, SOER, in Malawi, could be a good approach. A national environmental strategy dialogue would be assisted considerably by a well-structured analytical and informational document.

Expanding EPSF programming to support SOERs could generate a number of benefits, all of which might, in the Evaluation’s opinion, enhance the efficiency of the EPSF programming considerably:

- The production of SOERs could have major capacity *building* impact. This would be at the technical level of putting together the reports, potentially politically (mobilising understanding and support at decision-making level), and in terms of empowering stakeholders. It would provide more and better structured information, but could also allow more stakeholders to get involved in the production of future SOERs. It may lead to *institutional development* by clarifying roles, regulatory frameworks and rules of the game, thus strengthening their legitimacy and credibility.
- The SOERs may enhance the relevance and credibility of the environmental authorities, both within the national political debate, but in particular in relation to stakeholder groups in civil society: enterprises, NGOs and CBOs, etc.
- SOERs can make exchange of information and learning across countries easier. Over time, SOERs in the region may strengthen the possibilities for a regional programme. With national priorities clarified, it may be easier for governments to see where joint action may be of mutual benefit, and how such interventions can be constructed in order to further national policies and interests.
- Support to SOERs may also confer on the EPSF programmes a more strategic and programmatic dimension which to some extent is missing today.

### **Effectiveness**

The extent to which the EPSF programming is allowing national authorities and local stakeholder groups to attain their objectives is too early to say with certainty. At the national level, the lack of clear frameworks means that it is not always clear what it is that national authorities are prioritising in this field, and hence the yardstick against which to measure effectiveness is not there.

What seems clear, however, is that the Danida programming exercise has been a thorough and helpful one for a number of the actors involved. It has helped national bodies responsible for environmental problems to address at least some of their key concerns, particularly through the component analyses and programmes.

While there are weaknesses in the strong role that Danida has taken, the participatory approaches and concern for involving the stakeholders has largely been positive. It has provided a number of groups – women, youth, poor rural communities, low-income urban groups – with access to programming resources and interaction with other groups such as local decision-makers that they otherwise would not have. It has provided possibilities for addressing problems they are facing in their own environments, both in terms of analysing and designing solution sets to them, but also through providing concrete inputs to actually implement improvements.

Baseline studies have been carried out as part of the preparatory process of a number of projects. These make it easier for future results-evaluations to measure effectiveness, particularly where participatory methodologies have established the stakeholders' own criteria and priorities, Lindi perhaps being the best example.

### **Impact**

The long-run positive and negative results of EPSF programming are currently difficult to foresee. The empowerment of new groups due to successful participatory processes will undoubtedly contribute towards sustainability and thus long-term impact.

On the other hand, a consistent concern in this Evaluation is the often dominant role that Danida gives to itself in the programming and to some extent in implementation of EPSF activities. The asymmetry in the relationship between the partners is constantly revealed to the participants (see the following section on 'Sustainability'). Most partners do not react much to this as this is seen as typical donor behaviour and to some extent is accepted – "it's their money". But "lessons learned" is that the project approach and lack of genuine partnership in programming weakens ownership. Without ownership sustainability is undermined, which means that long-term impact also is lessened.

Moving from projects to components, with components programmed as equivalent to sectors, could address most of these problems. This would be facilitated if EPSF funding was not provided in the form of commitment frames but more like normal country frame resources. It also means allowing for more strategic programming by removing the separability and project programming. The fact that the EPSF is not financing activities in the agricultural sector or looking at fuelwood as part of renewable energy because country frames already fund activities in these areas should be cause for concern.

The bottom line is that impact is likely to improve if the EPSF is programmed in line with Danida's general policy of stronger partnerships and sector programming.

### Relevance

The EPSF programming is seen as highly relevant in several respects. The first and most important is that the environmental question is key to long-term sustainable development in Southern Africa, and that this relevance is societal in character. The EPSF represents an important (and largely non-substitutable) value-added source of finance in the region that will remain highly relevant for years to come.

Another aspect is that Danida, with the EPSF, has injected a degree of professional skills and competence into the programming dialogue with the various parties that seems to be highly appreciated by those involved, whether national authorities or local CBOs.

The programming approach, when based on participatory mechanisms, generates another dimension of relevance, as it promotes more inclusionary processes that are empowering and conducive to local resources mobilisation.

The relevance of the specific issues identified for EPSF support are variable, and also vary by which beneficiary group is considered. Renewable energy as an area for scarce donor funding is questioned, and some specific interventions are seen as second-order. In some cases, however, the specific activities are not the end of the story, but may be helpful in mobilising weak groups in taking on larger issues over time, hence in fact *increasing* the relevance of the EPSF funding.

Some implementation modalities chosen are controversial. The relevance of intensive Danish TA to the efficient implementation of activities is open to questioning.

### Sustainability

The key to sustainability is ownership and financial viability. This the Evaluation has found to be variable. The MITI and the *Sustainable Mwanza* projects both have strong ownership at the policy and programming level, with the MITI project also strong ownership at implementation level. The Mwanza project has a more Danida-defined implementation, and is currently not financially sustainable. A key reason is the heavy Danish technical assistance component which is generating short-term results but at a very high cost. But even the MITI project seems questionable regarding viability.

The DEAP project in Zimbabwe does not have much in the way of external technical assistance, but the original approach (which is to be changed) still is too costly and hence not sustainable (and this without even being able to document that the approach generates substantial benefits to beneficiary groups).

The share of EPSF resources that is used to pay the Danish resource base is high (Annex E gives figures for key projects in Tanzania). The “big push” approach of many of the projects make them vulnerable along the sustainability dimension. A large up-front combination of technical assistance and implementation funding is kick-starting a lot of activities, but may be generating activity levels and expectations that are not sustainable once external TA is withdrawn. Addressing this point is going to have to be a major concern for the EPSF over the years to come.

Urban activities should have the strongest possibilities for sustainability. Urban areas have more dynamic economies, better and more efficient administrations and thus better revenue generation, larger economies of scale/agglomeration that can generate

positive externalities that justify public sector funding, etc. But even here there is little analysis of conditions for long-term sustainability.

The economic/financial sustainability picture will undoubtedly change over time. In Tanzania, the intention is to phase out the Danish advisors, which will reduce costs dramatically. The DEAP project in Zimbabwe is looking into ways that can lower the costs of preparing district action plans. Whether this will be enough to make the activities more sustainable, remains to be seen.

Ownership as key to sustainability is a key theme of this evaluation. Some Danida staff find this questioning of local ownership as unfounded since many trends point in the direction of increased voice for local partners. In order to better settle this question, the ownership concept needs to be operationalised. One dimension that has been mentioned is to look at how great a share of project risk the various stakeholders are willing to assume in the short and long run. Long-term financial viability in principle is squarely the partner countries' responsibility. This they implicitly have accepted once they signed the original project concept. Reality is probably that they expect donors to assume much of this risk also in the long term by continuing activity funding. Since this issue generally has not been addressed in the project or programme documents, there has so far been little testing of actual willingness to accept risk. This ought to become a more explicit dimension of future project and programme designs.

Another dimension could be to look at who defines key parameters for programming and implementation. The different implementation *modalities* across countries are a function of what the different embassies have preferred. The fact that Danida has a very TA-intensive programme in Tanzania when NORAD has almost no TA for a similar programme can only be explained by the role of the donor. National consultants are largely producers of sub-components to the final product. Stakeholders and national authorities largely react to drafts and proposals produced by Danish-led teams. The PAPs are Danida defined and driven, the size and structure of project budgets is not based on local resource commitment levels and priorities, the project document structure and the document itself are Danida's. Some issues are not significant: changing the name from ESP to EPS, or getting a project document cover that is jointly owned – but they provide signals regarding who decides. – Obviously many important decisions are national: areas of concentration, project ideas, etc. But a “decision tree” analysis may reveal who has final say when decisions are to be taken. This may help identify how local ownership – however defined – can be improved.

It is early days for a sustainability analysis. Yet this is the issue that the Evaluation is most concerned about. As this is an Environmental programme, this lack of attention to sustainability appears somewhat paradoxical. It undoubtedly will require continued attention by both Danida and its partners in the region.

### Summing up and Findings

- *Efficiency:* The EPSF programming exercise has been quite costly in terms of funds, own organisation, and time. Programmes and projects have largely been produced as expected, however, and in that sense the efficiency of what has after all been an extraordinary effort can be considered good. The cost-effectiveness can be enhanced considerably by ensuring that all the work that goes into programming the EPSF is utilised by larger groups of relevant stakeholders, and possibilities that may be worth

exploring are noted, particularly supporting the government and local stakeholders in producing more “live” updated documents like SOERs or policy and action plans.

- *Effectiveness*: This requires clearer national statements of purpose in order to measure degree of attainment. The increased production of baseline studies and more stakeholder based identifications of priorities and objectives provides grounds for future effectiveness studies, however.
- *Impact*: Since activities are still very recent it is too early to have strong opinions about likely impacts. The strong Danida role in programming and implementation and the focus on projects would in general seem to weaken the probable impact of the EPSF, while a strengthening of component level work more in line with SPS guidelines, it is hypothesised, should help strengthen future impact.
- *Relevance*: The EPSF is seen as highly relevant both to the problems of the region, and with regards to the funding and skills it brings to Southern Africa.
- *Sustainability*: The Evaluation considers this to be the key issue, and perhaps the weakest one, of the entire EPSF programming exercise. This is where the ownership question comes home to roost, and where perhaps the excessive focus on getting programmes and projects into place may have structurally weakened the long-run results. Danida and partner organisations are aware of some of the problems, such as poor cost effectiveness undermining financial viability. Adjustments may therefore still be made that can correct this current somewhat sombre assessment. More rigorous risk analysis may provide further insights. But it is a key question that merits continuous monitoring and discussion to ensure that it does not in the end become the Achilles heel of the EPSF in Southern Africa.
- *Ownership* seems to be handed over once *implementation* is to begin. It may instead be helpful to think that ownership should start once financial frames have been decided and *programming* is to be initiated.

## 6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

The EPSF provides additional funding to some of the poorest countries in the world. It is therefore imperative that the programming focuses on efficiency of resource use.

### The Donor Role

Danida as an actor is strong, well organised, highly committed, with a strong skills base and substantial resources at its disposal. Its corporate culture is results oriented, hands-on, and wants full information. Many Danida staff see little problems with more direct interventions if this is considered helpful to attain stated objectives.

Danida can easily become overwhelming and take on ownership roles that are perceived by locals to be different than the OECD/DAC guidelines. This weakens local ownership, but also puts Danida in a situation of being accountable for activities/decisions that a donor really should not be responsible for (project implementation, viability..).

Pressures for Danida to increase disbursement rates will undoubtedly increase. A classic lesson in this regard is that when commitment/disbursement demands are considerable – which typically are donor concerns, not those of the recipients – these tend to override “softer” concerns like participation, impact, sustainability, relevance. Danida should ensure that this does not happen to EPSF programming.



### Efficiency of Resource Use

The EPSF has all the time confronted the problem of the demand for environmental support being fairly “soft”. There are few credible national actors with a strong performance record in utilising such resources that are competing for access to them. Instead, Danida has had to pursue an aggressive programming approach which can easily lead the programmes to become supply-driven rather than demand-based.

Given this situation, it is all the more important that Danida try to find some quasi-market signals for resource allocation decisions. Some dimensions of this can be the capacity and will to achieve results with the funds. NGOs, private entrepreneurs, civic organisations and special interest groups may be more effective than a public sector that is usually under-staffed, under-paid and over-stretched. The share of resources going to civil society actors is low. Danida may wish to see if the experiences from for example the Malawi community funds warrant replication for expanding such funding.

It is important to get the *intervention levels* right. In Zimbabwe, for example, the *causal analysis* for the rural EPM is good, where it establishes tenurial rights and land distribution as key to the situation of over-exploitation of the natural resource base. This ought to lead to an EPSF programme at several levels: (i) At *national policy level*, land rights and land redistribution should be supported. (ii) At the level of *factor and sector markets*, provision of public goods and cases of market failure that needs to be corrected should form the basis for specific public sector interventions. This kind of analysis is generally lacking in the ESP documents, but could provide a better basis for defining the role/functions of the DEAP, for example; (iii) At *household and community levels*, sustainable exploitation of local resources provides the rationale for projects like MITI and community funds. This leads back to the suggestion made earlier, that a more careful analysis of the comparative advantage of different actors – public sector, firms, CBOs and other civic organisations – could help sharpen the focus of the interventions. The public/global/private goods dimension becomes important in this regard, because this may also vary by intervention level. Such an analysis may improve our understanding of what may constitute more cost-effective instruments for the desired sustainable impact.

### A Knowledge Driven Programme

The quality of the EPSF programme is going to be a function of the lessons learned on the ground by Danida, but primarily by its partners. This requires a more conscious effort at generating new insights and lessons across the board through structured project and programme M&E, but also through more free-standing R&D which goes beyond the normal implementation concerns. This should support national institutions that over time can improve quality of efforts, identify “best practice” lessons, push the research frontier on issues such as criteria for monitoring and evaluation, and disseminate these lessons into the public domain for policy debate. Key concerns should be looking at roles, sustainability and impact:

- Roles concerns division of labour between donor and partner authorities, between public sector and civil society, between central and local authorities and communities. The analyses must include an understanding of the frameworks and constraints that these pose, and how one can positively influence or change them to make the relationship between the parties more equitable and enable stakeholders to effectively participate in decision making. Here cross-donor comparisons could be helpful to understand viable alternatives in terms of roles in programming and



implementation: UNDP, ADB, World Bank, UNEP, bilaterals, IUCN/large international NGOs.

- Based on an understanding of roles, what are implications for ownership, and from there to sustainability, both economic/financial, and in more general terms of continued production of activity benefits?
- Finally, how do different degrees of ownership and sustainability translate into impact on the ground – for households, communities, nation-states? Danida may consider comparative studies to see if for example criticisms of “excessive TA” seem warranted. Joint reviews by the Scandinavian donors regarding their environmental programmes in SADC countries (Mozambique? Tanzania? Zimbabwe?) may provide a stronger basis from which to draw – or reject – such conclusions.

*Bottom line:* The Evaluation believes the key issue is *ownership*. Subtle aspects of own corporate culture and how Danida in fact operates and is perceived by its partners may impact substantially on this. It may therefore make sense to look more critically at this issue, as seen from partners’ and stakeholders’ perspectives, to see if this in fact is a genuine issue, and if so how this can be addressed.

### Recommendations

- Based on the experiences gathered, Danida should specify a little better the objectives in the fields of poverty reduction (*distributional dimensions*), gender (*practical vs. strategic needs*), human rights and democratisation (including *social capital*).
- Danida should look again at the guidelines for programming the EPSF. The restrictions compared with Danida’s standard SPS Guidelines are seen as not being helpful, the SPS Guidelines themselves do not seem appropriate at the level of the ESP document but should be used for the appropriations document, particularly if and when it becomes possible to programme and allocate resources at component level.
- Danida should develop the EPSF as a more knowledge-driven programme through strengthening the roles of national stakeholders. In particular more resources could be used to strengthen local institutions to take on more M&E and R&D, including looking at issues of *roles, ownership/sustainability and impact*.

## Annex A

Copenhagen, 10. November 1999  
Eval. J.nr. 104.A.l.e.20.

# **Terms of Reference Evaluation of the Regional Environmental Assistance in Southern Africa Administered by Danida**

## **1. Background**

At the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, new and additional funding was requested by the developing countries to address environmental problems. Accordingly, the Danish Parliament, in a resolution of December 1992 decided to allocate 0.5 percent of the Danish GNP for environment and disaster relief assistance, as a complement to the existing development assistance. The facility is now named the "Environment, Peace and Stability Facility" (EPSF).

In 1993, the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MEE) prepared a strategy for environmental activities in developing countries under the EPSF and the Danish Co-operation for Environment and Development (Danced) was established. Consistent with the overall recommendations of the Rio Conference, the overall objective of the strategy was to contribute to the restoration of the global environment. The strategy was directed towards two main issues: natural resource management and pollution prevention and control.

Danced's initial efforts were directed toward two regions: South East Asia and Southern Africa. These two regions are also recipients of Danish development assistance through Danida. In 1996 it was decided that the part of the EPSF used for environmental assistance should be implemented in close co-operation between MEE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to co-ordinate the efforts several studies and missions were carried out and in July 1996 a "Strategy for Danish Environmental Assistance to Developing Countries" was issued jointly by the two ministries.

The strategy's overall objective is to promote an increased effort to combat global environmental problems. More specifically the three objectives are: A) To ensure an environmentally sustainable utilisation of natural resources and the conservation of nature; B) To prevent and limit air and water pollution and soil degradation, and C) To promote sustainable use of energy. The environmental assistance should be planned from a regional perspective in order to facilitate holistic and coherent initiatives in the two regions.

On the basis of previous experience, the priorities of the partner countries, and the extent of Danish expertise in the individual areas, the following target areas were selected:

- Urban development and industrialisation
- Sustainable use of energy
- Agriculture
- Water resources
- Forest and wood resources
- Biological diversity
- Coastal zones.

The strategy also describes the division of responsibilities between Daned and Danida. In Southern Africa Daned is administering the EPSF in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland while Danida is responsible for Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Danida is furthermore responsible for the co-operation with regional institutions in the field of environment e.g. a number of institutions under the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

In 1995, a Regional Strategy for Danish Environmental Assistance in Southern Africa was prepared and following the approval in 1996 a number of identification missions took place. In 1996 identification missions were carried out in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe and in 1997 in Zambia and Tanzania. The objective of the missions was to plan the future environmental assistance by analysing the environmental problems and the national environmental policies together with relevant local stakeholders. A mission concerning the regional activities was also carried out in 1997 which recommended that activities initially be rooted in national institutions due to the weaknesses of the regional institutions and the lack of national capacity to co-operate at a regional level.

Following the identification missions and experiences with existing national environmental activities a regional EPSF meeting was held in Harare in November 1997 with participation of, among others, the involved embassies. During the meeting activities in the different partner countries covering the period 1998-2002 were discussed and planned. In continuation of this the final distribution of funds between the partner countries were made in 1998, when the Danish Ministry of Finance in mid-1998 communicated the precise amount of funds available in the above-mentioned period.

In view of implementing the strategy Environment Support Programmes (ESPs) are being or have been prepared for countries in the region. In Zimbabwe and Malawi the ESPs were prepared in 1998. The ESPs for Tanzania and Mozambique are being finalised shortly while the ESP for Zambia is under preparation.

Based on Danida's experiences with the sector programme support approach within the framework of the bilateral development assistance the same approach is now being applied in the preparation of ESPs in accordance with Danida's "Guidelines for Sector Programme Support - Annex 4". Nevertheless, due to the special characteristics of EPSF it is not possible to apply the sector programme support approach in full. Thus, whereas the ESP contains the analysis of the general environmental problems, long term priorities, and the choice of priority areas, the concrete and operational activities are described in project documents (Guidelines for SPS, Annex 5) and are accordingly

finally approved as separate project activities. Status regarding priority areas and project activities is given in Appendix 1.

Due to the political situation no activities have started in Angola and Zambia. Currently it is considered to initiate activities in Zambia in continuation of a programme/identification mission fielded in October 1999.

Generally the projects are designed to combine assistance in capacity development at local and national levels and financing of concrete environmental project activities. The fundamental concerns of Danish development assistance – poverty reduction and the cross-cutting themes of gender concern and democracy and human rights – are also considered as an integrated part of the programme and project preparation.

Concerning regional activities experience has shown that it is difficult to identify suitable projects mainly due to the lack of viable regional institutions to implement the project activities and national capacity to co-operate around regional issues. However, some activities are now being implemented through SADC and regional networks are also being supported.

Given the broad range of EPSF-activities in southern Africa it is necessary to limit the field phase of the evaluation to two countries in order to allow for an in depth evaluation of the prioritised topics. It has been decided that this evaluation should cover the activities in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. These countries have been selected considering a number of factors:

- In Zimbabwe the EPSF activities have been under implementation since the beginning of 1997. It was on this basis that Zimbabwe was chosen as the first country in which to formulate an ESP-approach.
- Zimbabwe represents a first generation country as far as ESP implementation is concerned. Thus, valuable experiences have been made concerning ESP formulation and implementation and the need for a procedural approach through which the ESP document is revised according to developments in project activities and environmental concerns. This has resulted in a first revision of the ESP-document.
- Tanzania was chosen as this country has been accorded the largest share of the EPSF-funds in southern Africa. Thus this is the country where most activities are under implementation and preparation.
- Furthermore, Tanzania represents a later generation in ESP preparation and implementation, and thus represents an attempt to formulate an ESP considering the experiences made.

## **2. Objectives**

The objective of the evaluation is to undertake an assessment of Danida's performance at the level of programming of EPSF activities in Southern Africa in order to assess the relevance of formulated strategic intentions, the choice of priority areas and related concrete project activities, and the connection between strategic intentions and project activities as expressed in the ESP.

In this context strategic intentions are defined as the negotiated combination of Danish policy, priority issues at national and local level in the partner country, existing

framework conditions for implementation (i.e. institutional set-up, donor co-ordination etc) and concerns for and understandings of environmental problems and needs. Project activities are defined as the activities which are singled out and prioritised in the ESP as a result of the expressed strategic intentions.

The evaluation should result in the provision of recommendations where necessary for adjustments in terms of strategies, objectives, programming, institutional issues and implementation plans.

The evaluation should duly consider that activities have just recently been initiated (1997) and that the EPSF is still in an expansive phase until 2005.

## 1. Output

An evaluation report providing an overview of the present activities and an assessment of the five evaluation criteria as related to the overall question of Danida's performance at the level of programming:

- The relevance of the ESP and prioritised project activities (Are objectives in keeping with needs and priorities? Should the direction be changed? Should activities be continued or changed?).
- The efficiency of the ESP and prioritised project activities (To what degree have the outputs achieved been delivered as expected? Could it have been done cheaper, more quickly and with better quality?).
- The effectiveness of the ESP and prioritised project activities (To what extent have agreed objectives been reached or are likely to be reached? Are the activities sufficient to realise agreed objectives as set out in the ESP and the project document?).
- The impact of the ESP and prioritised project activities (What are the possible positive and negative effects and do positive effects outweigh negative effects?)
- The sustainability of the ESP and prioritised project activities (To which extent does the possible positive impact justify the investments? Are the involved parties willing and able to keep facilities operational and continue on their own?).

The evaluation report should contain the lessons learned, state causes, and explain reasons for successes or failures and contribute to make the co-operation more relevant, effective, efficient, and sustainable.

## 3. Scope of Work

The evaluation shall be carried out in accordance with Danida's "Evaluation Guidelines" published in February 1999, and the tasks of the Evaluation Team shall comprise but not necessarily be limited to the following:

### Assessment of the programming process and the ESP's in the five countries

- Assess the use of ESPs to implement EPSF-projects in relation to:
  - The application of Danida's Sector Programme Support approach;
  - the appropriateness of the combined programme/project approach;
- assess to what extent the programming process (selection of projects etc.) and the resulting ESPs are coherent with:

- Danish policies, including the strategies defining the EPSF;
- the regional context/problems;
- national priorities, environmental problems and opportunities;
- needs and priorities of local communities/stakeholders;
- the fact that the environmental agenda is of a cross-cutting nature covering different sectors in terms of issues and institutions.
- assess to what extent the programming process (selection of projects etc.) and the resulting ESPs are coherent with Danida policies in terms of:
  - the demand for simultaneous distinct identity and complementarity as related to activities initiated under the bilateral development assistance;
  - the demand for a focussed and concentrated choice of project activities;
  - the demand for a combined focus on environmental concerns and poverty reduction;
- assess the sustainability and adaptability of the ESPs and the programming process in terms of national ownership and opportunities for stakeholders to participate in the formulation and implementation of the programme;
- assess the appropriateness of the interventions in relation to the absorptive capacity of the partner countries and institutions;
- assess the on-going monitoring and evaluation of the ESPs.

#### **Assessment of project activities in Tanzania and Zimbabwe**

- Assess the project portfolio against the overall EPSF strategy with a view to an overall assessment of the likelihood of achieving the objectives of the strategy;
- assess the implementation of the activities, in particular the adaptability to prevailing or changing circumstances such as the economic reform programmes and the administrative and political realities;
- assess the extent to which the activities address poverty alleviation as well as the cross cutting issues, gender and democratisation /human rights.

In order to make these assessments the evaluation shall focus on the activities which are sufficiently advanced to permit meaningful conclusive documentation of the processes which have taken place.

#### **Assessment of regional activities**

- Assess to what extent the formulation and implementation of regional activities is coherent with:
  - Danish policies, including the strategies defining the EPSF;
  - the regional context/problems;
  - national priorities, including the national willingness to co-operate regionally on environmental issues and the national capacity to be engaged in regional activities;
  - opportunities in terms of co-operating partners/anchor points for regional projects (regional institutions, networks etc.) and environmental problems that call for regional solutions.

## **4. Composition of the Evaluation Team**

The evaluation team shall consist of the following members:

Economist – institutional/organisational specialist – environmental sector specialists and possibly a gender specialist.



## **5. Timing**

The evaluation is planned to take place from January to April 2000. The field phase shall take place in February 2000.

## **6. Methods of work**

The evaluation shall comprise a desk study of documentation in Danida, interviews of involved staff in Denmark and a field study to Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The primary users of the evaluation, i.e. S.7, Secretariat for the Environment, the Embassies and involved partner authorities should participate actively throughout the execution of the evaluation in frequent dialogues with the Evaluation Team and in workshops and/or seminars as deemed necessary.

## **7. Reporting**

The Evaluation Team shall produce a draft report not later than three weeks after the conclusion of the field trip and a final report, including a four-page summary in both Danish and English not later than three weeks after partner the comments to the draft report.

A brief of the findings of the mission shall be presented to the authorities in the partner countries visited and to the Danish Embassies in those countries for discussions during the final stage of the team's stay.

## Appendix 1

	Priority Areas	Projects
<b>Malawi</b>	1. Support to Community-Based Natural Resource Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Bilharzia control programme in selected communities</li> <li>- Lake Chilwa Management</li> <li>- Lake Malawi District Env. Management</li> <li>- FNK Land Forestry, Phase I+II</li> </ul>
	2. Renewable Energy Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support to Renewable Energy</li> </ul>
	3. Urban Development and Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Urban and industrial environment *)</li> <li>- Dust filter for Chungalume Cement Plant *)</li> </ul>
	4. Capacity Development in Environment and Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity development at national/district level</li> <li>- Natural Resources College</li> <li>- Environmental funding facility *)</li> </ul>
<b>Mozambique</b>	1. Cleaner industrial development & waste management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Disposal of obsolete pesticides</li> <li>- Industrial pollution prevention.</li> </ul>
	2. Urban environmental management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Environmental management in Quilimane and Mocuba</li> <li>- Technical advisor for the Zambesia province *)</li> <li>- Capacity development in MICOA and development of urban environmental programme.</li> </ul>
	3. Coastal zone management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coastal zone management, Phase 1.</li> <li>- Finalisation of activities at Ilha de Mozambique.</li> <li>- Coastal zone management, Phase 2. *)</li> <li>- Lake Niassa lakeshore management *)</li> </ul>
<b>Tanzania</b>	1. Collaborative Natural Resource Management and Biodiversity Conservation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity development in the Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism</li> </ul>
	a) Wetlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Malagarasi-Myowosi Ramsar site</li> </ul>
	b) Wildlife	
	c) Forestry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Udzungwa mountains forest management and biodiversity conservation, Phase 1</li> <li>- Community based natural woodlands management, Phase 1.</li> <li>- Management of woodland resources, Lindi Region *).</li> </ul>

	Priority Areas	Projects
<b>Tanzania</b>	c) Forestry	- Capacity building in Wildlife Conservation Society.
	2. Urban Environment	- Capacity building for environmental management in Mwanza municipality, Phase 1 - Environmental management in Mwanza municipality, Phase 2 *) - Sustainable Iringa project, Phase 1 - Sustainable Arusha project, Phase 1 *)
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	1. Environmental Planning and Management in Rural Areas	- Rural District Env. Action Planning - Managing our Indigenous Tree Inheritance
	2. Urban Environmental Planning and Management	- Urban Env. Planning and Management through Ezoo - Norton Env. Management - Support to DNR
	3. Industrial Environment Management	- Cleaner Production Technology - Assistance to National Social Security Authority
	4. Renewable Energy	- Support to Renewable Energy *)
<b>Regional Activities</b>		- Support to the Southern African Network for Training on the Environment - Water consultancy fund - SADC Protocol Awareness Campaign - Support to SATAC/Water Vision - ZACPRO 6.2: Development of an Integrated water resources development strategy for the Zambezi river basin *) - Conference on working environment. - Regional training and technology transfer centre: implementation of the Basel Convention in English speaking Africa.

\*) Under preparation.

## Annex B

### Bibliography

The Bibliography is divided into three sections. The first one contains official Danish documents related to the EPSF programme. The second includes the documents related to the EPSF activities, whether at programme or project level, and relevant national policy documents. The third section is general literature relevant to this study.

References from the first and third sections use standard references as identifiers: “MFA 1988” refers to “Environment and Development. A Plan of Action”.

The EPSF material in the second section is less easily identified in this way. Instead a three-letter code indicates the country or the regional programme, a number gives the sub-section, and a letter provides the order by date within that sub-section. “TAN.2-1.c” thus refers to draft project document “Capacity Building for Environmental Management in Mwanza Municipality. Tanzania”. TAN refers to Tanzania, the Mwanza project is activity 2-1, while the document itself is the third one listed under that project.

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## Annex C

### Persons Met by Evaluation Team

**Note:** if a person was interviewed in different locations – for example Danida staff both in Copenhagen and Malawi – the person is listed only once.

#### Denmark/Copenhagen

##### Danida

Mr. Ole E. Moesby, Head of Department, S.7  
 Mr. Ole Torpegaard-Hansen, Head of Section. S.7  
 Mr. Lars Gert Lose, Head of Section, S.7  
 Mr. Peter Mark, Head of Section, S.7  
 Mr. Tomas Königfeldt, S.7  
 Ms. Elsebeth Tarp, Chief Technical Adviser, TSA-6  
 Ms. Margrethe Holm Andersen, Technical Adviser, TSA-6  
 Mr. Mike Speirs, Environmental Adviser, TSA-6  
 Mr. Jean Paul Laude, Technical Adviser, TSA-4  
 Mr. Niels Dabelstein, Head of Evaluation Secretariat  
 Mr. Lars Elle, Minister Counsellor, Deputy Head of Evaluation Secretariat  
 Mr. Morten Elkjær, Deputy Head, Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development  
 Mr. Kenneth Nilsen, Adviser, Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development

##### Others

Mr. Ole Jakob Hjøllund, Chief Programme Coordinator, Danced  
 Mr. Torsten Malmendorf, Chief Programme Coordinator, Danced  
 Mr. Dolf Noppen, Senior Consultant, Nordic Consulting Group  
 Mr. Andrew Wardell, Senior Consultant, Nordic Consulting Group  
 Mr. Per Jakob Tidemand, Senior Consultant, Rambøll

#### Tanzania

##### Dar es Salaam

##### *Danish Embassy Officials, Danida Advisers*

Mr. Peter Lysholt Hansen, Ambassador  
 Mr. Mark V. Jensen, Minister Counsellor  
 Mr. Søren Wium-Andersen, Counsellor (Environment)  
 Mr. Kahana Lukumbuzya, Assistant Programme Officer  
 Mr. Carsten Lund, Intern  
 Mr. Henrik Lerdorf, Danida Advisor, Iringa CBNWMP  
 Mr. Robert Jensen, Danida Advisor, Forestry and Bee-keeping Division, Department of Forestry, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism

*Government Officials*

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 Department of Forestry, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism  
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 Mr. Florentius M. Seiya, Municipal Economist, Kinondoni Municipality , Ministry of  
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 Mrs. E. Kerario, National Environmental Management Council  
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 Mr. Silvester Sisila, Assistant Representative, UNDP  
 Ms. Gertrude Lyatuu, National Programme Officer, UNDP  
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 Mr. Nils-Johan Jørgensen, Ambassador, Embassy of Norway  
 Mr. Gunnar Føreland, Counsellor, Embassy of Norway  
 Mr. Lornts Finanger, First Secretary/Development, Embassy of Norway  
 Mr. Jan-Erik Studsrud, First Secretary/Development, Embassy of Norway  
 Ms. Tone Tinnes, Country Economist, Embassy of Norway  
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*NGOs, Other Persons Interviewed*

Mr. Stanford A. Mwakasonda, CEEST  
 Mr. Steven M. Mwakifwany, CEEST  
 Ms. Alice S. Bhukoli, Coordinator, Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania  
 Mr. Bariki Kaale, TATEDO  
 Mr. G. Benne, Sustainable Arusha Project

**Iringa***Government Officials*

Mr. A. S. Mallango, Natural District Resources Officer, Iringa District, Municipal Council

Mr. I. S. Massam, Regional Forest Office, Iringa Region.  
 Mr. A.M. Gideon, District Catchment Forest Officer, Iringa District Municipal Council  
 Mr. James Joseph Mchomvu, District Forest Officer, Iringa District Municipal Council  
 Ms. A. Sarakyka, Beekeeping Officer, Iringa District Municipal Council.  
 Mr. Lema, Forester, Iringa District Municipal Council.  
 Mr. F. Nikata, Forestry Field Officer, Kalenga Division, Iringa Rural District Council

*Stakeholder Representatives, NGOs*

Mr. J. Mgumba, Village Government, Mfyome, Kalenga Ward, Iringa.  
 Ms. Y. Mdindile, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Ms C. Mlele, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Ms. L. Kibiki, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. G. Kahela, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. I. Makasi, Natural Resource Committee Chairman, Mfyome village, Iringa.  
 Mr. J. Changa, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. D. Chotamasege, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. F. Ngwale, Villager, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. Y. Mdindile, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. Mlele, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. Mhehe, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr Mhagama, Villager, Mfyome Village, Iringa  
 Mr. A. Mhina, Chacoal Dealer, Iringa.  
 Mr. J. Sanga, Village Chairman, Mfyome, Iringa  
 Mr. Merad Mpulule, Ward Executive officer, Kiwere, Iringa Rural  
 Mr. L Kibiki, Natural Resource Committee member, Mfyome village, Iringa  
 Mr. C Mnemba, CCM Chairman Kiwere, Iringa Rural.  
 Mr. F. Sungu, Ward Secretary Kiwere, Iringa Rural

**Mwanza**

*Government Officials*

Mr. Tofiki, District Community Development Officer, Mwanza Municipality  
 Mr. J. Nyanguli, Councillor, Milongo Ward, Mwanza Municipality  
 Mr. K. J. M. Kitundu, Municipal Economic Planning Officer, Mwanza Municipality  
 Ms. Gaudensi Bambereki, Community Development Worker, Mwanza Municipality  
 Mr. Patrick Karanga, Sustainable Mwanza Project Coordinator, Mwanza Municipality  
 Ms. Tibekenga, Community Development Officer, Mwanza

*Stakeholder Representatives, NGOs*

Mr. Matuwo Stanley, Chairman, Lake Victoria Basin Environmental Care Organisation (LABECO)  
 Mrs. M. I. Hewa, Housing & Unplanned Settlements Working Group, Mwanza  
 Dr. D. Mabeba, Solid Waste Management Working Group, Mwanza  
 Mr. Katani, Housing & Unplanned Settlements Working Group, Mwanza  
 Ms Iluminata Mwita, Community Development Worker, Micro Projects Working Group, Mwanza District  
 Ms Anna Mbande, Ibungilo Committee member, Nyamanoro, Mwanza  
 Mr. Shabani Moshi, Chairman Ibungilo Committee, Nyamanoro Mwanza  
 Mr. Kazembe, Solid Waste Management Working Group Committee, Mwanza

*Other Persons Interviewed*

Mr. M. Taylor Chief Technical Advisor, CBEM, Kampsax International A/S, Mwanza Municipality  
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 Mr. E. N. Sawe, Executive Director, TaTEDO  
 Ms A. Kapande, TAHEA NGO, Wood Saving stoves, Mwanza  
 Ms. Z. Nassoro, Igembe Nsabo Women group, Mwanza  
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 Mr. Jens Dige, Counsellor (Environment Programme)  
 Mr. Bent G. Andersen, Counsellor (Private Sector Programme)  
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 Mr. Japhet Fuindire, Environmental Specialist, UNDP  
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*NGOs, Other Persons Interviewed*

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 Ms. Charlene A. Hewat, General Secretary, Environment2000  
 Mr. Robin Wild, Environment2000  
 Mr. Gus le Breton, Director, SAFIRE  
 Ms. Dorcas Mbedzi, Chiredzi District Officer, SAFIRE  
 Mr. Peter C. Gondo, Research and Technical Coordinator, SAFIRE  
 Mr. Yemi Katerere, Director, IUCN  
 Mr. Stephen Kasere, Campfire Association  
 Dr. Mtetwa, Managing Director, ENDA  
 Mr. M. Chenje, SARDC-IMERSA  
 Mr. Rob Cunliffe, Environmental Consultant, Biodiversity Foundation for Africa  
 Mr. Maxwell Mapako, BUN  
 Ms. Desire Upenyu Matirekwe, Project Officer, ZERO  
 Mr. C. T. Kagoro, Manager, Engineering Department, ENDA  
 Mr. T. Manoto, Manager, Training and Development, ENDA  
 Mr. Daniel Sithole, Head, Environment and Development Division, ENDA  
 Mr. Champion Chinoyi, ZimTrust  
 Dr. David H. M. Cumming, Programme Director, Regional Programme Office  
 Southern Africa, WWF  
 Mr. Russell Taylor, WWF  
 Mr. Rob Munroe, Zimbabwe Environment Trust  
 Mr. Steven Murray, Action Magazine  
 Mr. Mike Mispelaar,  
 Ms. Jennifer Mohamed-Katerere, Environmental Lawyer  
 Ms. Barbara Banda, Consultant  
 Mr. Francis Duri, Training and Programme Officer, Urban Council Association of  
 Zimbabwe  
 Mr. Roger Mpande, Consultant  
 Ms. Sithembile L. Nyoni, Consultant  
 Mr. Norbert Nziramasanga, Consultant

**Rushinga**

Mr. Isiah Sango, Rushinga Project Officer, SAFIRE  
 Mr. Joseph Mapfumo, Acting EO Finance, Rushinga RDC  
 Mr. Musa, District Officer, Department of Natural Resources  
 Mr. Mukwekwerere, District Officer, Forestry Commission  
 Ms. Epiphaniah Zvavamwe, Project Officer, DAPP Rushinga  
 Mr. L. D. Karimakwenda, Acting CEO, Rushinga RDC  
 Mr. M. L. Reza, District Administrator, Rushinga

**Norton**

Mr Zamunya, Chief Executive Officer, Norton Town Council  
 Mr. Philip Huni, Town Engineer, Norton Town Council  
 Mr Doga, Director, Department of Housing and Community Services, Norton Town  
 Council  
 Mr Matavire, (former) Acting Director, Department of Housing and Community  
 Services, Norton Town Council  
 Mr Machakoto, Informal Traders Supervisor, Norton Town Council  
 Mr. Isaac Gorembewu, Chairperson, Vegetable Vendors Committee  
 Sister Changasi, Health Representative, Informal Traders



Mr. Jacob Chigambura, Chairperson, Flea Market  
 Mr. Benjamin Mumba, Managing Director, Mirtle Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd  
 Mr. Macleod Kembo, Managing Director, Non Ferrous Die Casting (Pvt) Ltd  
 Mr. Eshmael Tembo, Managing Director, Hunyani Pulp and Paper Industries Ltd  
 Mr. Elvis Shoko, Environmental Manager, Hunyani Pulp and Paper Industries Ltd

#### **Victoria Falls**

Mr. Alec Nyoni, Ward Chairman, Counsellor, Victoria Falls  
 Mr. E. M. Ndlovu, Acting Town Clerk, Victoria Falls Municipality  
 Mr. Namu Chuma, E2000 Representative  
 Mr. Emmanuel Mandy, UN Volunteer  
 Mr. M. Karenyi, Forestry Commission, Binga and Hwange District  
 Mr. Emmanuel Banda, Natural Resources Department, Binga and Hwange District  
 Mr. Theminkosi Mlauzi, Campfire Manager, Binga and Hwange District  
 Ms. Sibindi Zskhali, Chairlady, ostrich project, Ndhlovu camp, Kachecheti Ward  
 Mr. Aaron Madakwa, grazing chairman, Ndhlovu camp, Kachecheti Ward  
 Ms. Siphon Ndlovu, secretary for ostrich project, Ndhlovu camp, Kachecheti Ward  
 Ms. Maggie Zikhali, member, Ndhlovu camp, Kachecheti Ward  
 Ms. R. Ncube, member, Ndhlovu camp, Kachecheti Ward  
 Mr. Shackson Ncube, Counsellor, E2000 Representative, Chidobe Ward  
 Ms. Sithembisile Ncube, Chidobe Ward  
 Ms. Vilechan Hlanganani, Chidobe Ward

#### **Bulawayo**

Mr. Harold Sibanda, Provincial Advisor, DEAP II, Matabeleland, Bulawayo  
 Ms. Unity Tshabango, DEAP II, Matabeleland, Bulawayo  
 Mr. Hlalakuhle, Provincial Natural Resources Officer, Matabeleland, Bulawayo  
 Mr. Mpiliso Ndiweni, Water Section, ORAP, Bulawayo  
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 Ms. S. Ngwane, Project Officer, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. D. Sihwa, District Natural Resources Officer, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. R. Marondo, Department of Natural Resources, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Ms. T. Seva, Department of Local Government, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Ms. L. Mailwarimba, Esigodini District Hospital, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. J. M. Sibanda, PST Matabeleland South, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. J. Dube, PA's office, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. E. Tholo, Superintendent, Water, District Development Fund, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. T. Sibanda, Assistant Planning Officer, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Ms. L. Einarsson, Environmental Adviser, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. J. Dube, Pas Office, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. V. Soganile, SSO, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Mr. Ngurane, Project Officer, Umzingwane Rural District Council  
 Several community members and leaders participating in DEAP projects

#### **Malawi/Lake Malawi Regional Workshop (participants from Danida/ Copenhagen, Tanzania and Zimbabwe not listed again here)**

Mr. Mads Sandau-Jensen, Ambassador, Danish Embassy in Zambia  
 Mr. Thomas Scherbeck, Ambassador, Danish Embassy in Mozambique  
 Mr. Bjarne Sørensen, Ambassador, Danish Embassy in South Africa  
 Mr. Bo Jensen, Chargé d'Affaires, Danish Embassy in Malawi

Mr. Mogens Laumand Christensen, Counsellor, Danish Embassy in Malawi  
Mr. Jean Kigombe, First Secretary, Danish Embassy in Mozambique  
Mr. John Balarin, Danida Adviser, Malawi  
Mr. Kim Hermind, Danida Adviser, Mozambique  
Mr. Einar H. Jensen, Programme Director, Danced, Copenhagen  
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